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This Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan for Columbia County, Oregon covers each of the 
major natural and human-caused hazards that pose risks to the County. The 
primary objectives of this Mitigation plan are to reduce the negative impacts of 
future disasters on the community: to save lives and reduce injuries, minimize 
damage to buildings and infrastructure (especially critical facilities) and minimize 
economic losses. This Mitigation Plan is a planning document, not a regulatory 
document. 
 
This mitigation plan meets FEMA’s planning requirements by addressing hazards, 
vulnerability and risk. Hazard means the frequency and severity of disaster events. 
Vulnerability means the value, importance, and fragility of buildings and 
infrastructure. Risk means the threat to people, buildings and infrastructure, taking 
into account the probabilities of disaster events. Adoption of a mitigation plan is 
required for communities to remain eligible for future FEMA mitigation grant funds. 
 
Review comments, suggestions, corrections and additions are enthusiastically 
encouraged from all interested parties. Please send comments to: Vicki Harguth, 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION  
1.1 What is a Mitigation Plan? 
The communities of Columbia County are subject to a wide range of natural and human-caused 
hazards, including: floods, winter storms, landslides, wildland/urban interface fires, earthquakes, 
dam failures, hazardous material spills, and many others. The impact of a hazard event on a 
community may be minor - a few inches of water in a street - or it may be major - with damages 
reaching millions of dollars. There have been several recent disaster events in Columbia County 
with widespread damages and impacts on affected communities. 
Mitigation simply means actions that reduce the potential for negative impacts from 
future disasters. That is, mitigation actions reduce future damages, losses and 
casualties. 
This Mitigation Plan addresses all levels of natural hazard events and some human-caused 
hazards as well. The Plan includes minor events such as winter storms or localized storm water 
flooding that may happen in some locations almost every year and localized events such as 
landslides or mudslides. The plan also includes larger events such as major floods, 
earthquakes, or major wildland/urban interface fires that may affect large numbers of residents 
in Columbia County, with very high levels of damages and losses, albeit with much lower 
probabilities of occurrence. 
The Columbia County mitigation plan has several key elements.  
1. Each hazard that may impact Columbia County significantly is reviewed to 
determine the probability (frequency) and severity of likely hazard events. 
2. The vulnerability of Columbia County to each hazard is evaluated to determine 
the likely extent of physical damages, casualties, and economic impacts. 
3. A range of mitigation alternatives are evaluated to identify those with the greatest 
potential to reduce future damages and losses in Columbia County, to protect 
facilities deemed critical to the community’s well being, and that are desirable 
from the community’s political and economic perspectives. 
1.2 Why is Mitigation Planning Important for Columbia County? 
Effective mitigation planning will help the residents of Columbia County deal with natural and 
anthropogenic (human-caused) hazards realistically and rationally. That is, it will help identify 
specific locations in Columbia County where the level of risk from one or more hazards may be 
unacceptably high and then find cost effective ways to reduce such risk. Mitigation planning 
strikes a pragmatic middle ground between unwisely ignoring the potential for major hazard 
events on one hand and unnecessarily overreacting to the potential for disasters on the other 
hand. 
Furthermore, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) now requires each local 
government entity to adopt a multi-hazard mitigation plan to remain eligible for future pre- or 
post-disaster FEMA mitigation funding. Thus, an important objective in developing this plan is to 
maintain eligibility for FEMA funding and to enhance Columbia County’s ability to attract future 
FEMA mitigation funding. 
The Plan is specifically designed to help Columbia County gather the data necessary to 
compete successfully for future FEMA funding of mitigation projects. FEMA requires that all 
FEMA-funded hazard mitigation projects must be “cost-effective” (i.e., the benefits of a project 
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must exceed the costs). Benefit-cost analysis is thus an important component of mitigation 
planning, not only to meet FEMA requirements, but also to help evaluate and prioritize potential 
hazard mitigation projects in Columbia County, regardless of whether funding is from FEMA, 
state or local government or from private sources. 
Hazard mitigation planning is applicable to Columbia County as a whole, including the entire 
population and all of the built environment of buildings (residential, commercial, and public) and 
infrastructure (transportation and utility systems). However, for mitigation planning purposes and 
for implementation of mitigation actions, facilities designated as critical for the well being of 
residents of Columbia County are given a higher priority. A brief summary of the types of critical 
facilities in Columbia County is given below in Table 1.1 
 
January 3, 2005 1-3
Category Critical Functions High Priority Medium Priority
Emergency Services Facilities critical for immediate emergency response, including life safety
    Fire Stations YES
    Police Stations YES
    Ambulance Services YES
    Emergency Operations Centers YES
    Emergency Shelters YES
Medical Facilities Facilities providing direct patient care, including hospitals, clinics, and nursing homes
    Hospitals and Urgent Care Facilities YES
    Other Medical Facilities YES
Special Needs Populations Facilities housing people that may need assistance is evacuation from emergencies
   Elderly Housing High occupancy facilities Low occupancy facilities
   Schools (K-12) YES
   Schools (Higher Education) YES
   Jails YES
Utilities
    Telecommunications Facilities for transmission, switching and distribution of telephone traffic
PSAPs (911 centers) and 
Central Offices (switching) Trunk lines
    Electric Power Facilities for generation, transmission and distribution of electric power
High voltage substations and 
transmission lines
Other substations and 
transmission lines,        
trunk distribution lines
    Natural Gas Facilities for transmission and distribution of natural gas
Transmission lines and 
compressor stations
    Water Facilities for treatment and distribution of potable and irrigation water
Major reservoirs, well fields, 
treatment plants and major 
pumping plants
Smaller reservoirs and 
pumping plants
    Wastewater Facilities for pumping and treatment of wastewater Treatment plants and major pumping plants
Dams Facilities to impound water for flood control, power generation and water supply
Major dams upstream of 
population centers
Smaller dams and dams 
not upstream of 
population centers
Transportation Systems
    Roadways Necessary for emergency response, public safety and disaster recovery
Major highways, arterials, 
and bridges on such roads
Secondary roads and 
bridges
    Air, rail, and water transport These transport modes are of secondary importance for Columbia County Not at this time Not at this time
Hazmat Facilities Facilities that manufacture, store, use, or transport hazardous materials
Sites with large inventories of 
hazardous materials
Sites with smaller 
inventories of hazardous 
materials
Table 1.1 Types of Critical Facilities in Columbia County 
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The Columbia County Mitigation Plan 
This Columbia County Mitigation Plan is built upon a quantitative assessment of each of the 
major hazards that may impact Columbia County, including their frequency, severity, and areas 
of the County likely to be affected. The hazards addressed include: floods, severe winter 
storms, landslides, wildland/urban interface fires, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, dam failures, 
utility and transportation disruptions, hazmat incidents, and terrorism. 
The Columbia County Mitigation plan includes a quantitative assessment of the vulnerability of 
buildings, infrastructure, and people to each of these hazards, to the extent possible with 
existing data. The plan also includes an evaluation of the likely magnitude of the impacts of 
future disasters on Columbia County. 
These reviews of the hazards and the vulnerability of Columbia County to these hazards are the 
foundation of the mitigation plan. From these assessments, high hazard areas where buildings, 
infrastructure, and/or people may be at high risk are identified whenever possible. These high-
risk situations then become priorities for future mitigation actions to reduce the negative impacts 
of future disasters on Columbia County. 
The Columbia County Mitigation Plan deals with hazards realistically and rationally and also 
strikes a balance between suggested physical mitigation measures to eliminate or reduce the 
negative impacts of future disasters and enhancements in land use planning to reduce the 
potential for negative impacts of disasters on new development. Finally, the plan suggests 
better emergency planning to help prepare the community to respond to and recover from 
disasters for which physical mitigation measures are not possible or not economically feasible. 
1.3 Key Concepts and Definitions 
The central concept of mitigation planning is that mitigation reduces risk. Risk is defined as the 
threat to the built environment posed by the hazards being considered. That is, risk is the 
potential for damages, losses and casualties arising from the impact of hazards on the built 
environment. 
The extent of risk depends on the combination of hazard and exposure as shown in Figure 1.2 
below. 
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Figure 1.2 
Hazard and Exposure Combine to Produce Risk 
HAZARD EXPOSURE RISK
Frequency + Value and = Threat to the
and Severity Vulnerability Built Environment
of Hazard Events of Inventory
 
 
Thus, there are four key concepts that govern hazard mitigation planning: hazard, 
exposure, risk and mitigation. Each of these key concepts is addressed in turn. 
HAZARD refers to natural or anthropogenic events that potentially may cause damages, 
losses or casualties (e.g., floods, winter storms, landslides, earthquakes, hazardous 
material spills, etc.). Hazards are characterized by their frequency and severity and by the 
geographic area affected. Each hazard is characterized differently, with appropriate 
parameters for the specific hazard. For example, floods may be characterized by the 
frequency of flooding, along with flood depth and flood velocity. Winter storms may be 
characterized by the amount of rainfall in a 24-hour period, by the wind speed, by the 
amount of snow or ice associated with a storm. Earthquakes may be characterized by the 
severity and duration of ground motions and so on. 
A hazard, by itself, may not result in any negative impacts on a community. For example, 
a highly flood-prone five acre parcel may typically experience several shallow floods per 
year, with several feet of water expected in a 50-year flood event and more than six feet of 
water expected in a 100-year flood event. However, the parcel may be wetlands adjacent 
to a tidal marsh that floods daily, with no development (structures or infrastructure) on the 
parcel. In this case, the frequent flooding does not have any negative impacts on the 
community. Indeed, in such circumstances, the very frequent flooding (i.e., high hazard) 
may be beneficial in providing wildlife habitat. 
The important point here is that hazards do not produce risk, unless there is vulnerable 
inventory exposed to the hazard. In the context of mitigation planning, “inventory” means 
simply people, buildings, or infrastructure exposed to damages from one or more natural 
or manmade hazards. 
EXPOSURE is the quantity, value and vulnerability of the built environment (inventory of 
buildings and infrastructure) in a particular location subject to one or more hazards. 
Inventory is described by the number, size, type, use, and occupancy of buildings and by 
the infrastructure present. Infrastructure includes roads and other transportation systems, 
utilities (potable water, wastewater, natural gas, electric power), telecommunications 
systems and so on. 
Inventory varies markedly in its importance to a community and thus varies markedly in its 
importance for hazard mitigation planning. Some types of facilities, “critical facilities,” are 
especially important to a community, particularly during disaster situations. Examples of 
critical facilities include police and fire stations, hospitals, schools, emergency shelters, 
911 centers, and other important buildings. Critical facilities may also include 
infrastructure elements that are important links or nodes in providing service to large 
numbers of people such as a potable water source, an electric power substation and so 
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on. “Links” are elements such as water pipes, electric power lines, telephone cables that 
connect portions of a utility or transportation system. “Nodes” are locations with important 
functions, such as pumping plants, substations, or switching offices. 
For hazard mitigation planning, inventory must be characterized not only by the quantity 
and value of buildings or infrastructure present but also by its vulnerability to each hazard 
under evaluation. For example, a given facility may be vulnerable to flood damages and 
earthquake damages or to flood damages only or to earthquake damages only. 
Depending on the hazard, different measures of vulnerability must be used. 
RISK is the threat to the built environment (buildings and infrastructure) and people - the 
potential for damages, losses and casualties arising from hazards. Risk results from the 
combination of Hazard and Exposure. That is, when the geographic areas affected by one 
or more hazards contain people, buildings, and infrastructure vulnerable to damage from 
the hazard(s). For mitigation planning, evaluation of risk generally emphasizes the built 
environment and people. However, risk also includes the potential for environmental 
damage. 
Risk is the potential for future damages, losses or casualties. A disaster event happens 
when a hazard event is combined with vulnerable inventory (that is when hazard event 
strikes vulnerability inventory exposed to the hazard). The highest risk in a community 
occurs in high hazard areas (frequent and/or severe hazard events) with large inventories 
of vulnerable buildings or infrastructure. 
However, high risk can also occur with only moderately high hazard, if there is a large 
inventory of highly vulnerable inventory exposed to the hazard. For example, seismic 
hazard is lower in Oregon than in the seismically active areas of California. However, for 
some buildings, seismic risk in Oregon may be comparable to or even higher than seismic 
risk in California, due to the very recent adoption in Oregon of seismic design standards 
commensurate with current understanding of seismic hazards in Oregon. Much of the 
building inventory in Oregon is vulnerable to earthquake damages because older buildings 
were generally designed and built to much lower seismic standards than currently 
required in Oregon. Conversely, a high hazard area can have relatively low risk if the 
inventory is resistant to damages (e.g., elevated to protect against flooding or 
strengthened to minimize earthquake damages). 
 
January 3, 2005 1-7
Figure 1.3 













MITIGATION means actions to reduce the risk due to hazards. Mitigation actions reduce 
the potential for damages, losses, and casualties in future disaster events. Repair of 
buildings or infrastructure damaged in a disaster is not mitigation because repair simply 
restores a facility to its pre-disaster condition and does not reduce the potential for future 
damages, losses, or casualties. Hazard mitigation projects may be initiated proactively - 
before a disaster, or after a disaster has already occurred. In either case, the objective of 
mitigation is always to reduce future damages, losses or casualties. 
A few of the most common types of mitigation projects are shown below in Table 1.4. 
 
RISK . . .
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Table 1.4 
Common Mitigation Projects 
Hazard Mitigation Project 
Flood Build or improve levees or flood walls 
  Improve channels for flood control 
  Improve drainage systems and culvert capacities 
  Create detention ponds for storage 
  Relocate, elevate or floodproof flood-prone structures 
  Acquire and demolish highly flood-prone structures 
Winter Storms Add emergency generators for critical facilities 
  Improve redundancy of utility systems 
  Trim trees to reduce failures of utility lines 
Earthquakes Upgrade seismic performance of buildings 
  Upgrade seismic performance of infrastructure 
  
Landslides Remediate slide conditions 
  Relocate utility lines or structures 
Wildland/Urban 
Interface Fires Increase fire safe construction practices 
  Vegetation (fuel load) control 
General Enhance emergency planning and mutual aid 
  Expand public education programs 
 
The mitigation project list above is not comprehensive and mitigation projects can 
encompass a broad range of other actions to reduce future damages, losses, and 
casualties. 
1.4 The Mitigation Process 
The key element for all hazard mitigation projects is that they reduce risk. The benefits of 
a mitigation project are the reduction in risk (i.e., the avoided damages, losses, and 
casualties attributable to the mitigation project). In other words, benefits are simply the 
difference in expected damages, losses, and casualties before mitigation (as-is 
conditions) and after mitigation. These important concepts are illustrated below in  
Figure 1-5. 
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Figure 1.5 













Quantifying the benefits of a proposed mitigation project is an essential step in hazard 
mitigation planning and implementation. Only by quantifying benefits is it possible to 
compare the benefits and costs of mitigation to determine whether or not a particular 
project is worth doing (i.e., is economically feasible). Real world mitigation planning almost 
always involves choosing between a range of possible alternatives, often with varying 
costs and varying effectiveness in reducing risk. 
Quantitative risk assessment is centrally important to hazard mitigation planning. When 
the level of risk is high, the expected levels of damages and losses are likely to be 
unacceptable and mitigation actions have a high priority. Thus, the greater the risk, the 
greater the urgency of undertaking mitigation actions. 
Conversely, when risk is moderate both the urgency and the benefits of undertaking 
mitigation are reduced. It is neither technologically possible nor economically feasible to 
eliminate risk completely. Therefore, when levels of risk are low and/or the cost of 
mitigation is high relative to the level of risk, the risk may be deemed acceptable (or at 
least tolerable). Therefore, proposed mitigation projects that address low levels of risk or 
where the cost of the mitigation project is large relative to the level of risk are generally 
poor candidates for implementation. 
The overall mitigation planning process is outlined in Figure 1.6 on the following page. 
The flow chart below outlines the major steps in Hazard Mitigation Planning and 
Implementation for Columbia County. 
The first steps are quantitative evaluation of the hazards (frequency and severity) 
impacting Columbia County and of the inventory (people, buildings, infrastructure) 
exposed to these hazards. Together these hazard and exposure data determine the level 
of risk for specific locations, buildings or facilities in Columbia County. 
The next key step is to determine whether or not the level of risk posed by each of the 
hazards impacting Columbia County is acceptable or tolerable. Only the residents of 
Columbia County can make this determination. If the level of risk is deemed acceptable or 
at least tolerable, then mitigation actions are not necessary or at least not a high priority. 
On the other hand, if the level of risk is deemed not acceptable or tolerable, then 
mitigation actions are desired. In this case, the mitigation planning process moves on to 
more detailed evaluation of specific mitigation alternatives, prioritization, funding and 
implementation of mitigation measures. As with the determination of whether or not the 
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level of risk posed by each hazard is acceptable or not, decisions about which mitigation 
projects to undertake can be made only by the residents of Columbia County. 
For reference, a more detailed discussion of the overall mitigation planning process, 
including each step in the planning process flow chart shown in Figure 1.6. 
Figure 1.6 

















to the Built Environment
Is Level of Risk
 
 
January 3, 2005 1-11
Project prioritization and implementation take a variety of comprehensive as well as 
subjective measures to accomplish. It is important to use proven methods of analyzing 
data whenever possible. Analysis of Mitigation Projects using FEMA’s methods of 
identifying the costs and benefits associated with natural hazard mitigation strategies, 
measures, or projects fall into two general categories: benefit/cost analysis and cost-
effectiveness analysis. Conducting benefit/cost analysis for a mitigation activity can assist 
communities in determining whether a project is worth undertaking now, in order to avoid 
disaster-related damages later. Cost-effectiveness analysis evaluates how best to spend 
a given amount of money to achieve a specific goal. Determining the economic feasibility 
of mitigating natural hazards provides decision-makers with an understanding of the 
potential benefits and costs of an activity, as well as a basis upon which to compare 
alternative projects. The Hazard Mitigation Planning Committee and Columbia County 
Emergency Management will use FEMA-approved cost benefit methodology as a tool for 
identifying and prioritizing mitigation action items when applying for federal mitigation 
funding. For other projects and funding sources, the committee will use other approaches 
to understand the costs and benefits of each action item and develop a prioritized list. 
All planning, mitigation or otherwise, needs to be done with the thought of being ready to 
implement projects when certain opportunities arise. These opportunities can be in the 
form of funding availability, land develop projects, or unforeseen disasters that open 
“windows of opportunities” for project implementation. It is important to keep the mitigation 
plan current and organized to take advantage of all opportunities. 
1.5 The Role of Benefit-Cost Analysis in Mitigation Planning 
Communities that are considering whether or not to undertake mitigation projects must 
answer questions that don’t always have obvious answers, such as: 
What is the nature of the hazard problem? 
How frequent and how severe are hazard events? 
Do we want to undertake mitigation measures? 
What mitigation measures are feasible, appropriate, and affordable? 
How do we prioritize between competing mitigation projects? 
Are our mitigation projects likely to be eligible for FEMA funding? 
Benefit-cost analysis is a powerful tool that can help communities provide solid, defensible 
answers to these difficult socio-political-economic-engineering questions. Benefit-cost 
analysis is required for all FEMA-funded mitigation projects, under both pre-
disaster and post-disaster mitigation programs. Thus, communities seeking FEMA 
funding must understand benefit-cost analysis. However, regardless of whether or not 
FEMA funding is involved, benefit-cost analysis provides a sound basis for evaluating and 
prioritizing possible mitigation projects for any natural hazard. 
Benefit-cost analysis software, technical manuals and a wide range of guidance 
documents are available from FEMA at no cost to communities. A Benefit-Cost Analysis 
Toolkit CD which contains all of the FEMA benefit-cost materials is available from FEMA. 
The publication What is a Benefit? Draft Guidance for Benefit-Cost Analysis is 
particularly recommended as a general reference for benefit-cost analysis. This 
publication includes categories of benefits to count for mitigation projects for various types 
of buildings, critical facilities, and infrastructure and has simple, standard methods to 
quantity the full range of benefits for most types of mitigation projects. 
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The principles of benefit-cost analysis are briefly summarized in the Annex at the end of 
this Chapter. 
1.6 Hazard Synopsis 
To set the overall context of hazard mitigation planning, we briefly review the major 
hazards that impact Columbia County. Different parts of Columbia County vary in 
topography, climate, population, development patterns and so on. Similarly, the impact of 
many hazards on communities in Columbia County varies with location within the County. 
Some hazards affect the entire County, while some hazards have only localized potential 
consequences. 
Floods. Nearly every community in Columbia County is affected by flood 
hazards, to at least some extent. Most communities in Columbia County have 
areas of flood plains mapped by FEMA. These include areas along the 
Columbia, Clatskanie, and Nehalem Rivers, areas along Conyers, McNulty, 
Milton, Rock, Scappoose and North Scappoose Creeks, and areas near the 
Multnomah Channel. In addition, other portions of Columbia County, outside of 
the mapped floodplains, are also subject to significant, repetitive flooding from 
local storm water drainage or from creeks too small to be mapped by FEMA. 
County also has areas protected by flood dikes maintained by 15 separate dike 
districts. These areas are subject to flooding when dikes fail or are overtopped. 
Winter Storms. All of Columbia County is subject to the effects of winter 
storms, including wind, rain, snow and ice, as well as secondary effects such 
as power outages. However, the severity of impacts and types of impacts vary 
with location and with elevation. 
Landslides. Portions of the hilly areas of Columbia County, especially in the 
interior of the County, are subject to landslides or debris flows (mudslides), 
which may affect buildings, roads, and utilities. There are also several 
segments of Highway 30 subject to slide damage and road closures. 
Wildland/Urban Interface Fires. Columbia County has large areas of forest 
and much of Columbia County is subject to the risk of wildland fires. As a 
result, many residential areas bordering or impinging into forested areas near 
the edges of the developed areas of Columbia County may have high levels of 
risk from wildland/urban interface fires. Every major community in Columbia 
County is listed in the Oregon State Hazard Mitigation Plan (Oregon Natural 
Hazards Risk Assessment, Region 2, Northern Willamette Valley/Portland 
Metro Hazards Assessment) as an “interface” community with risk of 
wildland/urban interface fires. 
Earthquakes. All of Columbia County is subject to the impacts of earthquakes, 
including not only major earthquakes on the Cascadia Subduction Zone off the 
Oregon coast, but also smaller crustal earthquakes within western Oregon. 
Volcanic Hazards. All of Columbia County is subjected, to some degree, to 
volcanic hazards from eruptions in the Cascades (e.g., Mt. St. Helens or Mount 
Hood,). For Columbia County, the impacts of volcanic events are likely to be 
only minor ash falls, with perhaps some impact on public water supplies from 
ash causing high turbidity in drinking water supplies. 
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Dam Failures. Portions of Columbia County along the Columbia River are in 
the inundation areas from dam failures. While dam failures are highly unlikely, 
the consequences of failure would be significant for affected areas. 
Disruption of Utility and Transportation Systems. All of Columbia County is 
also subject to disruption of utility and transportation systems from winter 
storms and other natural hazards, as well as from anthropogenic causes. 
Hazmat Incidents. Human-caused hazards, such as hazardous material 
releases, are possible nearby or downwind from fixed site concentrations (e.g., 
industrial sites) as well as along transportation corridors from truck or railroad 
accidents. All populated areas of Columbia County are subject to hazmat 
incidents. 
Terrorism. The term “terrorism” is broadly inclusive of all deliberate malevolent 
actions intended to damage property or inflict casualties. Terrorism includes 
actions by outsiders (domestic or international groups or individuals,), insiders 
(e.g., employees), and cyber-terrorists (computer hackers). Any community in 
Columbia County could potentially be affected by terrorist actions. According to 
the FBI, acts of violence in protest of harm to animals or to the environment, 
are the United States' number one domestic terrorism threat. 
In evaluating these natural or human-caused hazards, it is important to recognize that the 
risk to Columbia County (i.e., the potential for damages, economic losses, and casualties) 
varies markedly from one hazard to another. As discussed in more detail in Section 1.4, 
risk depends on the combination of the frequency and severity of hazard events and on 
the value and vulnerability of infrastructure, buildings, and people to each potential 
hazard. Risk is thus always probabilistic in nature. Some hazard events, such as winter 
storms, happen every year to at least some extent. Other hazard events, such as major 
earthquakes may happen only once every few hundred years. However, risk from 
earthquakes may not be low, even though the frequency of occurrence is low, because 
the consequences (damage, economic losses, and casualties) may be very high. 
The relative risk posed to Columbia County by each of the 10 hazards covered in this 
mitigation plan is summarized below in Table 1.7. 
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Table 1.7 




Wildand/Urban Interface Fires Moderate
Disruption of Utility and 
Transportation Systems Moderate





Volcanic Eruptions (Ash Falls) Low  
 
Another measure of the relative impacts of hazards on Columbia County is provided by 
survey results obtained at the August 3, 2004 meeting of CEPA (Columbia Emergency 
Planning Association). These results, shown below in Table 1.8 indicate which hazards 
were deemed most important to mitigate for Columbia County. In Table 1.8, the scores 
represent the average ranking; hazards with lower scores were deemed the highest 
priority. Thus, floods and earthquakes were deemed the highest and second highest 
priorities, respectively. 
Table 1.8 





Disruption of Utilities 5.67





Volcanic Eruption 10.05  
 
In summary, there are many natural and human-caused hazards which affect all or large 
portions of Columbia County. 
The remaining chapters of this mitigation plan include the following. 
Chapter 2 provides a brief community profile for Columbia County. 
Chapter 3 documents the community involvement and public process involved in 
developing this mitigation plan. 
Chapter 4 outlines the mitigation plan goals, mitigation strategies, and action items. 
Chapter 5 documents the formal process of plan adoption, implementation, and 
maintenance. 
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Chapters 6 through 15 cover each of the major hazards addressed in this mitigation plan, 
including: floods, winter storms, landslides, wildland/urban interface fires, earthquakes, 
volcanic hazards, dam safety, disruption of utility and transportation systems, hazmat 
incidents, and terrorism. 
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Chapter 1 Annex 
Principles of Benefit-Cost Analysis 
Benefit-cost analysis is the tool that provides answers to a central question for hazard 
mitigation projects: “Is it worth it?” If hazard mitigation were free, individuals and 
communities would undertake mitigation with robust enthusiasm and the risks from 
hazards would soon be greatly reduced. Unfortunately, mitigation is not free, but often 
rather expensive. For a given situation, is the investment in mitigation justified? Is the 
owner (public or private) better off economically to accept the risk or invest now in 
mitigation to reduce future damages? These are hard questions to answer! Benefit-cost 
analysis can help a community answer these difficult questions. 
In the complicated real world of mitigation projects, there are many factors which 
determine whether or not a mitigation project is worth doing or which of two or more 
mitigation projects should have the highest priority. Consider a town which has two flood 
prone neighborhoods and each neighborhood desires a mitigation project. The two 
neighborhoods have different numbers of houses, different value of houses, different 
frequencies and severity of flooding. The first neighborhood proposes storm water 
drainage improvements at a cost of $3.0 million. The second neighborhood wants to 
elevate houses at a cost of $3.0 million. Which of these projects should be completed? 
Both? One or the Other? Neither? Which project should be completed first if there is only 
funding for one? Are there alternative mitigation projects which are more sensible or more 
cost-effective than the proposed projects? 
Such complex socio-political-economic-engineering questions are nearly impossible to 
answer without completing the type of quantitative flood risk assessment and benefit-cost 
analysis discussed below. 
In determining whether or not a given mitigation project is worth doing, the level of risk 
exposure without mitigation is critical. Consider a hypothetical $1,000,000 mitigation 
project. Whether or not the project is worth doing depends on the level of risk before 
mitigation and on the effectiveness of the project in reducing risk. For example, if the 
before mitigation risk is low (a subdivision street has a few inches of water on the street 
every couple of years or a soccer field in a city park floods every five years or so) the 
answer is different than if the before mitigation risk is high (100 or more houses are 
expected to have flooding above the first floor every 10 years or a critical facility is 
expected to be shut down because of flood damages once every five years).  
All well-designed mitigation projects reduce risk (badly designed projects can increase risk 
or simply transfer risk from one community to another). However, just because a 
mitigation project reduces risk does not make it a good project. A $1,000,000 project that 
avoids an average of $100 per year in flood damages is not worth doing, while the same 
project that avoids an average of $200,000 per year in flood damages is worth doing. 
The principles of benefit-cost analysis are briefly summarized here. The benefits of a 
hazard mitigation project are the reduction in future damages and losses, that is, the 
avoided damages and losses that are attributable to a mitigation project. To conduct 
benefit-cost analysis of a specific mitigation project the risk of damages and losses must 
be evaluated twice: before mitigation and after mitigation, with the benefits being the 
difference. 
The benefits of a hazard mitigation project are thus simply future damages and 
losses which are avoided because a mitigation action was implemented. 
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Because the benefits of a hazard mitigation project accrue in the future, it is impossible to 
know exactly what they will be. For example, we do not know when future floods or other 
natural hazards will occur or how severe they will be. We do know, however, the 
probability of future floods or other natural hazards (if we have appropriate hazard data). 
Therefore, the benefits of mitigation projects must be evaluated probabilistically and 
expressed as the difference between annualized damages before and after mitigation. 
The following simplified example illustrates the principles of benefit-cost analysis; more 
details are given in the examples in the Appendices. 
To illustrate the principles of benefit-cost analysis, we consider a hypothetical single family 
home in the town of Acorn, with the home located on the banks of Squirrel Creek. The 
home is a one-story house, about 1500 square feet on a post foundation, with a 
replacement value of $60/square foot (total $90,000). We have flood hazard data for 
Squirrel Creek (stream discharge and flood elevation data) and elevation data for the first 
floor of the house. Therefore, we can calculate the annual probability of flooding in one-
foot increments, as shown below. 
Table 1.10 





Scenario Damages and 
Losses Per Flood Event 
Annualized Flood 
Damages and Losses  
0 0.2050 $6,400 $1,312 
1 0.1234 $14,300 $1,765 
2 0.0867 $24,500 $2,124 
3 0.0223 $28,900 $673 
4 0.0098 $32,100 $315 
5 0.0036 $36,300 $123 
Total Expected Annual (Annualized) Damages and Losses $6,312 
 
Flood depths shown above in Table 1.10 are in one-foot increments of water depth above 
the lowest floor elevation. Thus, a “3" foot flood means all floods between 2.5 feet and 3.5 
feet of water depth above the floor. We note that a “0" foot flood has, on average, 
damages because this flood depth means water plus or minus 6" of the floor; even if the 
flood level is a few inches below the first floor, there may be damage to flooring and other 
building elements because of wicking of water. 
The Scenario (per flood event) damages and losses include expected damages to the 
building, content, and displacement costs if occupants have to move to temporary 
quarters while flood damage is repaired. 
The Annualized (expected annual) damages and losses are calculated as the product of 
the flood probability times the scenario damages. For example, a 4 foot flood has slightly 
less than a 1% chance per year of occurring. If it does occur, we expect about $32,100 in 
damages and losses. Averaged over a long time, 4 foot floods are thus expected to cause 
an average of about $315 per year in flood damages. Note that the smaller floods, which 
cause less damage per flood event, actually cause higher average annual damages 
because the probability of smaller floods is so much higher than that for larger floods. With 
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these data, the house is expected to average $6312 per year in flood damages. This 
expected annual or “annualized” damage estimate does not mean that the house has this 
much damage every year. Rather, in most years there will be no floods, but over time the 
cumulative damages and losses from a mix of relatively frequent smaller floods and less 
frequent larger floods is calculated to average $6312 per year. 
The calculated results in Table 1.10 are the flood risk assessment for this house for the 
as-is, before mitigation situation. The table shows the expected levels of damages and 
losses for scenario floods of various depths and also the annualized damages and losses. 
The risk assessment shown in Table 1.10 shows a high flood risk, with frequent severe 
flooding which the owner deems unacceptable. Therefore he explores mitigation 
alternatives to reduce the risk: the example below is to elevate the house 4 feet. 
Table 1.11 





Scenario Damages and 
Losses Per Flood Event 
Annualized Flood 
Damages and Losses  
0 0.2050 $0 $0 
1 0.1234 $0 $0 
2 0.0867 $0 $0 
3 0.0223 $0 $0 
4 0.0098 $6,400 $63 
5 0.0036 $14,300 $49 
 $112 
 
By elevating the house 4 feet, the owner has reduced his expected annual (annualized) 
damages from $6312 to $112 (98% reduction) and greatly reduced the probability or 
frequency of flooding affecting his house. The annualized benefits are the difference in the 
annualized damages and losses before and after mitigation or $6312 - $112 = $6200. 
Is this mitigation project worth doing? Common sense says yes, because the flood risk 
appears high: the annualized damages before mitigation are high ($6,312). To answer this 
question more quantitatively, we complete our benefit-cost analysis of this project. One 
key factor is the cost of mitigation. A mitigation project that is worth doing at one cost may 
not be worth doing at a higher cost. Let’s assume that the elevation costs $20,000. This 
$20,000 cost occurs once, up front, in the year that the elevation project is completed. 
The benefits, however, accrue statistically over the lifetime of the mitigation project. 
Following FEMA convention, we assume that a residential mitigation project has a useful 
lifetime of 30 years. Money (benefits) received in the future has less value than money 
received today because of the time value of money. To take the time value of money into 
account, we need to do what is known as a “present value calculation.” We compare the 
present value of the anticipated stream of benefits over 30 years in the future to the up-
front out-of-pocket cost of the mitigation project. 
A present value calculation depends on the lifetime of the mitigation project and on what is 
known as the discount rate. The discount rate may be viewed simply as the interest rate 
you might earn on the cost of the project if you didn’t spend the money on the mitigation 
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project. Let’s assume that this mitigation project is to be funded by FEMA, which uses a 
7% discount rate to evaluate hazard mitigation projects. With a 30-year lifetime and a 7% 
discount rate, the “present value coefficient” which is the value today of $1.00 per year in 
benefits over the lifetime of the mitigation project is 12.41. That is, each $1.00 per year in 
benefits over 30 years is worth $12.41 now. The benefit-cost results are now as follows. 
Table 1.12 
Benefit-Cost Results 
Annualized Benefits $6,200 
Present Value Coefficient 12.41 
Net Present Value of Future Benefits $76,942 
Mitigation Project Cost $20,000 
Benefit-Cost Ratio 3.85 
 
These results indicate a benefit-cost ratio of 3.85. Thus, in FEMA’s terms the mitigation 
project is cost-effective and eligible for FEMA funding. Taking into account the time value 
of money, which is essential for a correct economic calculation, results in lower benefits 
than if we simply multiplied the annual benefits times the 30-year project useful lifetime. 
Economically, simply multiplying the annual benefits times the lifetime would ignore the 
time value of money and thus gives an incorrect, spurious result. 
The above discussion of benefit-cost analysis of a flood hazard mitigation project is 
intended to illustrate the basic concepts. Very similar principles apply to mitigation projects 
for earthquakes or any other natural hazards. The role of benefit-cost analysis in 
prioritizing and implementing mitigation projects in Columbia County is addressed in 
Chapter 4 (Plan Goals, Mitigation Strategies and Action Items).
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2.0 COMMUNITY PROFILE: COLUMBIA COUNTY 
2.1 Geography and Climate 
Columbia County is located in northwestern Oregon and covers about 657 square miles. 
Columbia County is bordered by Clatsop County on the west and by Washington County 
and Multnomah County on the south. Columbia County’s northern and eastern boundary 
is the Columbia River, with 62 miles of shoreline within the County. 
For hazard mitigation planning, we consider two main physiographic regions within 
Columbia County, 
The Columbia River Valley, which is characterized by low-elevation generally flat lands 
along the Columbia River, and 
The interior of Columbia County, which is characterized by heavily forested hills 
with elevations up to 2033 feet (Cater Hill in southern Columbia County). 
The geography, topography, climate, and other natural attributes such as vegetation vary 
somewhat with location in Columbia County. The geographic diversity of Columbia County 
is one factor to consider in mitigation planning for natural and human-caused hazards. 
The severity of potential impacts of most natural hazards varies significantly from location 
to location in Columbia County. 
For example, portions of the Columbia River Valley part of Columbia County are protected 
from floods by dike districts, many of which provide less than optimum levels of flood 
protection. Furthermore, some of the dikes may be vulnerable to failure in earthquakes. 
Other hazards such as floods, landslides and wildland/urban interface fires vary spatially 
within the County, depending on specific local elevation, topography, rainfall, and 
vegetation. Even the impacts of winter storms, which generally affect the entire County, 
vary in severity depending on local topography. Other hazards such as earthquakes vary 
more or less smoothly across Columbia County. 
The climate for Columbia County is moderate. Mean daily temperatures range from highs 
in the 70s to 80s and lows in the 40s to 50s in July and August to highs in the 40s and 
lows of about 30 in December and January (sample data for Clatskanie, St. Helens, and 
Vernonia). The average annual rainfall varies from about 40 inches to about 60 inches 
depending on location. Average monthly precipitation varies from about 6 to 9 inches in 
November through January to about 0.5 inch to 1.0 inch in July. Average annual snowfall 
varies from about 2” along the Columbia River in southeastern Columbia County to about 
10” in Clatskanie. At higher elevations in the hilly interior of Columbia County, 
temperatures are typically somewhat lower, with higher amounts of precipitation. 
2.2 Population and Demographics 
In 1805-1806, Lewis and Clark explored the area and camped along Columbia County’s 
Columbia River shoreline. Very small early settlements were established by fur traders as 
early as 1810. However, immigration of non-native Americans began in earnest in the 
1840s and 1850s, with most of the early population centers being along the Columbia 
River. Settlement occurred more slowly in the interior portion of the County. For example, 
Vernonia was founded in 1891 as a logging center. 
Columbia County was created from the northern portion of Washington County in 1854. 
Milton was the first county seat until 1857 when St. Helens became the county seat. 
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Columbia County population (2000 Census) was 43,560. The 2003 population estimate 
was 46,261. Population data for Columbia County and for the incorporated cities in 
Columbia County are shown below in Table 2.1. Columbia County’s current (October, 
2004) population is approximately 47,000. 
Table 2.1 
Columbia County Population Data 
Location 2000         Census
Estimate     
July 1, 2003
Columbia County 43,560 46,261
Incorporated Cities
Clatskanie 1,528 1,608
Columbia City 1,571 1,644
Prescott 72 71
Rainier 1,687 1,787
St. Helens 10,019 11,209
Scappoose 4,976 5,506
Vernonia 2,228 2,244
Balance of Columbia County 21,479 22,192  
 
The seven incorporated cities in Columbia County had just over 50% of the county’s 
population in 2000, with the remaining 50% in rural areas. However, nearly 75% of the 
population growth between 2000 and 2003 has been in the larger cities. 
Historical population data for Columbia County since 1900 are shown below in Table 2.2 
(Census data). These long term data show the steady growth of population in Columbia 
County over the decades, from only about 6,000 in 1900 to the current population of about 
47,000. From 1980 to 2003, the population of Columbia County grew at an annual rate of 
about 0.8%. From 2000 to 2003, the rate of annual population growth has accelerated to a 
little above 2.0%. 
Table 2.2 













2003 46,261  
 
More detailed population and demographic data for Columbia County from the 2000 
Census are shown below in Table 2.3, along with similar data for Oregon. The Age and 
Ethnicity categories in Table 2.3 below intentionally include overlapping subsets of 
categories for planning purposes. 
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Table 2.3 
Population Demographics (2000 Census Data) 
Columbia 
County Oregon
Under 5 years 6.4% 6.5%
Under 18 years 27.3% 24.7%
18 years and over 72.7% 75.3%
18 years to 65 years 61.1% 62.5%
65 years and over 11.6% 12.8%
White 94.4% 86.6%
Black or African Amerian 0.2% 1.6%
American Indian and Alaska Native 1.3% 1.3%
Asian 0.6% 3.0%
Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander 0.1% 0.2%
Other or two or more races 3.3% 7.3%
Hispanic or Latino (of any race) 2.5% 8.0%
English only 96.1% 87.9%
Language other than English 3.9% 12.1%
   Speak English less than very well 1.3% 5.9%
   Spanish 1.9% 6.8%
   Other Indo-European languages 1.2% 2.6%




Language Spoken at Home
 
 
For emergency planning purposes, children, elderly adults, the disabled, and people 
whose primary language is not English are considered special needs populations. Based 
on these 2000 census data, Columbia County has a substantial population of children and 
elderly adults, along with about 4% of the population whose primary language is not 
English. As shown in Table 2.3 above, about 27% of the population are children less than 
18 years old, while about 12% are adults over 65 years old. 
The Census website (www.census.gov) has a vast amount of demographic data for 
Columbia County and for the individual cities within Columbia County. See the website for 
additional demographic data, including school enrollment, educational levels, disability 
status, and other categories of demographic data useful for planning purposes. 
2.3 Employment and Economics 
The primary industries of Columbia County are timber, fishing, water transportation, 
dairying, horticulture and recreation. The extensive stands of old growth timber, which had 
attracted many of the early settlers to Columbia County, were completely logged over by 
the 1950s. Second growth timber now provides the raw materials for the local lumber and 
pulp mills. 
In the earliest years, the economy of Columbia County was largely agrarian; wheat  
Selected economic data for Columbia County from the 2000 Census are summarized 
below in Table 2.4. Corresponding data for Oregon are also shown for reference. 
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Table 2.4 
Selected Economic Data 
Columbia 
County Oregon
Population 16 years and older 33,035 3,472,867
In labor force 64.8% 65.2%
Employed 60.7% 61.0%
Unemployed 4.1% 4.2%
Not in labor force 35.2% 34.8%
Drove alone 78.7% 73.2%
Carpooled 13.7% 12.2%
Public transportation 0.2% 4.2%
Walked 2.1% 3.6%
Other means (includes bicycles) 1.0% 1.9%
Worked at home 4.6% 5.0%
Homeownership rate 76.1% 64.3%
Housing units in multi-unit structures 11.4% 23.1%
Median household income $45,797 $40,916
Per capita money income $20,078 $20,940
Families below poverty level 6.7% 7.9
    with children under 18 years 10.4% 12.4
   with children under 5 years 14.6% 16.6






The Census website (www.census.gov) has a vast amount of other economic/ 
demographic data for Columbia County and for the individual cities within Columbia 
County. See the Census website for additional economic/demographic data, including 
employment breakdowns by occupation and industry, and detailed income data. 
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2.4 Housing in Columbia County 
Housing demographic data for Columbia County from the 2000 Census are summarized 
below in Table 2.5. 
Table 2.5 
Housing Data 
Demographic Data Columbia County Oregon
Total housing units 17,572 1,452,709
    Occupied units 16,375 1,333,723
    Vacant units 1,197 118,986
    Vacany percentage 6.8% 8.2%
    Owner-occupied units1 48.4% 53.5%
    Renter-occupied units1 21.3% 38.2%
  1 Owner- and renter-occupied units do not total 100% because
the remaing units are unspecified in census data.  
 
For Columbia County, the percentage of owner-occupied units is slightly lower than for 
Oregon as a whole. 
The age distribution of Columbia County’s housing stock is shown below in Table 2.6. Age 
of the housing stock is relevant for mitigation planning purposes because older 
construction is much less likely to conform to current building code requirements for fire 
safety and earthquake safety and less likely to conform to current flood plain management 
regulations. For example, about 32% of Columbia County’s housing stock was built before 
1960, with 18% built before 1940. 
Table 2.6 
Columbia County Housing Stock by Year Built 
Year Built Percent





1939 or earlier 18.0%  
2.5 Land and Development 
The overall pattern of land use and development in Columbia County is shown below in 
Figure 2.7 (Land Development Division, November 2004). 
The vast majority of Columbia County is forest, with much smaller areas of agricultural or 
agricultural/forest lands. Cities and rural residential areas are heavily concentrated along 
the Columbia River in the eastern and northern parts of the County and in the Vernonia 
area. 
2.6 Regulatory Context: Overview 
Oregon land use laws require land outside Urban Growth Boundaries (UGBs) to be 
protected for farm, forest, and aggregate resource values. For the most part, this law limits 
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the amount of development in the rural areas. However, the land use designation can 
change from resource protection in one of two ways: 
• The requested change could qualify as an exception to Statewide Planning Goals, 
in which case the county must demonstrate to the State that the change meets 
requirements for an exception. These lands, known as exception lands, are 
predominantly designated for residential use. 
• Resource land can also be converted to non-resource use when it can be 
demonstrated to Columbia County that the land is no longer suitable for farm or 
forest production. 
Local and state policies currently direct growth away from rural lands into UGBs and, to a 
lesser extent, into rural communities.  
Over the next 50 years, emerging telecommunications services may affect the rural 
economy, enhancing the capacity of residents in rural areas to access information and 
deliver services from remote locations. Pressure for rural development may come from 
people seeking a rural lifestyle, especially workers in the information economy with remote 
service capacity and retirees who do not have commuting needs. 
If development follows historical development trends, urban areas will expand their UGBs, 
rural unincorporated communities will continue to grow, and overall rural residential 
density will increase slightly with the bulk of rural lands kept in farm and forest use. The 
existing pattern of development in the rural areas, that of radiating out from the urban 
areas along rivers and streams is likely to continue. Most of the “easy to develop” land is 
already developed, in general leaving more constrained land such as land in the 
floodplains or on steep slopes to be developed in the future, perhaps increasing the rate 
at which development occurs in natural hazard areas. 
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Figure 2.7 
Columbia County Zoning Map 
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2.7 Regulatory Context: Oregon Statewide Planning Goal 7 
Oregon State Planning Overview 
Since 1973, Oregon has maintained a strong statewide program for land use planning. 
The foundation of that program is a set of 19 statewide planning goals that express the 
state's policies on land use and on related topics, such as citizen involvement, land use 
planning, and natural resources. 
Most of the goals are accompanied by "guidelines," which are suggestions about how a 
goal may be applied. Oregon's statewide goals are achieved through local comprehensive 
planning. State law requires each city and county to adopt a comprehensive plan and the 
zoning and land-division ordinances needed to put the plan into effect. The local 
comprehensive plans must be consistent with the statewide planning goals. Plans are 
reviewed for such consistency by the state's Land Conservation and Development 
Commission (LCDC). When LCDC officially approves a local government's plan, the plan 
is said to be "acknowledged." It then becomes the controlling document for land use in the 
area covered by that plan.  
Goal 7 
Goal 7: Areas Subject to Natural Disasters and Hazards has the overriding purpose to 
“protect people and property from natural hazards”. Goal 7 requires local governments to 
adopt comprehensive plans (inventories, policies and implementing measures) to reduce 
risk to people and property from natural hazards. Natural hazards include floods, 
landslides, earthquakes, tsunamis, coastal erosion, and wildfires. 
To comply with Goal 7, local governments are required to respond to new hazard 
inventory information from federal or state agencies. The local government must evaluate 
the hazard risk and assess the: 
1. frequency, severity, and location of the hazard; 
2. effects of the hazard on existing and future development; 
3. potential for development in the hazard area to increase the frequency and 
severity of the hazard; and 
4. types and intensities of land uses to be allowed in the hazard area. 
Local governments must adopt or amend comprehensive plan policies and implementing 
measures to avoid development in hazard areas where the risk cannot be mitigated. In 
addition, the siting of essential facilities, major structures, hazardous facilities and special 
occupancy structures should be prohibited in hazard areas where the risk to public safety 
cannot be mitigated. The state recognizes compliance with Goal 7 for coastal and riverine 
flood hazards by adopting and implementing local floodplain regulations that meet the 
minimum National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) requirements. 
Goal 7 provides local jurisdictions with the following guidelines for planning and 
implementation: 
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Planning 
1. Adopting plan policies and implementing measures for protection from 
natural hazards local governments should consider: 
a. the benefits of maintaining natural hazard areas as open space, recreation, 
and other low density uses; 
b. the beneficial effects that natural hazards can have on natural resources and 
the environment; and 
c. the effects of development and mitigation measures in identified hazard areas 
on the management of natural resources.  
2. Local governments should coordinate their land use plans and decisions 
with emergency preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation 
programs. Given the numerous waterways and forested lands throughout 
Lane County, special attention should be given to problems associated with 
river bank erosion and potential for wild land/urban interface fires.  
Implementation 
1. Goal 7 guides local governments to give special attention to emergency 
access when considering development in identified hazard areas. 
2. Consider programs to manage storm water runoff as a means to address 
flood and landslide hazards. 
3. Consider non-regulatory approaches to help implement the goal. 
4. When reviewing development requests in high hazard areas, require site 
specific reports, appropriate for the level and type of hazard. Reports 
should evaluate the risk to the site as well as the risk the proposed 
development may pose to other properties. 
5. Consider measures exceeding the National Flood Insurance Program. 
Columbia County Compliance With Goal 7 
The County evaluates emergency access when considering development. For the most 
part (with few acceptations) developers are required to build dwellings near the roadway 
in part to provide easier access for emergency vehicles. Larger development proposals 
must include a storm water management plan for storm water discharge and development 
cannot alter an existing waterway. In conformance with NFIP regulations, the County 
requires that new development in mapped floodplains be at least one foot above the base 
flood elevation reducing the risk of flood damage. 
The County could improve compliance with Goal 7 by participating in the Community 
Rating System (CRS) program (see Section 2.9) which exceeds the minimum measures 
required by the National Flood Insurance Program, including developing a program for 
storm water maintenance and management. The County could also establish limitations or 
standards for development in steep slope areas. 
2.8 Community Rating System 
Jurisdictions that regulate new development in their floodplains are able to join the 
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). In return, the NFIP provides federally backed 
flood insurance for properties in participating areas. Columbia County participates in the 
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NFIP program and over 600 flood insurance policies are held within Columbia County 
(including the cities). 
The Community Rating System (CRS) is a part of the NFIP. The CRS reduces flood 
insurance premiums to reflect what a community does above and beyond the NFIP’s 
minimum standards for floodplain regulation. The objective of the CRS is to reward 
communities for what they are doing, as well as to provide an incentive for new flood 
protection activities. The reduction in flood insurance premium rates is provided according 
to a jurisdiction’s CRS classification, which is dependent upon the number of points 
awarded the jurisdictions for flood reduction activities implemented. To apply, a jurisdiction 
submits documentation that shows what it is doing and that its activities deserve at least 
500 points. By participating in the CRS program, a jurisdiction not only reduces the risk of 
loss due to flood damage but policyholders gain up to a 45 percent reduction in flood 
insurance premiums. Community participation in the CRS is voluntary and Columbia 
County does not currently participate in this program. 
There are 18 floodplain management activities credited by the CRS organized under four 
series: 
1. Public Information, 
2. Mapping and Regulations, 
3. Flood Damage Reduction, and 
4. Flood Preparedness. 
All but two of the 18 management activities are optional. The two required activities for 
Columbia County to participate in the CRS program are the elevation certificate and 
repetitive loss requirements. 
The CRS program could be “self-supporting” in the sense that the County could charge 
higher fees for initial construction in a flood zone area, paying for the cost of implementing 
the program. Although the initial cost to the property owner is higher, the property owner 
enjoys long-term savings from reduced insurance rates. The property owner and the 
county also gain long-term reduction in the risk associated with flood hazards. 
Once the Columbia County Hazard Mitigation Plan is adopted, the County should: 
• Apply for funding to complete a thorough assessment of the points the County 
qualifies for under the CRS,  
• Develop a floodplain management plan for repetitive loss areas,  
• Enhance existing programs to gain additional credits; and  
• Proceed with the CRS program application. 
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2.9 Regulatory Context: Summary Comments 
Sections 2.6 to 2.8 above reviewed regulatory programs and issues related to hazard 
mitigation planning. The state land use planning requirements, Goal 7, and the CRS 
regulations are all regulatory programs. That is, these programs impose legal 
requirements and restrictions on development that are intended to provide for public 
safety and to minimize the future impacts of disaster events on Columbia County. 
In contrast, this Hazard Mitigation Plan is not a regulatory document. That is, a Hazard 
Mitigation Plan is intended to educate the public about hazards and to encourage prudent 
practices but it does not mandate practices or regulate development. However, a Hazard 
Mitigation Plan is closely related so some regulatory processes in the sense that greater 
awareness about and better data on hazards may subsequently lead to changes in 
regulations. 
An important objective of developing a Hazard Mitigation Plan is to start the long term 
process of acquiring better data on hazards, vulnerability and risk in Columbia County. 
Acquiring better data may eventually lead to more regulation of identified high hazard 
areas. However, better data with higher spatial resolution may also result in reclassifying 
areas tentatively mapped as being in potential hazard areas as, in fact, not being in 
hazard areas. For example, the spatial resolution of mapping of potential landslide areas 
or areas subject to liquefaction in earthquakes is generally low. More refined mapped of 
such hazards is likely to reduce the areas designated as being potentially subject to these 
hazards. 
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PUBLIC PROCESS 
3.0 PUBLIC PROCESS: COLUMBIA COUNTY 
Public participation is a key component in all strategic planning processes. Citizen 
participation offers the public opportunity to voice their ideas, interests, and opinions. 
Oregon’s land use planning system addresses the need for public process in Statewide 
Land Use Planning Goal 1(one): Citizen Involvement. This goal ensures the opportunity 
for citizens to be involved in the planning process. The Federal Emergency Management 
Agency also required public input during the development of the flood Hazard Mitigation 
plan completed in 1998. 
The Columbia County Natural Hazards Mitigation Plan integrates a cross-section of 
citizen input throughout the planning process. To accomplish this goal, the county 
commissioners directed the Director of Emergency Manager to oversee the development 
of a new updated Hazard Mitigation Plan and to develop a public participation process 
using three components: (1) developing a project steering committee comprised of 
knowledgeable individuals representing the County, Cities, Special Districts, Businesses, 
Industry and the public, (2) Conduct public workshops to identify common concerns and 
ideas regarding hazard mitigation and to discuss specific goals and actions of the 
mitigation plan, (3) After development and approval of the Hazard Mitigation Plan, 
develop the Columbia County Hazard Mitigation Advisory Committee (HMAC) to oversee 
projects, prioritization, funding of projects and hold additional public meeting for input. 
Integrating public participation, business and industry during the development of the 
Columbia County Natural Hazards Mitigation Plan has ultimately resulted in increased 
public awareness. Through citizen involvement, the mitigation plan reflects community 
issues, concerns, and new ideas and perspectives on mitigation opportunities. Citizens 
have also participated in the development of the hazard specific action items. 
Steering Committee 
The last hazard mitigation plan was completed in 1998 and was developed by a group of 
community members. In recent years, the Director of Emergency Management for 
Columbia County has overseen hazard mitigation in Columbia County. For the 
development of this plan, the committee was broadened from the normal county 
agencies to include city agencies, public safety agencies and representation from private 
organizations and business in the county. One such organization is the Columbia 
Emergency Planning Association (CEPA), which has representatives businesses, 
industry, non-profit organizations, county government, city government, public safety 
agencies and citizens. The steering committee members have an understanding of how 
the community is structured and how residents, businesses, and the environment may 
be affected by natural hazard events. The steering committee guided the development of 
the plan, and assisted in developing plan goals and action items and sharing local 
expertise to create a more comprehensive plan. 
Table B.1 lists the various people and organizations that participated on the Columbia 
County Natural Hazards Mitigation Plan Steering Committee. 
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Table B.1. Mitigation Plan Steering Committee 
Name Organization 
Tony Hyde Columbia County Commissioner 
Janet Wright/ 
Vicki Harguth 
Columbia County Emergency Management  
Dave Hill Columbia County Road Department 
Todd Dugdale Columbia County Land Development Service 
Robin Basset City of Vernonia Public Works 
Andre Le duc ECO NW 
Doug Greisen City of Scappoose Police 
Steve Salle City of St. Helens Police 
Brian Little City of St. Helens 
Terry Grice Columbia River Fire & Rescue 
Michael Greisen Scappoose Fire District 
Diane Dillard Boise Cascade & CEPA 
Mary Lou Busch Mist-Birkenfeld Fire District 
Lee Knowlton Columbia 911 Communication District 
Michael Walter City of Scappoose 
Dick Long Clatskanie Fire District 
Michael Simek Oregon Department of Forestry 
Ken Goettel Consultant  
 
Meeting #1 
The first meeting was held with consultant Ken Goettel, who is overseeing the developed 
of the new Hazard Mitigation Plan. Introductions where made, with steering committee 
members giving information to Ken about each of their organizations. There was general 
discussion about the procedures used on the county’s old Mitigation Plan. Ken provided 
a power point presentation on appropriate procedures used to develop the Hazard 
Mitigation Plans. The group discussed disasters, incidents, problems, damages and 
mitigation that have occurred in Columbia County over the years. During meeting one 
the group determined Mission Statement, Goals, hazards, vulnerability, and risk. 
Meeting #2 
The group agreed on a mission statement and the general chapters. They also agreed 
on the areas in the plan to cover the following disasters that the committee felt was 
important to have in a hazard mitigation plan, which could or has happened in Columbia 
County. It was agreed to have Earthquake, Volcano, Hazmat, Dams, Utility Transmission 
and Transportation, Terrorism, Flood, Winter Storms, Landslides and Fire as hazards 
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that have potential to occur in the county and need to be addressed in the plan. Further 
discussion was held on the Earthquake, Volcano’s and Flood hazards. 
Meeting #3 
The group discussed the chapters sent through e-mail correspondence that included 
Earthquakes, Volcano’s and Flood and revised based on group consensus. Draft 
chapters were presented on Fire, Landslides, Dams and Winter Storms. E-mail is 
working well and is an excellent way for everyone to discuss opinions and develop 
overall consensus. It was agreed that email will continue to be the main group wide 
communication tool. The group agreed to start on the action items in the plan at the next 
meeting. 
Meeting #4 
Finalized changes to Earthquakes, Volcano’s and Flooding chapters. Additional 
information on the Fire chapter is needed from the structural fire agencies; Oregon 
Department of Forestry added significant information addressing wildland urban 
interface wire hazards. Revisions were made to the chapters on Landslides, Dams and 
Winter Storms. Reviewed draft chapters on Utility Transmission, Terrorism and Hazmat. 
The group also reviewed Action Item drafts. 
Meeting #5 
Agreed on corrections made to all chapters. Reviewed and reprioritize action plans. 
Discussed and cleaned up additional questions and e-mails on hazard specific chapters. 
Public Hearing 
On February 17, 2005 a public hearing was held in Vernonia, Oregon. Approximately 15 
people attended the 60-minute presentation and question/answer session. All three 
County Commissioners were in attendance. Vicki Harguth welcomed everyone and 
started the hearing with a brief explanation of the Pre-Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 
(PDM2K). Many citizens in the audience offered their perspective of the 1996 flood and 
some of the flood mitigation activities that have occurred in Vernonia and Clatskanie. 
The planning process was presented and followed by suggestion to continue the 
planning process so mitigation is always considered a priority. Vicki offered applications 
for membership in the Hazard Mitigation Advisory Committee (HMAC) as a way to be 
involved with the ongoing sustainability of the mitigation program in Columbia County.  
Other Public Involvement 
Throughout the plan development ongoing plan development progress reports were 
provide to the Citizens Emergency Preparedness Association (CEPA) monthly meetings 
in July 2004 through January 2005. CEPA is a group of citizens, businesses, local 
governments, and non-profit groups that are very strong emergency management 
advocates. CEPA currently has approximately 155 members with a monthly meeting 
attendance averaging 50. 
Throughout the plan development process, ongoing progress reports were given to the 
Board of County Commissioners at Board Work Sessions between November 2004 and 
January 2005. The public is aware of these sessions and are encouraged to attend. 
The hazard mitigation planning committee plans another public hearing as a kick off for 
the Hazard Mitigation Advisory Committee and ongoing project and planning process. 
This meeting is tentatively scheduled for April 2005 in Clatskanie, Oregon. 
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Once the plan is officially adopted, scheduled for March 2, 2005, the HMAC will begin a 
quarterly meeting schedule. The formalized plan will be put on the Columbia County 
Internet site for continuous public viewing and awareness. A process for ongoing public 
input will be available through County offices of Land Development Services, Road 
Department, and Emergency Management. 
Applications are being accepted by the Board of County Commissioners through March 
2005 for membership to the Columbia County Hazard Mitigation Advisory Committee 
(HMAC). The HMAC will be made up of a cross section of community members, 
business, industry and public agencies that will be appointed by the County 
Commissioners to serve on the advisory committee. The overall goal of the HMAC is to 
periodically monitor, evaluate and update the plan and search for mitigation funding 
sources. The County will continue to provide staffing to the committee through the 
Emergency Management Program and other agencies throughout the County. 
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4.0 MISSION STATEMENT, GOALS, OBJECTIVES AND ACTION ITEMS 
4.1 Overview 
The overall purpose of the Columbia County Hazard Mitigation Plan is to reduce the 
impacts of future natural or human-caused disasters on the people and communities of 
Columbia County. That is, the purpose is to make Columbia County more disaster 
resistant and disaster resilient, by reducing the vulnerability to disasters and enhancing 
the capability to respond effectively to and recover quickly from future disasters. 
Completely eliminating the risk of future disasters in Columbia County is neither 
technologically possible nor economically feasible. However, substantially reducing the 
negative impacts of future disasters is achievable with the adoption of this pragmatic 
Hazard Mitigation Plan and ongoing implementation of risk reducing action items. 
Incorporating risk reduction strategies and action items into the county’s existing programs 
and decision making processes will facilitate moving Columbia County toward a safer and 
more disaster resistant future. 
This mitigation plan provides the framework and guidance for both short- and long-term 
proactive steps that can be taken to: 
• Protect life safety, 
• Reduce property damage, 
• Minimize economic losses and disruption, and 
• Shorten the recovery period from future disasters. 
In addition, the Columbia County Hazard Mitigation Plan is intended to meet or contribute 
towards meeting various regulatory requirements, including: 
1. FEMA’s (Federal Emergency Management Agency) mitigation planning 
requirements so that Columbia County remains eligible for pre- and post-
disaster mitigation funding from FEMA, 
2. FEMA’s Flood Insurance Program’s Community Rating System guidelines, 
to help minimize future flood insurance rates in Columbia County, 
3. Oregon Emergency Management’s mitigation planning evaluation criteria, 
and 
4. Oregon’s Goal 7 natural hazard planning guidelines. 
Meeting these regulatory requirements is an essential step to facilitate implementation of 
mitigation measures and in making progress towards achieving the primary mission, goals 
and objectives summarized below. 
The Columbia County Hazard Mitigation Plan is based on a four-step framework that is 
designed to help focus attention and action on successful mitigation strategies: Mission 
Statement, Goals, Objectives and Action Items. 
• Mission Statement. The Mission Statement states the purpose and defines the 
primary function of the Columbia County Hazard Mitigation Plan. The Mission 
Statement is an action-oriented summary that answers the question “Why develop 
a hazard mitigation plan?” 
• Goals. Goals identify priorities and specify how Columbia County intends to work 
toward reducing the risks from natural and human-caused hazards. The Goals 
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represent the guiding principles toward which the County’s efforts are directed. 
Goals provide focus for the more specific issues, recommendations and actions 
addressed in Objectives and Action Items. 
• Objectives. Each goal has objectives which specify the directions, methods, 
processes, or steps necessary to accomplish the plan’s Goals. Objectives lead 
directly to specific Action Items. 
• Action Items. Action items are specific well-defined activities or projects that work 
to reduce risk. That is, the Action Items represent the steps necessary to achieve 
the Mission Statement, Goals and Objectives. 
4.2 Mission Statement 
The mission of the Columbia County Hazard Mitigation Plan is to: 
Proactively facilitate and support county-wide policies, practices, and programs 
that make Columbia County more disaster resistant and disaster resilient. 
Making Columbia County more disaster resistant and disaster resilient means taking 
proactive steps and actions to: 
• Protect life safety, 
• Reduce property damage, 
• Minimize economic losses and disruption, and 
• Shorten the recovery period from future disasters. 
4.3 Mitigation Plan Goals and Objectives 
Mitigation plan goals and objectives guide the direction of future policies and activities 
aimed at reducing risk and preventing loss from disaster events. The goals and objectives 
listed here serve as guideposts and checklists as agencies, organizations, and individuals 
begin implementing mitigation action items in Columbia County. 
Columbia County’s mitigation plan goals and objectives are based on the goals 
established by the State of Oregon Natural Hazards Mitigation Plan. However, the specific 
priorities, emphasis and language are Columbia County’s. These goals were developed 
with extensive input and priority setting by agencies, the mitigation plan steering 
committee, stakeholders and citizens from throughout Columbia County.
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Goal 1: Reduce the Threat to Life Safety 
OBJECTIVE:  
• Enhance life safety by minimizing the potential for deaths and injuries in future 
disaster events. 
Goal 2: Protect Critical Facilities and Enhance Emergency and Essential Services 
OBJECTIVES: 
• Implement activities or projects to protect critical facilities and infrastructure. 
• Seek opportunities to enhance, protect, and integrate emergency and essential 
services.  
• Strengthen emergency operations plans and procedures by increasing 
collaboration and coordination among public agencies, non-profit organizations, 
business, and industry. 
Goal 3: Reduce the Threat to Property 
OBJECTIVES: 
• Seek opportunities to protect, enhance and integrate emergency and essential 
services.  
• Strengthen emergency operations plans and procedures by increasing 
collaboration and coordination among public agencies, non-profit organizations, 
business, industry and the citizens of Columbia County. 
Goal 4: Create a Disaster Resistant and Disaster-Resilient Economy 
OBJECTIVES: 
• Develop and implement activities to protect economic well-being and vitality while 
reducing economic hardship in post disaster situations. 
• Reduce insurance losses and repetitive claims for chronic hazard events. 
• Work with State and Federal Partners to reduce short-term and long-term recovery 
and reconstruction costs.  
• Work with local organization, such as Columbia Emergency Planning Association 
(CEPA). 
• Expedite pre-disaster and post-disaster grants and program funding. 
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Goal 5: Increase Public Awareness, Education, Outreach, and Partnerships 
OBJECTIVES: 
• Coordinate and collaborate, where possible, risk reduction outreach efforts with 
the Oregon Partners for Disaster Resistance & Resilience and other public and 
private organizations. 
• Develop and implement risk reduction education programs to increase awareness 
among citizens, local, county, and regional agencies, non-profit organizations, 
business, and industry. 
• Promote insurance coverage for catastrophic hazards 
• Strengthen communication and coordinate participation in and between public 
agencies, citizens, nonprofit organizations, business, and industry.  
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4.3 Columbia County Hazard Mitigation Plan Action Items 
The Mission Statement, Goals and Objectives for Columbia County, as outlined above, 
are achieved via implementation of specific mitigation action items. Action items may 
include refinement of policies, data collection to better characterize hazards or risk, 
education, outreach or partnership building activities, as well as specific engineering or 
construction measures to reduce risk from one or more hazards at specific locations within 
Columbia County. 
Individual action items may address a single hazard (such as flood, earthquake, or 
wildland/urban interface fires) or they may address two or more hazards concurrently. 
Action items identified and prioritized during the development of the Columbia County 
Hazard Mitigation Plan are summarized in the following tables. The first group of action 
items is for multi-hazard items that address more than one hazard, followed by groups of 
action items for each of the ten hazards addressed in this plan (as addressed in Chapters 
6 to 15 
4.4 Mitigation Activity Evaluation and Prioritization 
Columbia County HMAC will be the lead group for determining mitigation activity 
prioritization and project funding eligibility. The group has determined to begin the 
evaluation process using the STAPLE/E methodology described below. Once the HMAC 
has discussed mitigation projects and activities using STAPLE/E, the Columbia County 
Board of Commissioners will have the final say on project/activity approval. 
STAPLE/E Approach 
Using STAPLE/E criteria, mitigation activities can be evaluated quickly in a systematic 
fashion. This criterion requires the committee to assess the mitigation activities based on 
the Social, Technical, Administrative, Political, Legal, Economic, and Environmental 
(STAPLE/E) constraints and opportunities of implementing the particular mitigation item in 
the County. The STAPLE/E approach is helpful for doing a quick analysis of mitigation 
projects. Most projects that seek federal funding and others often require more detailed 
Benefit/Cost Analyses. 
The following are suggestions for how to examine each aspect of the STAPLE/E 
Approach from the “State of Oregon’s Local Natural Hazard Mitigation Plan: An Evaluation 
Process”. The HMAC along with suggested organizations listed will consider these or 
similar questions. 
Social: Community development staff, local non-profit organizations, or local planning 
groups can help answer these questions. 
• Is the proposed action socially acceptable to the community?  
• Are there equity issues involved that would mean that one segment of the 
community is treated unfairly? 
• Will the action cause social disruption? 
Technical: The County public works and building department can help answer these 
questions. 
• Will the proposed action work? 
• Will it create more problems than it solves? 
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• Does it solve a problem or only a symptom? 
• Is it the most useful action in light of other goals? 
Administrative: Elected officials from local government can help answer these questions. 
• Is the action implementable? 
• Is there someone to coordinate and lead the effort? 
• Is there sufficient funding, staff, and technical support available? 
• Are there ongoing administrative requirements that need to be met? 
Political: Consult Board of Commissioners, local City Mayor’s, and planning officials, to 
help answer these questions. 
• Is the action politically acceptable? 
• Is there public support both to implement and to maintain the project? 
Legal: Include legal counsel, land use planners, and risk managers in this discussion. 
• Who is authorized to implement the proposed action? 
• Is there a clear legal basis or precedent for this activity? 
• Are there legal side effects? Could the activity be construed as a taking? 
• Is the proposed action allowed by the comprehensive plan, or must the 
comprehensive plan be amended to allow the proposed action? 
• Will the County be liable for action or lack of action? 
• Will the activity be challenged? 
Economic: County economic development staff, civil engineers, building department, and 
the assessor’s office can help answer these questions. 
• What are the costs and benefits of this action? 
• Do the benefits exceed the costs? 
• Are initial, maintenance, and administrative costs taken into account? 
• Has funding been secured for the proposed action? If not, what are the potential 
funding sources (public, non-profit, and private)? 
• How will this action affect the fiscal capability of the County? 
• What burden will this action place on the tax base or economy? 
• What are the budget and revenue effects of this activity? 
• Does the action contribute to other goals, such as capital improvements or 
economic development? 
• What benefits will the action provide? (This can include dollar amount of damages 
prevented, number of homes protected, credit under the CRS, potential for funding 
under the HMGP or the FMA program, etc.) 
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Environmental: Environmental groups, land use planners, and natural resource 
managers can help answer these questions. 
• How will the action impact the environment? 
• Will the action need environmental regulatory approvals? 
• Will it meet local and state regulatory requirements? 
• Are endangered or threatened species likely to be affected? 
4.4.1 High Priority Projects Examples 
Columbia County has been coordination mitigation activities across jurisdictional 
boundaries and disciplines since the flood of 1996 on a regular basis. Vernonia and 
Clatskanie were both isolated communities during that event causing increased 
awareness of mitigation activities for all hazards. The following is a list of Columbia 
County projects that are given a high priority to develop and implement. This is a partial 
list and will be developed further as more Cities and Special Districts join the Hazard 
Mitigation Advisory Committee and help determine projects and priorities. Project 
implementation will be considered as funds become available through mitigation grants, 
local budgets, State and Federal funds, strong benefit cost analysis data, and other 
sources.
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Critical Facility Projects  
 
County Sites  
County Courthouse 
230 Strand, St. Helens 
Provide power backup throughout the building to 
ensure continuity of government and critical 
operations 
Emergency Operations Center, 
230 Strand, St. Helens 
Move EOC to 911 Building at 58611 McNulty Way, 
St. Helens to ensure sustainability and critical 
operations.  
County Road Dept. 
1054 Oregon St. 
Provide power backup throughout the building to 




230 Strand, St. Helens 
Seismically upgrade building and develop non-
structural mitigation projects to ensure continuity of 
government and critical operations 
  
County Road Dept. 
1054 Oregon St. 
Seismically upgrade building and develop non-
structural mitigation projects to ensure continuity of 
government and critical operations 
  




Numerous Fire Stations need Seismic Upgrades.  
Stations identified currently Include: 
Scappoose 
52751 Columbia River Hwy, Scappoose 
Columbia River Fire and Rescue 
105 South 12th Street, St. Helens 
58798 Saulsler Rd., Warren 








Medical Facilities/Urgent Care 
Facilities 
 
Special Population Facilities 
 
Fire Stations 






Other Critical Infrastructure Projects 
 
 
Culvert - Major Roadway 
 
Replace culvert on Scappoose-Vernonia Highway 
at milepost 9.3 
Culvert - Major Roadway 
 
Culvert replacement at Oak Ranch Creek on 
Apiary Road 1.8 miles from Hwy 47 
 Install culverts to improve drainage on Upper 
Apiary Rd., 11.2 and 11.4 miles from Apiary Rd. 
and Hwy 47 
 
 
Culvert – Major Roadway  





































































Flood Mitigation Action Items:  Within FEMA-Mapped Floodplains
Short-Term     
#1
Complete inventory of critical facilities within 100-year 
and 500-year floodplains, with GIS mapping if 
possible
Columbia County (Land 
Development Services, Roads, 
Assessor), cities, special districts
Ongoing X X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Complete inventory of residential and commercial 
buildings within 100-year and 500-year floodplains, 
with GIS mapping if possible
Columbia County (Land 
Development Services, Roads, 
Assessor), cities, special districts
Ongoing X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Consult with property owners and explore mitigation 
actions for any Columbia County properties on 
FEMA's national repetitive loss list
Columbia County Hazard Mitigation 
Advisory Committee 1 year X X X X
Long-Term     
#1
Survey elevation data for critical facilities, residential 
buildings and commercial buildings within the 100-
year floodplain and establish flood mitigation priorities
Local emergency services, 
Columbia County Hazard Mitigation 
Advisory Committee
2-5 years X X X X X
Long-Term     
#2
For critical facilities within the 100-year floodplain and 
for other structures deep within the 100-year 
floodplain explore mitigation options with property 
owners and implement mitigation measures
Local emergency services, 
Columbia County Hazard Mitigation 
Advisory Committee
2-10 years X X X X X
Flood Mitigation Action Items:  Outside of FEMA-Mapped Floodplains
Short-Term     
#1
Complete the inventory of locations in Columbia 
County subject to frequent storm water flooding
Columbia County (Land 
Development Services, Roads, 
Assessor), cities, special districts
Ongoing X X X X X
Long-Term     
#1
For locations with repetitive flooding and significant 
damages or road closures, determine and implement 
mitigation measures such as upsizing culverts or 
storm water drainage ditches
Columbia County (Land 
Development Services, Roads, 
Assessor), cities, special districts
Ongoing X X X X X
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
 





































































Winter Storms Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Complete the inventory of locations in Columbia 
County subject to frequent storm water flooding Columbia County Roads, cities Ongoing X X X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Enhance tree trimming efforts especially for 
transmission lines and trunk distribution lines.
BPA, West Oregon Electric Coop, 
local PUDs Ongoing X X X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Encourage prudent tree planting (avoid service lines) 
and safe, professional tree trimming where necessary
Columbia County Hazard Mitigation 
Advisory Committee Ongoing X X X
Short-Term     
#4
Ensure that all critical facilities in Columbia County 
have backup power and emergency operations plans 
to deal with power outages
Local emergency services, 
Columbia County Hazard Mitigation 
Advisory Committee
1-2  Years X X
Long-Term     
#1
For locations with repetitive flooding and significant 
damages or road closures, determine and implement 
mitigation measures such as upsizing culverts or 
storm water drainage ditches
Columbia County Roads, cities Ongoing X X X X X
Long-Term     
#2
Consider upgrading lines and poles to improve 
wind/ice loading, undergrounding critical lines, and 
adding interconnect switches to allow alternative feed 
paths and disconnect switches to minimize outage 
areas
BPA, West Oregon Electric Coop, 
local PUDs 5 Years X X X X X
Long-Term     
#3
Encourage new developments to include underground 
power lines
Columbia County Land 
Development Services, cities ongoing X X X X X
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
 





































































Landslide Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Complete the inventory of locations where critical 
facilities, other buildings and infrastructure are subject 
to landslides
Columbia County Land 
Development Services, cities (public 
works)
1-2 Years X X X X X
Long-Term     
#1
Consider landslide mitigation actions for slides 
seriously threatening critical facilities, other buildings 
or infrastructure
Columbia County Hazard Mitigation 
Advisory Committee 5 Years X X X X X
Long-Term     
#2
Limit future development in high landslide potential 
areas
Columbia County Land 
Development Services, cities Ongoing X X X X X
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
 





































































Wildland/Urban Interface Fire Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Identify specific parts of Columbia County at high risk 
for urban/wildland urban interface fires because of 
fuel loading, topography and prevailing construction 
practices
County Fire Defense Board, fire 
agencies 1-2 Years X X X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Identify evacuation routes and procedures for high 
risk areas and educate the public
County Fire Defense Board, fire 
agencies, law enforcement, County 
Roads, public works
Ongoing X X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Develop Community Wildand Fire Protection Plans for 
all at-risk communities County, cities, fire agencies, ODF 1-2 Years X X X X X
Long-Term     
#1
Encourage fire-safe construction practices for existing 
and new construction in high risk areas
County Land Development 
Services, city building departments, 
fire agencies
Ongoing X X X X X
Long-Term     
#2
Enhance home landscape cleanup (defensible space) 
and debris disposal programs
County Land Development 
Services, city building departments, 
fire agencies
Ongoing X X X X X
Long-Term     
#3
Identify potential fuel breaks and fuel reduction zones 
and implement mitigation actions
County Land Development 
Services, city building departments, 
fire agencies
Ongoing X X X X X
Long-Term     
#4
Implement SB360 Wildland Urban Interface Act of 
1997 in Columbia County
County Land Development 
Services, city building departments, 
fire agencies
5-10 years X X X X X
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
 
 





































































Earthquake Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Complete inventory of public and commercial 
buildings that may be particularly vulnerable to 
earthquake damage
County, cities, special districts 1-2 Years X X X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Complete inventory of wood-frame residential 
buildings that may be particularly vulnerable to 
earthquake damage, including pre-1940s homes and 
homes with cripple wall foundations.
County, cities 1-2 Years X X X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Disseminate FEMA pamphlets to educate 
homeowners about structural and non-structural 
retrofitting of vulnerable homes and encourage retrofit
Columbia County Hazard Mitigation 
Advisory Committee Ongoing X X X X
Short-Term     
#4
Complete seismic vulnerability analysis of important 
public facilities with significant seismic vulnerabilities County, cities, special districts 1-2 Years X X X X X
Long-Term     #1 Obtain funding and retrofit important public facilities with significant seismic vulnerabilities County, cities, special districts 10 years X X X X X
Long-Term     #2 Retrofit bridges that are not seismically adequate for lifeline transportation routes ODOT, County, cities, roads X X X X X
Volcanic Hazards Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Update public emergency notification procedures for 
ash fall events
CEPA, CCOM, local emergency 
services agencies 1-2 Years X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Update emergency response planning for ash fall 
events
CEPA, CCOM, local emergency 
services agencies 1-2 Years X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Evaluate capability of water treatment plants to deal 
with high turbidity from ash falls and upgrade 
treatment facilities and emergency response plans to 
deal with ash falls
local water agencies 1-2 Years X X X X X
Short-Term     
#4
Evaluate ash impact on storm water drainage system 
and develop mitigation actions if necessary public works agencies 1-2 Years X X X X
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline





































































Dam Safety Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Prepare high resolution maps of dam failure 
inundation areas and update emergency response 
plans, including public notification and evacuation 
routes
County Land Development 
Services, city building departments, 
local emergency service agencies
1-2 Years X X X
Long-Term     
#2
Encourage the Corps of Engineers to complete 
seismic vulnerability assessments for dams upstream 
of heavily populated areas in Columbia County and to 
make seismic improvements as necessary
Columbia County Hazard Mitigation 
Advisory Committee, US Army 
Corps of Engineers
Ongoing X X X X X
Long-Term     
#3
Evaluate the adequacy of dike systems for both floods 
and earthquakes and implement mitigation measures 
if necessary
Local Dike Districts, US Army Corps 
of Engineers Ongoing X X X X X
Utility and Transportation System Disruption Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Educate and encourage residents to maintain several 
days of emergency supplies for power outages or 
road closures
Columbia County Hazard Mitigation 
Advisory Committee, CEPA Ongoing X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Review and update emergency response plans for 
disruptions of utilities or roads
local emergency service agencies, 
CEPA 1-2 Years X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Ensure that all critical facilities in Columbia County 
have backup power and emergency operations plans 
to deal with power outages
local emergency service agencies, 
CEPA 1-2 Years X X X
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
 





































































Hazmat Incident Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Ensure that first responders have readily available 
site-specific knowledge of hazardous chemical 
inventories in Columbia County
local fire and law enforcement 
agencies 1 year X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Enhance emergency planning, emergency response 
training and equipment to address hazardous 
materials incidents.
local fire and law enforcement 
agencies Ongoing X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Evaluate existing security measures for sites with 
large quantities of hazardous materials or any 
quantities of extremely hazardous substances and 
enhance security as necessary
local facility managers 1 year X X X X X
Short-Term     
#4
Evaluate seismic bracing/anchoring for sites with 
large quantities of hazardous materials or any 
quantities of extremely hazardous substances and 
upgrade as necessary
local facility managers 1-2 years X X X X X
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
 





































































Terrorism Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Enhance emergency planning, emergency response 
training and equipment to address potential terrorism  
incidents.
local fire and law enforcement 
agencies, facility managers Ongoing X X X X X
Long-Term     
#1
Upgrade physical security detection and response 
capability for critical facilities, including water systems 
and for any high-profile facilities such as major timber 
industry facilities and sites with large quantities of 
hazardous materials
facility managers 5 Years X X X X X
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
 
 








January 3, 2005 5-56 
5.0 PLAN ADOPTION, MAINTENANCE, AND IMPLEMENTATION 
5.1 Overview 
For a hazard mitigation plan to be effective, it has to be implemented gradually over time, as 
resources become available, continually evaluated and periodically updated. Only through 
developing a system which routinely incorporates logical thinking about hazards and cost-
effective mitigation into ongoing public- and private-sector decision making will the mitigation 
action items in this document be accomplished effectively. The following sections depict how 
Columbia County has adopted and will implement and maintain the vitality of the Columbia 
County Hazard Mitigation Plan. 
5.2 Plan Adoption 
The Columbia County Hazard Mitigation Plan was adopted by the Columbia County Board of 
Commissioners on March 9, 2005, making it the effective date of the plan. The Final Draft of the 
plan was submitted to OEM and FEMA for review approval, with the stipulation that edits 
required for approval were included in the adoption motion.  
FEMA approval of the Plan was received on March 9, 2005. FEMA approval means that 
Columbia County’s Hazard Mitigation Plan meets national standards and that the County will 
continue to be eligible for hazard mitigation funding from FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Grant 
Program, the Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program and other programs. 
Columbia County has the necessary human resources to ensure the Plan continues to be an 
actively used planning document. County staff has been active in the preparation of the plan, 
and have gained an understating of the process and the desire to integrate the plan into the 
Comprehensive Land Use Plan. Through this linkage, the plan will be kept active and be a 
working document. In 1996 and more recently, Columbia County has experienced several 
natural disaster events. These events have kept the interest in hazard mitigation planning and 
implementation alive at the Commissioner level, at the County staff level, in cities and special 
districts and among the citizens of Columbia County. 
5.3 IMPLEMENTATION 
Coordinating Body 
The Columbia County Hazard Mitigation Advisory Committee, convened by Commissioner Tony 
Hyde, will coordinate the implementation of the plan and be responsible for periodically 
monitoring, evaluating and updating the plan. The County will continue to provide staffing to the 
committee through the Emergency Management Program. Consistent staffing allows for well-
organized meetings and will ensure that the right people are involved at the meetings. The 
existing active interest in mitigation and emergency planning that exists within Columbia County 
will help to ensure the successful implementation of the plan. 
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Integration of the Hazard Mitigation Plan Into Ongoing Programs, Policies, and Practices 
The mission statement, objectives, goals and action items outlined in Chapter 4 of the Columbia 
County Hazard Mitigation Plan provide a strong framework and guidance for the identified 
mitigation priorities for Columbia County. However, the Mitigation Plan is a guidance document, 
not a regulatory document, and thus implementation of the objectives, goals and action items 
can be accomplished only by fully integrating this guidance into ongoing programs, policies and 
practices. Such integration is important not only at the county level, but also within cities and 
special districts as well. 
The current Hazard Mitigation Advisory Committee has representatives from key departments of 
Columbia County government including: Emergency Management, Land Development Services, 
Forest, Parks and Recreation and Roads. 
Figure 5.1 



















The County currently addresses statewide planning goals and legislative requirements through 
its comprehensive land use plan, capital improvement plans, and implementation of building 
codes. The Natural Hazard Mitigation Plan provides a series of action items – many of which 
are closely related to the objectives of these existing county programs. To the extent possible, 
Columbia County will work to incorporate the recommended mitigation action items into existing 
programs and procedures. These action items will help the County address various other 
statewide requirements, such as land-use planning Goal 7 which was developed to protect life 
and property from natural disasters and hazards through planning strategies that restrict 
development in areas of known hazards. 
 
January 3, 2005 5-58 
Goal 7 requires that local governments base development plans on inventories of known areas 
of natural disasters and hazards and that the intensity of development should be limited by the 
degree to which the natural hazard occurs within the areas of proposed development. The 
County’s Land Development Services is responsible for land use reviews, and assuring 
compliance with the zoning codes. The department will be able to use the resources and actions 
identified in this plan as an avenue to update statewide land-use planning Goal 7: Natural 
Hazards element of the County’s comprehensive plan and to integrate mitigation into existing 
zoning and planning documents when applicable. 
Additionally, the County is also responsible for issuing building permits and promoting 
compliance with state adopted construction codes. After the adoption of the mitigation plan, they 
will work with the State Building Code Office to make sure that they enforce the minimum 
standards established in the new State Building Code. In addition, the Hazard Mitigation 
Advisory Council will promote safe building practices in an effort to have structures more 
resistant to the impacts of all hazards. 
This integration of the Plan with ongoing activities will continue for other plans and projects 
within the County. As development plans come into the Community Development Department, 
reviewers will need to keep in mind potential hazard mitigation actions that may need to be 
implemented. The adopted building codes for the County include many standards that mitigate 
potential hazard damage. The County stays current in adoption of upgraded codes, ensuring 
that the new construction activities will meet the highest standard available for hazards such as 
floods and seismic. 
Capital improvement planning that occurs in the future will also contribute to the goals in the 
Natural Hazard Mitigation Plan. Various County Departments, including Public Works and 
Roads, develop Capital Improvement Programs (CIPs) and review them on an annual basis. 
The Hazard Mitigation Advisory Council will work with these departments to identify any relevant 
action items from Natural Hazard Mitigation Plan and work to incorporate such actions into the 
appropriate sections of the County’s CIPs. 
Within six months of formal adoption of the County’s Mitigation Plan, the procedures listed 
above will be incorporated into the process of existing planning mechanisms at the County level. 
The meetings of the Hazard Mitigation Advisory Council will provide an opportunity for 
committee members to report back on the progress made on the integration of mitigation 
planning elements into County planning documents, policies, procedures, and programs. 
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Cost Effectiveness of Mitigation Projects 
As Columbia County or the communities and special districts within the County consider 
whether or not to undertake specific mitigation projects or evaluate how to decide between 
competing mitigation projects, they must answer questions that don’t always have obvious 
answers, such as: 
• What is the nature of the hazard problem? 
• How frequent and how severe are hazard events? 
• Do we want to undertake mitigation measures? 
• What mitigation measures are feasible, appropriate, and affordable? 
• How do we prioritize between competing mitigation projects? 
• Are our mitigation projects likely to be eligible for FEMA funding? 
Columbia County recognizes that benefit-cost analysis is a powerful tool that can help 
communities provide solid, defensible answers to these difficult socio-political-economic-
engineering questions. Benefit-cost analysis is required for all FEMA-funded mitigation projects, 
under both pre-disaster and post-disaster mitigation programs. Thus, communities seeking 
FEMA funding must understand benefit-cost analysis. However, regardless of whether or not 
FEMA funding is involved, benefit-cost analysis provides a sound basis for evaluating and 
prioritizing possible mitigation projects for any natural hazard. Thus, Columbia County will use 
benefit-cost analysis and related economic tools, such as cost-effectiveness evaluation, to the 
extent practicable in prioritizing and implementing mitigation actions. 
5.4 Plan Maintenance 
Periodic Monitoring, Evaluation and Updating 
The Columbia County Hazard Mitigation Plan will be monitored and evaluated annually and 
updated at least every five years. As the community gradually implements the action items 
within the Plan, remaining action items may evolve or priorities may change. The hazards that 
exist in Columbia County will continue to exist, but the conditions within the community, such as 
the population and development patterns, will undoubtedly continue to change. As such 
changes occur gradually over time, the Plan will be regularly monitored, evaluated, and updated 
to ensure that it remains up to date and retains its vitality and relevance. 
Local, state and federal agencies will conduct or refine studies that may lead to new or better 
information on specific hazards. For example, flood plan maps are periodically updated and new 
studies may better define landslide or debris flow areas or areas subject to liquefaction during 
earthquakes. The new information will need to be incorporated not only into the Hazard 
Mitigation Plan but also into other documents, such as the Comprehensive Plan. 
Changes in the priorities of citizens of Columbia County may also affect the effectiveness of the 
Plan. Community values are regularly monitored through the Comprehensive Plan update 
process. As the Comprehensive Plan is implemented and updated, the Hazard Mitigation Plan 
will be reviewed as well. 
The Hazard Mitigation Advisory Committee will meet at least annually to review and evaluate 
the Plan. This will be the opportunity to incorporate new information into the Plan and remove 
outdated items and completed actions. This will also be the time to recognize the success of the 
community in implementation of action items. All revisions of the Plan will be taken to the Board 
of Commissioners for formal acknowledgement as part of Columbia County’s Plan maintenance 
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and implementation program. The Committee will also have lead responsibility for the formal 
updates of the plan every five years. 
Continued Public Involvement and Participation 
Implementation of the mitigation actions identified in the Plan will engage the community. The 
participation that led to the Plan was result of existing community networks and this network will 
continue to participate as the community wide mitigation activities identified in the plan are 
begun. Some projects can be done at the volunteer level, and others will require technical 
expertise. The stakeholders in the planning process will become project partners as needed on 
specific items. 
There are many organizations within the County that have common interests and concerns, 
including hazard mitigation. Organizations such as CEPA, the Oregon Department of Forestry, 
cities, special districts, and both large and small businesses will be important partners in the 
implementation of the Plan over time. Successful completion of high priority mitigation action 
items will require ongoing project planning with active participation from all stakeholders. 
Columbia County has a proven history of involving and continues to involve multiple partners in 
planning and mitigation work. These partnerships with local, state, and federal partners have 
resulted in comprehensive plans and projects that could not have been completed by any 
agency alone. This cooperation is also demonstrated by the broad based makeup of the Hazard 
Mitigation Advisory Committee. 
Columbia County is dedicated to involving the public directly in the ongoing monitoring, 
evaluating and updating of the Hazard Mitigation Plan. Copies of the Plan will be posted on the 
County website which will also contain an email address and phone number to which people 
can direct their comments and concerns about hazard mitigation issues and priorities. 
Public meetings will also be held after each annual evaluation or when deemed necessary by 
the Hazard Mitigation Advisory Council. The meetings will provide the public a forum for which 
they can express their concerns, opinions, or ideas about the Plan. The County Emergency 
Management Office will maintain public involvement and advertise for the public meetings 
through existing community organizations such as CEPA. County Emergency Management will 
be responsible for using County resources to publicize the annual public meetings and maintain 
public involvement through local newspapers. 
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6.0 FLOOD HAZARDS 
Columbia County is subject to flooding from several different types of flood sources, 
including: 
1. over bank flooding from the Columbia River, the Multnomah Channel and smaller 
rivers including the Clatskanie River and the Nehalem River, 
2. over bank flooding from smaller creeks such as Conyers Creek, McNulty 
Creek, Milton Creek, Rock Creek, Scappoose Creek, North Scappoose 
Creek, and others, and 
3. local storm water drainage flooding. 
The flood history of Columbia County indicates two distinct patterns for flooding: winter 
flooding from rainstorms affecting the streams and rivers within Columbia County and late 
spring flooding when snowmelt from the upper Columbia basin results in a gradual rise of 
the Columbia River along the northern and eastern border of Columbia County. 
Historically, the most severe floods have occurred in December, January and February, 
but damaging winter floods may occur anytime between October and April and spring 
runoff flooding along the Columbia River can occur between May and July. 
Winter flooding on streams and rivers within Columbia County generally results from large 
winter storms from the Pacific Ocean which often result in simultaneous flooding on many 
rivers and streams in an affected area. However, because of geographic variations in 
rainfall amounts and differences in drainage areas, slopes, and other watershed 
characteristics, the severity of flooding in any given rainfall event often varies significantly 
from stream to stream and location to location. 
6.1 Historical Floods in Columbia County 
Historically, flooding has occurred in Columbia County throughout the recorded history of 
the area, ever since the first European settlers arrived in the area in the mid-1800s. 
The FEMA Flood Insurance Study for Columbia County (August 16, 1988) has a brief 
history of major historical floods in Columbia County, over the 40 years preceding the 
Flood Insurance Study. Major floods occurred in 1948, 1964, 1972 and 1974. The 1948 
flood inundated eight drainage districts, much of Clatskanie’s central business district and 
the industrial port area of St. Helens. However, flood impacts for much of the reach of the 
Columbia River through Columbia County are limited by the relatively high and steeply 
sloping banks of the river, which limit flooding to a narrow band along the river. 
Winter flooding occurred in 1964, 1972, and 1974 on the Nehalem River, Scappoose 
Creek, North Scappoose Creek, Clatskanie River, Conyers Creek, and McNulty Creek. A 
major flood occurred on Scappoose Creek on February 1, 1987, flooding many homes in 
Scappoose. 
Flooding in St. Helens arises principally from the Columbia River, Multnomah Channel, 
Milton Creek and McNulty Creek. Significant flooding on Milton and McNulty Creeks 
occurred in 1955 and 1974, respectively. 
The largest floods on the Clatskanie River occurred in 1956, 1964, 1972, and 1974, 
although property damage was low. 
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Flooding on the Nehalem River has been more severe, with homes near Vernonia 
inundated by the 1964, 1972, and 1974 floods. 
Flooding potential along the Columbia River and Multnomah Channel has been 
substantially reduced by upstream flood control storage reservoirs. There are 22 major 
reservoirs upstream on the Columbia (about 40 million acre feet of flood control storage), 
11 major flood control reservoirs on the Willamette (1.7 million acre feet of flood control 
storage), and one reservoir on the Cowlitz River (360,000 acre feet of flood control 
storage). Therefore, the probability of flood events such as the 1948 Columbia River flood 
which flooded eight drainage districts and parts of Clatskanie and St. Helens is lower than 
in the past, but not zero. 
Despite the reduction in flood potential from construction of the dams, portions of 
Columbia County continue to have a significant level of flood risk from the major rivers as 
well as from the numerous creeks running through Columbia County. The dams on the 
larger rivers have not reduced flood risk on these smaller streams. 
6.2 The 1996 Flood 
The most recent significant flood event in Columbia County occurred in February 1996. 
Unusually heavy rains over the four-day period from February 5th to February 8th 1996 
resulted in significant flooding on numerous rivers and streams throughout western 
Oregon. In Columbia County, flood impacts continued for several days after the end of 
heavy rainfall. 
There were widespread road closures in Columbia County, from a combination of 
landslides and high water, including Highway 30 and Highway 47 at several locations and 
the Scappoose-Vernonia Road. During the peak flood period, all major highways were 
closed and secondary roads were open for emergency vehicles only or closed. Clatskanie 
and Vernonia were isolated due to road closures.  
The flooding in February 1996 affected many portions of Columbia County, with major 
flooding in Vernonia, Clatskanie, Rainier, and Mist and significant flooding in many other 
areas. Evacuations were necessary in much of Clatskanie and Vernonia as well as 
portions of Scappoose, St. Helens and Rainier and in several dike-protected areas along 
the Columbia River. The Columbia County Drainage District No. 1 and the Clatskanie 
Drainage Improvement Company Levees were breached during this flood.  
A boil water alert was necessary for most of the county, due to high turbidity in drinking 
water. Telecommunications, including emergency communications in some areas, were 
disrupted. 
FEMA funded repair and response costs for eligible public entities totaled over $5,000,000 
and the Oregon Economic Development Department provided nearly $1,000,000 in 
Disaster Recovery Grants to Columbia County. Total damages to private property were 
undoubtedly much larger than $5,000,000. 
The 1996 flood was significant for Columbia County, but certainly not the maximum 
possible flood event. Much larger floods are possible. 
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6.3 Flood Hazards and Flood Risk: Within Mapped Floodplains 
6.3.1 Overview 
FEMA Floodplain Maps show areas where the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) has determined that a flood hazard exists. Nearly all communities have at least 
some portion of the mapped hazard areas, or floodplains, within their jurisdiction. The 
FEMA-mapped floodplains in Columbia County are summarized below in Table 6.1 
(FEMA Flood Insurance Study, August 16, 1988). 
For the most part, the FEMA-mapped floodplains in Columbia County include only areas 
along the larger rivers and streams, which also have significant concentrations of 
development and population. Throughout Columbia County, there are many other 
localized areas that have significant flood risk but are not included in the FEMA mapped 
floodplains because the streams are too small and/or because the flood-prone population 
is too small. Thus, evaluation of flood hazards in Columbia County must consider not only 
the FEMA-mapped floodplains, but also the localized areas of repetitive flooding or high 
flood risk outside of the mapped floodplains. 
Table 6.1 
FEMA-Mapped Floodplains in Columbia County 
Flood Source Mapped Reach1
Columbia River entire reach from Multnomah to Clatsop County lines
Clatskanie River mouth to RM 3.2 at the Hazel Grove Road
Conyers Creek mouth to RM 1.5 in Clatskanie
McNulty Creek mouth to RM 2.3 at Ross Road near St. Helens
Milton Creek mouth to RM 8.1 at Brinn Rd. in Yankton
Multnomah Channel from confluence with Columbia River to Multnomah County Line
Nehalem River from RM 88.2 to RM 91.2 near Vernonia
Rock Creek from mouth to RM 1.1 at Vernonia
Scappoose Creek from RM 4.2 near West Lane Road to RM 9.9 at Raymond Creek Road near Scappoose
North Scappoose Creek from mouth to RM1.2 near Scappoose
North Scappoose Creek Overflow from its confluence with Scappoose Creek to the divergence from North Scappoose Creek
1 The term "reach"  means distance along a river or stream.  The term "RM" means river mile; river 
miles are measured upstream, starting from the mouth of the river or stream.  
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A synopsis of the flood-prone areas in Columbia County as shown on these FIRM maps is 
given below in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2 
Synopsis of FEMA-Mapped Flood-Prone Areas in Columbia County 
Flood Source Geographic Area
Columbia River
Diked areas along Columbia from near Clatskanie to near Ranier, 
including portions of Webb Drainage District, Marshland Drainage 
District, Midland Drainage District, Magruder Drainage District, 
Beaver Drainage District, John Drainage District, Kerry Drainage 
District, Woodson Drainage District, Clatskanie Drainage District
Fish Hawk Creek and 
Nehalem River Unincorporated areas west of Clatskanie
Clatskanie River, Conyers 
Creek, and Beaver Creek
Portions of City of Clatskanie, including approximately 10% of the 
streets in Clatskanie.  Narrow bands along Conyers Creek and 
Beaver Creek in unincorporated areas near Clatskanie .
Columbia River, Beaver 
Creek, and Goble Creek
Portions of the City of Ranier, north and east of Highway 30, 
including less than 10% of streets in Ranier.  Narrow bands along 
Beaver and Goble Creek in unincorporated areas near Ranier.
Nehalem River, Clatskanie 
River, Deep Creek and 
Rock Creek
Narrow bands along these flood sources in unincorporated areas 
in western and central Columbia County, including areas along 
Highway 47.
Tide Creek and Milton 
Creek
Narrow bands along these flood sources in unincorporated areas 
west of St. Helens.
Columbia River Deer Island and surrounding areas north of Columbia City and east of Highway 30.
Nehalem River Narrow bands along the river in unincorporated areas southwest of Vernonia
Nehalem River and Rock 
Creek
Large portions of Vernonia, including approximately 50% of the 
streets in the city.
Salmon Creek, Cox  Creek, 
Milton Creek, North 
Scappoose Creek,  South 
Scappoose Creek and 
Raymond Creek
Narrow bands along these flood sources in unincorporated areas 
in eastern Columbia County west of Scappoose.
Colombia River, Scappoose 
Creek and North 
Scappoose Creek
City of Scappoose, areas along the two creeks and area east of 
Highway 30 and north of the Burlington Northern Railroad line, 
including approximately 15% of the streets in Scappoose.
Columbia River
Diked areas along the Columbia from Ranier to Columbia City, St. 
Helens and Scappoose and southwards to the county line, 
including Scappoose Drainage District, Sauvie Island and other 
areas along the river.
McNulty Creek and Milton 
Creek
Narrow bands along the creeks in unincorporated areas west of 
St. Helens, continuing along the creeks into the city.  
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FEMA-mapped floodplains in Columbia County include: 
1. a broad swath of the lowlands along the entire reach of the Columbia River in 
Columbia County, including the dike districts, 
2. narrow bands along the Clatskanie and Nehalem Rivers and along 
numerous creeks in the County, 
3. portions of the larger cities, including Clatskanie, Rainier, Columbia City, 
St. Helens, Scappoose, and Vernonia. 
Of the larger cities, Vernonia appears to have the highest proportion of flood prone area 
and structures, with approximately 50% of the streets in the city within the 100-year flood 
plain. 
FEMA Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) for the above mapped areas show flood plain 
details such as the 100-year and 500-year flood plain boundaries. For Columbia County, 
there are several dozen FIRMs for cities and communities in unincorporated portions of 
the county. 
An important caveat in interpreting the FEMA floodplain maps (and the synopsis above) is 
that there are additional areas of Columbia County, not within the mapped floodplains, 
that are also at flood risk. These flood-prone areas are discussed later in this chapter 
(Section 6.4). 
6.3.2 Flood Hazard Data 
For mapped floodplain areas, the flood hazard data included in the Flood Insurance Study 
(FIS) allow quantitative calculation of the frequency and severity of flooding for any 
property within the floodplain. Such calculations are very important for mitigation planning, 
because they allow the level of flood risk for any structure to be evaluated quantitatively. 
The example below illustrates these concepts. 
For example, for the Nehalem River in Vernonia, downstream of the confluence with Rock 
Creek, the 1988 FEMA FIS includes the following data:  
Table 6.3 
Flood Hazard Data 
Nehalem River in Vernonia, at Highway 47 (Bridge Street) 





500 17,400 607.5  
 
The stream discharge data shown above are from the table on page 19 of the FIS for 
Columbia County, for the Nehalem River, downstream from the confluence of Rock Creek. 
Stream discharge means the volume of water flowing down the river and is typically 
measured in cubic feet of water per second (cfs). The flood elevation data are from the 
Flood Profile Graph 22P in the FIS. Flood elevation data vary with location along the 
reach of the river and thus separate flood elevation data points must be read from the 
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graph at each location along the river. The flood elevation data above are at Highway 47 
(Bridge Street). 
Quantitative flood hazard data, such as shown above, are very important for mitigation 
planning purposes because they allow quantitative determination of the frequency and 
severity (i.e., depth) of flooding for any building or other facility (e.g., road or water 
treatment plant) for which elevation data exist. For example, a building located in Vernonia 
near the Highway 47 bridge (cf. Table 6.3 above), with a first floor elevation of 604 feet is 
expected to flood about once very 10 years, on average. 50-year, 100-year, and 500-year 
flood events would result in about 1.6 feet, 2.2 feet and 3.5 feet of water above the first 
floor, respectively. Thus, such a structure is demonstrably at significantly high flood risk. 
Such quantitative flood hazard data also facilitate detailed economic analysis (benefit-cost 
analysis) of mitigation projects to reduce the level of flood risk for a particular building or 
other facility. Further details and examples of how such data are used are given in the 
Appendix (Mitigation Project Examples). 
6.3.3 Interpreting Flood Hazard Data for Mapped Floodplains 
The level of flood hazard (frequency and severity of flooding) is not determined simply by 
whether the footprint of a given structure is or is not within the 100-year floodplain. A 
common error is to assume that structures within the 100-year floodplain are at risk of 
flooding while structures outside of the 100-year floodplain are not. Some importance 
guidance for interpreting flood hazard is given below. 
a. Being in the 100-year floodplain does not mean that floods happen once every 
100 years. Rather, a 100-year flood simply means that the probability of a flood 
to the 100-year level or greater has a 1% chance of happening every year. 
b. Much flooding happens outside of the mapped 100-year floodplain. First, the 
100-year flood is by no means the worst possible flood. For example, for 
flooding along the Nehalem River in Vernonia, the 500-year flood is 1.3 feet 
higher than the 100-year flood (cf. data in Table 6.3 above). Thus, floods 
greater than the 100-year event will flood many areas outside of the mapped 
100-year floodplain. Second, many flood prone areas flood because of local 
storm water drainage conditions. Such flood prone areas have nothing to do 
with the 100-year floodplain boundaries. 
c. The key determinant of flood hazard and flood risk for a structure or other 
facility is the relationship of the elevation of the structure or facility to the flood 
elevations for various flood events. Thus, homes with first floor elevations 
below or near the 10-year flood elevation have drastically higher levels of flood 
hazard and risk than other homes in the same neighborhood with first floor 
elevations near the 50-year or 100-year flood elevation. 
The FEMA FIRM maps use a variety of nomenclature to describe different types of flood-
prone area and flood plain classifications have changed over time. For reference, 
definitions of some important flood plain terms commonly used on FIRMs are given below. 
 
January 3, 2005 
 
6-67
The FEMA floodplain maps include the following types of flood-prone areas: 
1. Zone AE, within the 100-year floodplain, with base flood elevation (100-
year flood) and detailed flood hazard data, 
2. Zone A, within 100-year flood plain, but without base flood elevation or 
detailed flood hazard data, 
3. Zone AH, flood depths of 1 to 3 feet (usually areas of ponding), base flood 
elevations determined, 
4. Zone AO, flood depths of 1 to 3 feet (usually sheet flow on sloping terrain), 
5. Zone A99, to be protected from 100-year flood by Federal flood protection 
system under construction, no base flood elevations determined, 
6. Zone X (shaded), areas of 500-year flood, areas of 100-year flood with 
average depths less than 1 foot or with drainage areas less than 1 square 
mile, and areas protected by levees from 100-year flood, 
7. Zone X (unshaded), areas outside 500-year flood plain, and 
8. Zone D, areas in which flood hazards are undetermined. 
6.3.4 Caveats for Columbia County Flood Insurance Study 
The Flood Insurance Study (FIS) for Columbia County was published in 1988. Flood 
hazard conditions often change with time as channels and watersheds evolve with 
increasing development and other changes. Overtime, the accuracy of a FIS typically 
diminishes with time and any FIS should be redone periodically to ensure that data are 
accurate and up to date for flood zoning and mitigation planning purposes.  
Simply because an FIS is old, does not necessarily mean that a FIS is obsolete or 
inaccurate. However, the older a study is, the more likely it is that channel or watershed 
conditions have changed over time. Therefore, as time passes, care should be taken in 
interpreting and using data from the FIS, especially in reaches of rivers or streams where 
substantial channel changes are documented or flood control measures have been 
added. 
6.4 Flood Hazards and Flood Risk: Outside of Mapped Floodplains 
Section 6.3 above applies only to the limited portions of Columbia County that are within 
the FEMA-mapped floodplains of the major rivers and portions of some of the smaller 
streams. For mitigation planning purposes, it is very important to recognize that flood risk 
for a community is not limited only to areas of mapped floodplains. Other portions of 
Columbia County outside of the mapped floodplains may also at relatively high risk from 
over bank flooding from streams too small to be mapped by FEMA or from local storm 
water drainage. In Columbia County as a whole there are dozens of small creeks with 
unmapped floodplains. 
Many areas of Columbia County outside of mapped floodplains are also subject to 
repetitive, damaging floods from local storm water drainage, separate from overbank 
flooding from creeks too small to be mapped. In many cases, local storm water drainage 
flooding occurs along unnamed gullies or simply in low spots. There are probably 
numerous such flood prone sites in Columbia County; many of these sites may have 
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experienced repetitive flooding over many years. Unlike FEMA-mapped floodplains for 
larger rivers and creeks, areas subject to storm water drainage are not systematically 
mapped. 
Storm water drainage systems vary markedly within Columbia County. In urban areas and 
some smaller communities, storm water drainage consists of drains and an underground 
pipe system. In lower population density areas, storm water drainage systems are 
generally open drainage ditches. In rural areas, storm water drainage systems are 
typically hit or miss, with culverts or other drainage infrastructure built only in limited 
locations with repetitive flooding episodes. 
A complete inventory of Columbia County’s storm water drainage system is beyond the 
scope of this mitigation plan. Individual communities can provide information about their 
specific local drainage system. In general, however, storm water drainage systems, 
including those in Columbia County, are almost always designed to handle only small to 
moderate size rainfall events. Storm water systems are sometimes designed to handle 
only 2-year or 5-year flood events, and are rarely designed to handle rainfall events 
greater than 10-year or 15-year events. 
For local rainfall events that exceed the collection and conveyance capacities of the storm 
water drainage system, some level of flooding inevitably occurs. In many cases, local 
storm water drainage systems are designed to allow minor street flooding to carry off 
storm waters that exceed the capacity of the storm water drainage system. In larger 
rainfall events, flooding may extend beyond streets to include yards. In major rainfall 
events, local storm water drainage flooding can also flood buildings. In extreme cases, 
local storm water drainage flooding can sometimes result in several feet of water in 
buildings, with correspondingly high damage levels. 
Columbia County’s 1998 Hazard Mitigation Plan identified three high priority locations for 
storm water drainage improvements: 
1. Culvert replacement on Scappoose-Vernonia Highway at milepost 9.3, 
2. Culvert replacement at Oak Ranch Creek on Apiary Road, and 
3. Drainage improvements/culverts on Apiary Rd. 
These identified projects remain as high priorities for mitigation projects as resources 
become available. The County is continuously seeking funding sources for mitigation 
activities such as these. 
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6.5 Inventory Exposed to Flood Hazards in Columbia County 
6.5.1 Overview 
Critical facilities such as emergency communications, fire stations, police stations, medical 
care facilities are, by definition, particularly important to a community. Similarly, key 
transportation and utility infrastructure are also particularly important to a community. One 
important action item for the Columbia County Hazard Mitigation Plan is to compile an 
inventory of such critical facilities that are at high risk for each hazard, including floods. A 
preliminary list of critical facilities located within the FEMA-mapped 100-year or 500-year 
floodplains, or otherwise perceived to be at high flood risk is given below in Table 6.4. 
To quantify the level of flood hazard for buildings, other facilities or infrastructure, within 
mapped floodplains, it is necessary to determine the elevations of these structures. Only 
by determining the elevation of each potentially flood-prone structure, can the level of 
flood hazard (frequency and severity of flooding) be calculated accurately. Similarly, 
acquiring elevation data for additional structures within the 500-year flood plain as well as 
for structures in other flood-prone areas outside of mapped floodplains would greatly 
increase the accuracy of hazard, inventory, and vulnerability assessments for floods in 
Columbia County. Compiling and interpreting such elevation data, especially for critical 
facilities is encouraged as a high priority action item. 
The best structure elevations (first floor elevations) are those determined accurately by 
surveying. Flood insurance certificates generally include survey elevation data. Absent 
survey data, however, useful estimates of elevations for structures can often be made by 
reference to elevations of nearby structures or public infrastructure with surveyed 
elevation data. 
In addition to elevation data, quantifying the level of risk faced by these structures requires 
basic data about each structure, including building data (square footage, number of 
stories, with or without basement), and information on the type and importance of function 
(residential, commercial, public). 
Additional sites of repetitive flood problems outside of the mapped floodplains are also 
included below in Table 6.4. 
As noted above, many localized areas of Columbia County, outside of the mapped 
floodplains, are also subject to relatively high levels of flood risk To quantify the level of 
flood risk posed by these areas, historical data should be systematically compiled to 
include documentation of the frequency and severity of flooding. Severity of flooding can 
include dollar estimates of past damages, if available, and/or simple narratives reporting 
whether the flooding in a given area is limited to minor street and yard flooding only, or 
whether flooding is severe enough to produce road damages, road closures, or damages 
to other infrastructure or buildings as well. 
 
 




Critical Facilities and Infrastructure Located within FEMA-Mapped Floodplains or Otherwise 






Within footprint of 100-year floodplain 
but floor level is approximately 2.5 to 3 
feet above 100-year flood elevation
City of Scappoose2 Water treatment plants (2)
Within 100-year floodplain or otherwise 
perceived as being at flood risk
Wastewater treatment plant Within 100-year floodplain or otherwise perceived as being at flood risk
Other water infrastructure Within 100-year floodplain or otherwise perceived as being at flood risk
City of Vernonia3
Washington Elementary and 
Vernonia High Schools
Within 100-year floodplain or otherwise 
perceived as being at flood risk
Vernonia and Columbia 
County Public Works
Within 100-year floodplain or otherwise 
perceived as being at flood risk
Vernonia Water Treatment 
Plant and Water Station at 
Mist Dr. and Ivy St.
Within 100-year floodplain or otherwise 
perceived as being at flood risk
Verizon Communications and 
Western Oregon Electric 
Facilities
Within 100-year floodplain or otherwise 
perceived as being at flood risk
Providence Health Clinic Within 100-year floodplain or otherwise perceived as being at flood risk




Sections of Highways 47 and 
202, as identified in 1998 
Columbia County Hazard 
Mitigation Plan
Subject to closures due to flooding.
1 Data from Sally Jones, 8/24/2004
2 Data from Jon Hanken, 8/312004
3 Data from Chief Matthew Workman, 8/23/2004
4 Data from Chief Dave Crawford, 8/23/04  
The above list of flood prone facilities is only a sample of flood prone facilities in Columbia 
County. Most other cities and other population centers also have at least some critical 
buildings and infrastructure at flood risk. Some of such critical facilities being considered 
for flood mitigation measures are: 
 
January 3, 2005 
 
6-71
Action Item Short Term #1 and Long Term #1 
Facility Location Water Body Approximate 
Elevation 
Fire Stations 






Fire and Rescue 
270 Col. Blvd. St Helens McNulty Creek 60 




















Jackson Creek  
Schools (K-12)    








475 Bridge St. Vernonia Nehalem River  
Rainier 
Elementary 
PO Box 160 Rainier  Goble Creek 100 
 






715 Maple St Vernonia Nehalem River 600 
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6.5.2 Columbia County Dike Districts 
There are 15 drainage improvement districts or companies which operate levees in 
Columbia County. In total these districts cover over 35,000 acres (about 56 square miles) 
with 98 miles of levees. Summary data on these districts or companies is given below in 
Table 6.5. 
As shown in Table 6.5, all of these levee systems were originally constructed in the first 
half of the twentieth century, although all have undergone numerous rounds of repairs and 
improvements over the decades. The FEMA firm maps show large areas of some of these 
districts as Zone AE (within 100-year floodplain); only a few of these levees are certified to 
provide 100-year flood protection. The five levee systems certified to provide 100-year 
flood protection, according to Richard Gamble (US Army Corps of Engineers, August 
2004) include: 
Sauvie Island Drainage Improvement Company, 
Scappoose Drainage Improvement Company, 
Rainier Water Improvement Company, 
Midland Drainage Improvement Company, and 
Beaver Drainage Improvement Company. 
The specific level of flood protection offered by each district’s levee system depends on 
levee heights, condition, and maintenance. 
All of these districts contain primarily agricultural lands, with many having low density rural 
development with a few residences. The level of flood risk posed to these residences 
varies from district to district. 
 




Drainage Improvement Districts or Companies 
Drainage District Acres Levee Miles
Original 
Construction Safe Water Level
2 Development within 
Levees
Sauvie Island Drainage 
Improvement Company 12,000 18 1938 to 1942 4 feet above 100-year flood agricultural lands, ponds
Scappoose Drainage 
Improvement Company 5,530 10 1922 to 1940 2.1 feet above 100-year flood
agricultural lands, with 
few residences
Ranier Water Improvement 
District 1,287 4.6 1920 1.8 feet above 100-year flood
agricultural lands, 
sloughs
Midland Drainage Improvement 
Company 1,330 6.7 1912 0.1 foot above 100-year flood agricultural lands
Beaver Drainage Improvement 
Company 5,595 13 1915 0 foot above 100-year flood mostly agricultural lands
Clatsop Drainage Improvement 
Company No. 15 233 2.1 1920 2.6 feet below 100-year flood agricultural lands
Westland Drainage District 
Improvement Company 1,090 6.5 before 1930 2.9 feet below 100-year flood agricultural lands
Woodson Drainage Districts 355 3.4 1915 3.1 feet below 100-year flood agricultural lands
Marshland Drainage 
Improvement Company 1,145 4.8 1920 3.4 feet below 100-year flood agricultural lands
Magruder Drainage 
Improvement Company 592 3 1911 3.9 feet below 100-year flood agricultural lands
Clatskanie Drainage 
Improvement Company 325 2.2 1912 4.2 feet below 100-year flood agricultural lands
Webb District Improvement 
Company 733 4.5 1921 4.4 feet below 100-year flood agricultural lands
John Drainage District 147 1.7 1915 4.8 feet below 100-year flood agricultural lands, residences
Columbia County Drainage 
District No. 1 1,559 9.3 1915 5.2 feet below 100-year flood
agricultural lands, wild 
fowl refuge, 20 acres of 
home sites
Deer Island Drainage 
Improvement Company 3,900 8.58 1942 5.2 feet below 100-year flood
agricultural lands, lakes 
and sloughs
Totals 35,821 98
1 Compilation of drainage district data obtained from US Army Corps of Engineers, Portland District 
publication "Columbia River and Tributaries Review Study CRT 69 - Lower Columbia River Flood 
Control Study - River Mile 0 to 145 - Summary Report Volume 2", January 1989.
2 Values given for the safe water level represents the highest flood level for which reasonable 
assurance can be made that the levee system will not fail. This level is further defined as the river 
state at which only normal surveillance and minor remedial work would be required during normal 
flood periods and close surveillance of the system is required only during extended flood periods.  
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6.6 Flood Loss Estimates and Flood Risk 
6.6.1 Flood Loss Estimates: Rough Estimates 
Rough estimates of the magnitude of potential flood losses in Columbia County can be 
made from estimates of the number of buildings located within mapped-floodplains, as 
shown below in Tables 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, and 6.9. These estimates are rough, for planning 
purposes only (e.g., for comparison of the relative impact of various hazards on Columbia 
County) and should not be taken literally. 
Based on census data, we estimate that there are roughly 20,000 buildings in Columbia 
County (Table 6.6). Based on review of the Columbia County FIRMs, we estimate than 
about 6% of these buildings may be in the 100-year floodplain, or otherwise flood-prone. 
Table 6.6 
Census Data and Estimated Number of Buildings 
    Demographic Category Estimate
Population 2003 Estimate 46,261
Persons per Household 2.65
Households 17,457
Other buildings 2,543
Total buildings 20,000  
 
Table 6.7 
Estimated Number of Flood-Prone Buildings 
Total
Population Percent Population Structures
Vernonia 2,243 50% 1,122 485
Scappoose 5,326 20% 1,065 461
Rest of County 38,692 2% 774 335
Total 46,261 6.40% 2,961 1,280
Estimated to be in 100-Year Flood PlainCommunity
 
 
Estimated damages per flooded building are shown below in Table 6.8. These estimates 
are based on an average building replacement value of $100,000 ($66.67/sf for 1,500 sf), 
with an average contents value of $30,000 (typical FEMA assumption for benefit-cost 
analysis of residential flood mitigation projects). For an average flood water depth of 2 feet 
above the first floor, building and contents damage percentages are estimated as 22% 
and 33%, respectively of building replacement value and contents replacement value, 
based on typical FEMA values for one-story structures without basements (from 
nationwide flood insurance claims data). Other damages, including damages to yards, 
vehicles, and outbuildings are estimated roughly at $4,000 per structure. Displacement 
costs for temporary housing are estimated roughly at $2,000 per structure. With these 
input data/assumptions, estimated damages and losses total nearly $38,000 per flooded 
building. 
 




Estimated Damages per Flooded Building 
Category Estimate
Average Building Replacement Value $100,000
Average Contents Value $30,000
Building damage (22%) $22,000
Contents damage (33%) $9,900
Other damages $4,000
Displacement costs $2,000
Total Damages and Losses $37,900  
 
Total damages and losses for buildings and contents (and related losses) are estimated 
simply by multiplying the estimated damages and losses per building by the estimate 
number of flood-prone buildings. Then, damages to infrastructure and economic impacts 
of floods (lost business income, lost wages, etc.) are each estimated very roughly at 50% 
of total damages and losses for buildings and contents. 
Table 6.9 
Estimated Total Damages and Losses for Hypothetical County-Wide 100-Year Flood 
Category Estimate
Building and Contents etc. $48,509,313
Infrastructure Damages $24,254,656
Economic Losses $24,254,656
Total Damages and Losses $97,018,626  
 
As acknowledged above, these estimated flood losses are very rough and should not be 
interpreted literally, but rather only as an order of magnitude estimate of potential flood 
losses. Furthermore, a 100-year flood (or any other flood event) would be highly unlikely 
to affect the entire county at one time. Nevertheless, these rough estimates seem 
approximately correct. 
From these rough estimates, it appears that a moderately severe flood event such as the 
1996 flood could easily result in $5,000,000 to $10,000,000 to $20,000,000 in flood 
damages and losses within Columbia County. Larger flood events, such as a 100-year 
event, could probably result in losses several times larger, perhaps approaching roughly 
$100,000,000 for Columbia County as a whole. 
Somewhat more accurate flood damage and loss estimates can be made using more 
detailed data, using loss estimation calculation tools such as FEMA’s HAZUS-MH loss 
estimation software. However, accurate flood loss estimates for specific communities 
requires much more detailed data as discussed below in the following section. 
6.6.2 Techniques for More Accurate Flood Loss Estimates 
More accurate flood loss estimates for specific areas of Columbia County can be made by 
obtaining more detailed inventory information, including elevations of flood prone 
structures. Then, the economic impacts of floods can be estimated more completely using 
the approaches outlined below. 
 
January 3, 2005 
 
6-77
For most residential structures and many similar commercial and public structures, the 
likely amount of building damage from floods of any given depth can be estimated 
approximately using FEMA depth-damage tables. These depth damage tables are derived 
from Federal Insurance Administration flood insurance claims data for several million 
properties and thus represent typical damage levels for typical structures. Although actual 
damages will vary somewhat from structure to structure, depending also on flood 
conditions such as duration, velocity, and degree of contamination, these typical values 
represent a good starting point to estimate flood damages for typical structures and thus 
to help quantify the level of flood risk. Current FEMA depth-damage data for typical 
structures are given in the Appendix – Example Mitigation Projects.  
In estimating flood losses or evaluating flood risk (for a structure or a whole community) it 
is very important to recognize that the economic impact of floods includes not only 
damages to buildings and contents but other economic impacts as well, including: 
1. damages to yards, vehicles, and outbuildings (not in depth damage data 
above), 
2. displacement costs for temporary quarters while repairs are made, 
3. loss of business income, 
4. loss of public services. 
In some cases, these economic impacts of floods can be a significant fraction of building 
and contents damages, or even larger, especially for critical facilities or critical 
infrastructure. FEMA’s publication What is a Benefit? Draft Guidance for Benefit-Cost 
Analysis provides an excellent primer, along with typical values and simple economic 
methods, to place monetary values on the loss of function of buildings, critical facilities, 
roads and bridges, and utility systems. 
6.7 Flood Insurance Data for Columbia County 
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) maintains a database of all flood insurance 
policies in the United States. NFIP data for Columbia County are summarized below in 
Table 6.10. As shown below, there are 626 flood insurance policies in place in Columbia 
County as a whole, with about 40% of these outside of the larger cities. Of the policies 
within the larger cities, most are in Vernonia and Scappoose, reflecting the significant 
fractions of these cities located within the mapped floodplains. 
 














St. Helens 45 0
Vernonia 156 0
Unincorporated Areas 252 1
Columbia County Total 626 1  
 
The FEMA NFIP database indicates that 234 of these insured structures (37%) are post-
FIRM structures and thus may have been built in accord with flood plain management 
regulations governing minimum first floor elevations vis-à-vis the base flood (100-year) 
elevation. However, 384 of these structures (61%) are pre-FIRM structures and likely to 
be lower, more flood-prone elevations. The data of construction and pre- or post-FIRM 
status of the remaining 8 structures is not known. 
FEMA’s repetitive loss list includes all insured properties that have experienced two or 
more insured losses of at least $1,000 for which the flood events were at least 10 days 
apart but not more than 10 years apart. The FEMA repetitive loss list provides one 
indication of properties that may be at high risk for future flooding. However, because 
these claims data do not consider the severity or frequency of the flood events causing 
the flood loss claims, the repetitive loss list is not mathematically rigorous. For example, 
some properties on the list may have simply been unlucky and have experienced two 
flood events with low probabilities (e.g., 100-year or greater events) within a short time 
period. Thus, the properties on the repetitive loss list may be at relatively high flood risk or 
they may not. Correspondingly, there are almost certainly other properties within 
Columbia County at equal or higher levels of flood risk that are not on the FEMA repetitive 
loss list. These properties may not have flood insurance or simply may have been lucky 
over the relatively short reporting period for the NFIP repetitive loss list (data since 1978). 
Despite these limitations of FEMA’s repetitive loss list, properties within Columbia County 
on the repetitive loss list may be good targets of opportunity for flood mitigation. Most of 
FEMA’s mitigation programs list repetitive loss properties as high priorities for mitigation 
and thus obtaining FEMA funding for properties on the repetitive loss list may be more 
likely than for properties not on the list. 
For reference, we note that the very approximate calculations presented above in Table 
6.7estimated about 1,280 buildings with footprints within the 100-year floodplain. The 
actual number of flood insurance policies in Columbia County (cf. Table 6.10 above) is 
about 50% of this estimate. A 50% ratio of flood insurance policies to structures in the 
100-year flood plain is more of less typical of many communities. The lower number of 
policies most likely results from a combination of factors, including homeowners who 
simply choose not to buy flood insurance, buildings not required to have flood insurance 
or not having insurance whether required or not as well as buildings whose footprint is in 
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the 100-year flood plain but whose first floor elevation is above the 100-year flood 
elevation. 
6.8 Summary of Flood Risk for Columbia County 
The flood hazard, vulnerability and risk data, estimates and analyses presented above are 
summarized in the following table. 
Table 6.11 
Summary of Flood Risk for Columbia County 
Question Commentary
a. overbank flooding from Columbia, Nehalem, and Clatskanie 
Rivers and numerous smaller streams
Affects portions of every community in Columbia 
County.  
b. storm water drainage flooding Affects portions of many communities and rural areas.
    a. FEMA-mapped floodplains
Every major community in Columbia County has 
portions of the community within FEMA-mapped 
floodplains.  Vernonia and Scappoose have the 
largest percentage of flood-prone structures.  All 
of the diked areas are subject to flooding in major 
flood events.
    b. areas outside of FEMA-mapped floodplains
Numerous locations affected by storm water 
drainage and flooding on smaller, unmapped 
streams; complete inventory of flood prone sites 
not yet available
    a. Buildings
Complete inventory not yet available.  Rough 
estimate is that about 1,000 to 1,500 buildings 
may be within footprint of 100-year flood plain.
    b. Critical facilities Complete inventory not yet available.  
    b. Roads and other infrastructure
As demonstrated by the 1996 flood, every major 
highway in Columbia County and many secondary 
roads are subject to closure during flood events.
    a. roads Road closures and road damages happen to some extent almost every year
    b. buildings
Relatively few buildings appear to be at extremely 
high flood risk (10-year floodplain or lower), but 
many buildings are at risk from flooding in larger 
less frequent flood events
    a. frequent flooding (annual or every few years)
Very frequent flooding appears to impact primarily 
roads and relatively few buildings and other 
facilities
    b  major floods (25-year, 50-year, 100-year etc. events)
Increasingly major floods affect increasingly large 
fractions of the population, building stock and 
infrastructure of Columbia County.  A widespread 
100-year flood event could result in up to one 
hundred million dollars of damages and directly 
affect over one thousand buildings and several 
thousand people.
How serious is the flooding problem?
What is the source and type of the flood problem?
What is the geographic area affected by the flooding?
What inventory of buildings and infrastructure are at risk?
How frequent is the flooding problem?
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6.9 Common Flood Mitigation Projects 
Potential mitigation projects to reduce the potential for future flood losses cover a wide 
range of possibilities. 
For either major rivers or the creeks, it would be theoretically possible to reduce future 
flood losses by building levees or floodwalls. In practice, however, such projects are often 
very expensive and have a host of environmental and other regulatory hurdles. 
For the smaller creeks, channel improvements to improve water conveyance capacity and 
removal of flow-restriction obstructions may be desirable. Another possibility for some of 
the smaller creeks would be to construct detention ponds upstream to temporarily store 
water during high rainfall periods. Detention ponds are basically leaky dams, designed to 
be dry during normal conditions. Detention ponds typically have restricted outlets with 
controlled flow rates. Thus, during periods of high inflow into the pond, water is stored 
temporarily and then gradually released. The effect of detention ponds is to lower peak 
discharge values and thus to lower peak flood elevations. 
For areas of Columbia County subject to flooding from storm water drainage, various 
storm water drainage system improvements may be desirable. Typical improvements 
include upgrades to the size of drainage ditches or storm water drainage pipes and 
upgrades to pumping capacity (for pumped portions of drainage systems). Another 
possibility for some areas may be construction of local detention ponds. 
For critical facilities at low elevations with high flood risk, such as the water and 
wastewater treatment plants, construction of berms or floodwalls to protect the facilities 
may be desirable. 
For residential, commercial or public facilities at high flood risk, elevation of structures or, 
for structures at very high flood risk, acquisition and demolition are potential mitigation 
options. Elevation and acquisition (especially) are expensive mitigation options that are 
generally not cost-effective unless the levels of flood hazard and flood risk are rather high. 
That is, these mitigation options are most attractive for structures deep in the flood plain 
(i.e., with first floors below the 10-, or 20-, or 30-year flood elevations). For structures 
outside of mapped floodplains, elevation or acquisition would likely be cost-effective only 
for structures with a strong history of major, repetitive flood losses. 
For structures near the fringe of the 100-year flood plain, near the 100-year flood level, or 
with some history of repetitive flood losses, various small-scale flood loss reduction 
measures such as elevation of furnaces and utilities may be desirable. 
The following table contains flood mitigation action items from the master Action Item 
table in Chapter 4
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Table 6.12 





































































Flood Mitigation Action Items:  Within FEMA-Mapped Floodplains
Short-Term     
#1
Complete inventory of critical facilities within 100-year 
and 500-year floodplains, with GIS mapping if 
possible
Columbia County (Land 
Development Services, Roads, 
Assessor), cities, special districts
Ongoing X X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Complete inventory of residential and commercial 
buildings within 100-year and 500-year floodplains, 
with GIS mapping if possible
Columbia County (Land 
Development Services, Roads, 
Assessor), cities, special districts
Ongoing X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Consult with property owners and explore mitigation 
actions for any Columbia County properties on 
FEMA's national repetitive loss list
Columbia County Hazard Mitigation 
Advisory Committee 1 year X X X X
Long-Term     
#1
Survey elevation data for critical facilities, residential 
buildings and commercial buildings within the 100-
year floodplain and establish flood mitigation priorities
Local emergency services, 
Columbia County Hazard Mitigation 
Advisory Committee
2-5 years X X X X X
Long-Term     
#2
For critical facilities within the 100-year floodplain and 
for other structures deep within the 100-year 
floodplain explore mitigation options with property 
owners and implement mitigation measures
Local emergency services, 
Columbia County Hazard Mitigation 
Advisory Committee
2-10 years X X X X X
Flood Mitigation Action Items:  Outside of FEMA-Mapped Floodplains
Short-Term     
#1
Complete the inventory of locations in Columbia 
County subject to frequent storm water flooding
Columbia County (Land 
Development Services, Roads, 
Assessor), cities, special districts
Ongoing X X X X X
Long-Term     
#1
For locations with repetitive flooding and significant 
damages or road closures, determine and implement 
mitigation measures such as upsizing culverts or 
storm water drainage ditches
Columbia County (Land 
Development Services, Roads, 
Assessor), cities, special districts
Ongoing X X X X X
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
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7.0 WINTER STORMS 
7.1 Overview 
Winter storms affecting Columbia County are generally characterized by a combination of 
heavy rains and high winds throughout the County, sometimes with snowfall, especially at 
higher elevations. Heavy rains can result in localized or widespread flooding, as well as 
debris slides and landslides. High winds commonly result in tree falls which primarily 
affect the electric power system, but which may also affect roads, buildings and vehicles. 
This chapter deals primarily with the rain, wind, snow and ice effects of winter storms. 
Larger scale flooding is addressed in Chapter 6. Debris flows and landslides are 
addressed in Chapter 8. 
For completeness, we also briefly address other severe weather events, including severe 
thunderstorms, hail, lightning strikes and tornadoes in Section 7.5. However, the 
frequency, severity, and impacts of such severe weather events are generally minor for 
Columbia County, compared to winter storm effects. 
Winter storms can affect the area directly, with damage within Columbia County, or 
indirectly, with damage outside the area but affecting transportation to/from the area 
and/or utility services (especially electric power). Historically, the area has often been 
subject to both direct and indirect impacts of winter storms. 
The winter storms that affect Columbia County are typically not local events affecting only 
small geographic areas. Rather, the winter storms are typically large cyclonic low pressure 
systems moving from the Pacific Ocean and that thus usually affect large areas of Oregon 
and/or the whole Pacific Northwest. 
Historical winter storm data complied by the Portland Office of the National Weather 
Service (www.wrh.noaa.gov/Portland/windstorm.html) include the following major winter 
storm events with substantial wind damage in Oregon: 
1. February 7, 2002 
2. December 12, 1995 
3. November 13-15, 1981 
4. March 25-26, 1971 
5. October 2, 1967 
6. March 27, 1963 
7. October 12, 1962 
8. November 3, 1958 
9. December 21-23, 1955 
10. December 4, 1951 
11. November 10-11, 1951 
12. April 21-22, 1931 
13. January 20, 1921 
14. January 9, 1880. 
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The website referenced above has informative narrative summaries of each winter storm 
event, including wind speed data and damage reports. Similar compilations of historical 
windstorm data have been compiled by Wolf Read at Oregon State University 
(http://oregonstate.edu/~readw/). The OSU website has a vast archive of historical winter 
storm data for Oregon. 
The specific severity and impacts of the major historical winter storm events listed above 
varied significantly with geographic location within Oregon. However, in terms of sustained 
wind speeds and damage levels, the 1880 and 1962 storms stand out as the most severe 
such events for Oregon. 
7.2  Rain Hazard Data 
Severe winter storms in Columbia County often include heavy rainfall. The potential 
impact of heavy rainfall depends on both the total inches of rain and the intensity of rainfall 
(inches per hour or inches per day). In the context of potential flooding, “rainfall” also 
includes the rainfall equivalent from snowmelt. Flash floods, which are produced by 
episodes of intense heavy rains (usually 6 hours or less) or dam breaks are rare in 
Columbia County (and western Oregon) but do represent a potential meteorological 
hazard. For Columbia County, sudden levee breaks could result in flash flooding of diked 
areas along the Columbia River. 
Large drainage basins, such as that for the Columbia River typically have response times 
of several days: the total rainfall amounts (plus snow melt) over periods of several days or 
more are what determines the peak level of flooding along large rivers. Smaller rivers may 
have response times of several hours up to a day or so. Smaller, local drainage basins 
have even shorter response times and levels of peak flooding may be governed by rainfall 
totals over a period of an hour to a few hours. 
However, for the Columbia River, there are numerous large multi-purpose dams and thus 
the usual natural correlation between rainfall events and flood levels does not apply. 
Rather, flooding along such rivers is predominantly affected by water release patterns 
from the dams. For the major rivers, dam operating characteristics and capacities are 
included in the flood modeling for FEMA-mapped floodplains (see Chapter 6). 
Columbia County annual rainfall data are summarized in Table 7.1 below for three 
representative cities. 
Table 7.1 











Clatskanie 57.23 31.50 (1948) 75.96 (1950)
St. Helens 43.53 9.01 (1976) 64.39 (1995)
Vernonia 48.88 19.08 (1967) 71.16 (1996)
Data for Clatskanie, St. Helens RFD and Vernonia 2 weather stations from
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Average annual rainfall amounts are moderately high throughout Columbia County, with 
somewhat higher averages in western portions of the county. As shown above, there are 
also substantial variations in annual rainfall from year to year. 
The rainfall data shown in Table 7.1 give general overview of the potential for winter storm 
flooding in Columbia County, but whether or not flooding occurs at specific sites depends 
heavily on specific local rainfall totals during individual storms and local drainage 
conditions. Whether or not localized flooding does occur depends on specific local 
drainage conditions. For example, 3" of rain in one area may cause no damage at all, 
while 3" of rain in a nearby area may cause road washouts and flooding of buildings. 
For Columbia County, identification of specific sites subject to localized flooding during 
winter storms is based on historical occurrences of repetitive flooding events during past 
winter storm events. Most of these sites affect roads, rather than buildings. 
An action-list of the some of the most problematic sites for roadway flooding in Columbia 
County is given below in Table 7.2. 
Table 7.2 
Sites with Repetitive Road Flooding Problems 
Address Community Address Community
1102 Millard St. Helens 2038 Meisner Rainier
1011 Barger St. Helens ? Calvin Rainier
1128 Pittsburg St. Helens 2100 Parkdale Rainier
1015 Berg St. Helens 2090 Neer City Rainier
1140 Shaffer 2033 Doan Rainier
1029 Cannan Deer Island 1064 Gensman Yankton
3064 Keasey Columbia City 2060 Heath Alston
3034 Fishhawk Fishhawk 2076 Larson Alston
4134 Mayger Mayger 1001 Alder Creek Chapman
4147 Beaver Falls Mayger 2011 Barker Beaver Homes
2087 Moiser Mayger 2053 Gregory Beaver Homes
3098 Bayers Mist
Other Repetitive Flood Problem Areas
Emergency Transportation Routes Flood Problem Areas
Scappoose-Vernonia Road
Apiary Road
18 locations between milepost 0.8 and 
milepost 20.0




In addition, the following areas were identified as top candidates for drainage problem 
mitigation: Gensman Road (St. Helens), Barker Road (Beaver Homes), South Canaan 
Road (Trenholm) and Smith Road (west of Columbia City). 
7.3 Wind Hazard Data 
Wind speeds associated with winter storms vary depending on meteorological conditions, 
but also vary spatially depending on local topography. For Columbia County, the wind 
hazard levels are generally highest in the immediate vicinity of the Columbia River and 
then fairly uniform across most of the rest of the county. In the hilly areas, however, the 
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level of wind hazard is strongly determined by local specific conditions of topography and 
vegetation cover. 
A regional overview of wind hazards is shown by the data in Figures 7.3 and 7.4 which 
show contours of wind speed (in kilometers per hour) for western Oregon (Wantz and 
Sinclair, Distribution of Extreme Wind Speeds in the Bonneville Power Administration 
Service Area, Journal of Applied Meteorology, Volume 20, 1400-1411, 1981). These data 
are for the standard meteorological data height of 10 meters (about 39 feet) above ground 
level. Figures 7.3 and 7.4 show wind speed contours for recurrence intervals of 2-years 
and 50-years, respectively. These data are for sustained wind speeds. Peak gusts are 
commonly 30% or so higher than the sustained wind speeds. These wind-speed data are 
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Figure 7.4 
Wind Speed Contours for 50-Year Recurrence Interval 
(km/hr) 
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Table 7.5 







2-year 60 to 70 37 to 43
50-year 90 to 100 56 to 62
1 Conversion from map contours in kilometers per hour is 
0.6214 miles per kilometer  
For Columbia County, the 2-year recurrence interval sustained wind speeds range from 
about 60 to 70 km/hour or about 37 to 43 miles per hour. These 2-year wind speeds are 
too low to cause widespread substantial wind damage. However, there may be significant 
local wind damage at sites where local wind speeds are higher or where there are 
especially exposed locations, such at the boundary between clear cut and forested areas. 
For Columbia County, the 50-year recurrence interval wind speeds range from about 90 to 
100 km/hour or about 56 to 62 miles per hour. These wind speeds are high enough to 
cause widespread wind damage. Damage may be severe at particularly exposed sites. 
Thus, for most regions of Columbia County winter storms with significant direct wind 
damage are not likely every year or every few years, but perhaps once every decade or 
so, on average, with major windstorm events happening at intervals averaging a few 
decades. 
The maps shown above have limited spatial resolution for Columbia County, but suggest 
that the potential for damaging winds may be somewhat higher in eastern Columbia 
County along the Columbia River. Historically, areas along the Columbia River North and 
West of Rainier appear to be hardest hit from severe winds. Additional areas with frequent 




















Scappoose Dike cottonwood tree farms
Scappoose-Vernonia Highway
Cater Hill area
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7.4 Snow and Ice Hazard Data for Columbia County 
Winter storms can also involve ice and snow, most commonly at the higher elevations in 
Columbia County, but sometimes along the Columbia River as well. The most likely 
impact of snow and ice events on Columbia County are road closures limiting 
access/egress to/from some areas, especially roads to higher elevations. Winter storms 
with heavy wet snow or high winds and ice storms may also result in power outages from 
downed transmission lines and/or poles. 
Average annual snowfalls in Columbia County are generally low as shown below in Table 
7.7. 
Table 7.7 
















Clatskanie 10.40 0.00 72.0 (1949-50) 1948-2004
St. Helens 2.50 0.00 25.3 (1979-80) 1976-2004
Vernonia 9.50 0.00 47.4 (1968-9) 1967-2004
www.wrcc.dri.edu
Data for Clatskanie, St. Helens RFD and Vernonia 2 weather 
Western Regional Climate Center website:  
However, there is considerable variation in historical snowfall data within Columbia 
County. Average annual snowfall for St. Helens is only about 25% of that for Clatskanie 
and Vernonia. Highest annual snowfall is also much higher at Clatskanie and Vernonia 
than at St. Helens. However, the highest annual snowfall data are affected by varying 
periods of weather records at these stations. 
Including Vernonia data from the previous weather station location, the highest annual 
snowfall is 147.70 inches in (1949-50). Nevertheless, the general pattern is clear, with 
eastern Columbia County typically receiving lower snowfall amounts than western portions 
of the county. 
The snowfall data in Table 7.8 below show dates of significant snow accumulations at 
these weather stations, with the Vernonia data being for the current weather station only. 
These snowfall data are from the same source as Table 7.7 above. 
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Table 7.8 












1948-9 33.0 February 19.5
1949-50 72.0 January 68.5
1950-1 34.5 March 30.0
1951-2 23.5 January 15.0
1953-4 33.0 January 33.0
1955-6 40.5 January 13.5
1964-5 27.0 December 22.0
1968-9 31.5 January 18.5
1970-1 41.5 January 21.5












1977-8 5.3 November 5.3
1978-9 10.0 November 3.9
1979-80 25.3 December 24.3
1984-5 8.3 February 7.3
1985-6 10.5 November 6.0












1967-8 18.1 January 18.1
1968-9 47.6 January 22.6
1970-1 43.8 January 17.5
1972-3 13.0 December 14.5
1975-6 12.1 February 7.5
1978-9 26.2 January 11.0
1979-80 16.0 January 10.5
1981-2 20.3 January 11.8
1984-5 12.5 February 6.1
1985-6 25.3 November 16.2
1988-9 12.0 February 6.4
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In addition to snow events, Columbia County is also subject to ice storm and freezing rain 
events. For example, the winter storm in January 2004 had 8” to 12” of snow, followed by 
about ½” to ¾” of ice. This storm resulted in considerable disruption of traffic in many 
portions of Columbia County. Ice storms and freezing rain are fairly common, especially 
along the Columbia River when cold air near the ground coincides with warm moist air at 
higher altitudes. 
The National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) database shows eight ice storm or freezing 
rain events for Columbia County between 1993 and 2004. Most of these were relatively 
minor events with increased traffic accidents due to ice on the roads, with some tree falls 
and localized power outages. Website addresses for NCDC and the state and county 
storm event database are: www.ncdc.noaa.gov and http://www4.ncdc.noaa.gov/cgi-
win/wwcgi.dll?wwevent~storms, respectively. 
The most significant ice storm event occurred between December 26th and 29th in 1996, 
with up to 4 or 5 inches of ice in the Columbia Gorge. Interstate 84 was closed for 4 days. 
There were hundreds of downed trees and power lines, with widespread power outages in 
the greater Portland area, including portions of Columbia County. 
Probabilistic ice storm data showing ice thicknesses with return periods from 50 years to 
400 years are given in a recent draft report for FEMA and the National Institute of Building 
Sciences: Extreme Ice Thicknesses from Freezing Rain (Kathleen F. Jones, US Army 
Corps of Engineers, Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory, May 28, 2004). 
The 50-year return period ice thickness map (Figure 7.9 below) shows about 0.5” of ice for 
Columbia County, with maximum ice thicknesses in southeastern Columbia County and 
decreasing towards northwestern Columbia County. Typical 100-year and 400-year ice 
thicknesses for Columbia County are about 0.75” and 1.0”, respectively. 
For Columbia County, ice thicknesses in 50-year or more severe events are high enough 
(0.5” or greater) to cause substantial damage, especially to trees and utility lines. 
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Figure 7.9 
50-Year Ice Thickness from Freezing Rain 
 
7.5 Other Severe Weather Events 
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), which includes the 
National Weather Service, also includes the National Climatic Data Center (NCDC). The 
NOAA and NCDC websites have a vast amount of historical information on severe 
weather events throughout the United States. These databases can also be searched by 
State and County to obtain more localized information. Website addresses are: 
www.noaa.gov and www.ncdc.noaa.gov, for NOAA and NCDC, respectively. The state 
and county storm event database can be found at: 
http://www4.ncdc.noaa.gov/cgi-win/wwcgi.dll?wwevent~storms. Unless otherwise 
referenced, all of the storm event data below for Columbia County are from the state and 
county storm event database referenced above. 
Severe Thunderstorms and Hail Events 
The NCDC database lists 21 thunderstorm and high wind events in Columbia County 
since 1993, but all of these appear to be winter storm events rather than thunderstorm 
events. The thunderstorm events in Columbia County are typically too minor to be 
recorded as significant storm events. Nevertheless, thunderstorm events in Columbia 
County can occasionally cause locally high winds with tree falls which may affect roads, 
utility lines, and buildings. 
The NCDD data base listed two hail events for Columbia County : July 15, 1955 and July 
31, 1995, both of which were reported to have 1” hail. No damage reports were available. 
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Hail events certainly occur in Columbia County, generally during summer months. 
However, hail damage is generally minor and few practical mitigation alternatives are 
applicable to hail, other than taking shelter and moving vehicles to garages when 
possible. 
Lightning 
Nationwide, lightning is the number two weather related killer nationwide, second only to 
floods. NOAA data show that lightning causes about 90 deaths per year, with at least 230 
injuries (NOAA Technical Memorandum NWS SR-193, 1997). Lightning injuries appear to 
be systematically underreported and thus the actual injury total is most likely significantly 
higher. 
For Oregon, casualties from lightning are very low, with totals of only 7 deaths and 19 
injuries reported over a 35 year period (NOAA). Thus, the level of risk posed by lightning 
strikes in Columbia County, while not zero, is very low. Public education about safe 
practices during electrical storms is the only available mitigation measure to reduce 
casualties from lightning. Lightning strike damage to buildings or infrastructure is generally 
relatively minor and few practical mitigation alternatives are applicable to lightning, other 
than installing lightning arrestors on critical facilities subject to lightning damage. 
Tornadoes 
Tornadoes also do occur occasionally in Oregon. However, Oregon is not among the 39 
states with any reported tornado deaths since 1950. A compilation of historical tornadoes 
in Oregon by the National Weather Service includes two tornadoes in Columbia County 
(http://nimbo.wrh.noaa.gov/Portland/tornado.html). in August 28, 1978 a small tornado 
near Scappoose damaged a mobile home. On November 11, 1965, a small tornado in 
Rainier destroyed two buildings, with the tornado path being about one-half mile long and 
15 to 20 yards wide. Several other tornadoes have occurred in nearby counties, including 
Clatsop and Multnomah. 
Climate and weather conditions in Oregon and specifically in Columbia County make the 
occurrence of major tornadoes unlikely. The most practical mitigation actions for 
tornadoes are public warnings and taking shelter to minimize the potential for deaths and 
injuries. 
7.6 Winter Storm Risk Assessment 
Winter storm flooding and wind impacts may affect both infrastructure and buildings. 
Localized flooding from winter storms very commonly affects the transportation system, 
especially roads. Severe winter storms will result in numerous road closures due either to 
washouts or due to depth of water on road surfaces. Such localized flooding also affects 
buildings located in the flooded areas. Additional road closures are likely in some events 
from landslides/mudslides as well as from snow/ice storms. 
Wind impacts from winter storms arise primarily from tree falls, which may affect vehicles 
and buildings, to some extent, but whose primary impact is often on utility lines, especially 
electric power lines. Widespread wind damages may result in widespread downing of 
trees or tree limbs with resulting widespread downage of utility lines. Such tree-fall 
induced power outages affect primarily the local electric distribution system, because 
transmission system cables are generally less prone to tree fall damage because of 
design and better tree-trimming maintenance. In severe wind storms, direct wind damage 
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or wind driven debris impacts on buildings cause building damages, especially for more 
vulnerable types of construction such as mobile homes. 
As discussed above in Section 7.1, both winter storm flood hazards and winter storm wind 
hazards have highly localized impacts. The location and severity of such impacts depend 
very strongly on specific local conditions. Therefore, it is difficult to make regional risk 
assessment or loss estimates from mapping the hazards and overlaying the inventory: 
such a risk assessment simply requires too much detailed data which are not available. 
An alternative approach is to document the severity and locations of winter storm flood 
and wind damage from the pattern of historical events. This approach is illustrated by the 
brief narratives above for selected winter storm events in Columbia County. 
For more quantitative risk assessment of localized flooding and wind damages arising 
from winter storms, the best approach is to systematically gather data on sites of repetitive 
damages due to localized flooding or wind damages. By documenting (and mapping using 
GIS) the sites of repetitive damage events, along with documentation of the type and cost 
of damages and losses, the most seriously impacted sites can be clearly identified. 
Clearly, such repetitive loss sites with significant damages are likely candidates for 
mitigation actions.  
The probable impacts of winter storms on Columbia County are summarized below in 
Table 7.10. 
Table 7.10 
Probable Impacts of Winter Storms on Columbia County1 
Inventory Probable Impacts
Portion of Columbia County affected
Entire County may be affected by road closures or loss of electric 
power; otherwise direct damages to buildings and infrastructure are 
likely to be localized and relatively minor
Buildings
Isolated minor damage from tree falls, some buildings affected by 
flood damage in major storms, especially in the storm water 
drainage problem areas identified in Section 6.3
Streets within communities Minor road closures due to tree falls and flooding; limited impact because of short detour routes within communities
Roads within and to/from Columbia 
County
Potential closures of some roads and major highways due to snow, 
debris flows or landslides, localized flooding and tree falls
Electric power
Loss of electric power may be localized due to tree falls on local 
distribution lines or affect larger areas if tree falls affect 
transmission lines
Other Utilities Generally minor or no impacts on other utilities from winter storms
Casualties Small potential for casualties (deaths and injuries) from tree falls or contact with downed power lines  
 
1 These winter storm impacts include localized flooding and the effects of wind, snow, and 
ice. 
Critical Facilities that are needed during an emergency event must have reliable back-up 
power to ensure public safety. The following buildings have no backup power currently. 
The County encourages property owners to consider generators either manually or 
automatic start for these specific locations: 
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Building Type Location Jurisdiction 
Fire Stations 76015 Atkins Road Clatskanie 
 80694 Mayger Hill Road Clatskanie 
 797 Quincy-Mayger Road Clatskanie 
 400 G Street Columbia City 
 19260 NW Cleetwood Portland/Scappoose 
   
Police Stations 195 S.E. 2nd Street Clatskanie 
 33568 E. Columbia Ave Scappoose 
   
City Halls/County Gov. 33568 E. Columbia Ave Scappoose 
 265 Strand Street St. Helens 
 260 Strand Street St. Helens 
   
   
 
7.7 Mitigation of Winter Storm Impacts 
Potential mitigation projects for winter storms may address any of the aspects of such 
storms, including floods, winds, and landslides (see Chapter 8). See also Chapter 13 for 
additional discussion of the disruptions to utility and transportation systems. 
For winter storm flooding, the mitigation measures discussed in Chapter 6 (Floods) for 
local storm water drainage flooding are exactly the mitigation measures for the flood 
aspects of winter storms. Common mitigation projects include: upgrading storm water 
drainage systems, construction of detention basins, and structure-specific mitigation 
measures (acquisition, elevation, flood proofing) for flood-prone buildings. For roads 
subject to frequent winter storm flooding, possible mitigation actions include elevation of 
the road surface and improved local drainage. For utilities subject to frequent winter storm 
flooding, possible mitigation actions include improved local drainage, elevation or 
relocation of the vulnerable utility elements to non-flood prone areas nearby. 
For wind effects of winter storms, the most common and most effective mitigation action is 
to increase tree trimming effects, because a high percentage of wind damage to utilities, 
buildings, vehicles, and people arises from tree falls. Trimming of trees subject to falling 
on utilities, buildings, vehicles, and people is an effective mitigation measure. However, 
economic, political and esthetic realities place limits on tree trimming as a mitigation 
action. Future wind storm damage in Columbia County could be almost eliminated by 
cutting down all large trees along roads or in populated areas. Obviously, such an 
extreme mitigation measure is neither practical nor desirable for many reasons. 
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Effective tree trimming mitigation programs focus on limited areas where tree falls have a 
high potential to result in major damages and economic losses. High priority areas include 
examples such as the following: 
1. Transmission lines providing electric power to the area, 
2. Major trunk lines providing the backbone of the electric power distribution 
system within the area 
3. Distribution lines for electric power to critical facilities in the area, 
4. Specific circumstances where falling of large trees poses an obvious threat 
to damage buildings and/or people or close major transportation arteries. 
Mitigation measures for snow and ice are limited, although tree trimming efforts, 
discussed above under wind, also reduce the impact of snow and ice on trees, roads, and 
utility lines. For the most part, dealing with snow and ice storms are primarily issues of 
emergency planning, along with response and recovery actions. 
Similarly, few mitigation measures appear practical for Columbia County for other types of 
severe weather, including severe thunderstorms, hail, lightning, and tornadoes. For such 
weather events, public education about safe practices and emergency planning, response 
and recover appear to be the most useful pragmatic actions. 
The following table contains winter storm mitigation action items from the master Action 
Item table in Chapter 4.
 
 
January 3, 2005 7-97 
Table 7.10 





































































Winter Storms Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Complete the inventory of locations in Columbia 
County subject to frequent storm water flooding Columbia County Roads, cities Ongoing X X X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Enhance tree trimming efforts especially for 
transmission lines and trunk distribution lines.
BPA, West Oregon Electric Coop, 
local PUDs Ongoing X X X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Encourage prudent tree planting (avoid service lines) 
and safe, professional tree trimming where necessary
Columbia County Hazard Mitigation 
Advisory Committee Ongoing X X X
Short-Term     
#4
Ensure that all critical facilities in Columbia County 
have backup power and emergency operations plans 
to deal with power outages
Local emergency services, 
Columbia County Hazard Mitigation 
Advisory Committee
1-2  Years X X
Long-Term     
#1
For locations with repetitive flooding and significant 
damages or road closures, determine and implement 
mitigation measures such as upsizing culverts or 
storm water drainage ditches
Columbia County Roads, cities Ongoing X X X X X
Long-Term     
#2
Consider upgrading lines and poles to improve 
wind/ice loading, undergrounding critical lines, and 
adding interconnect switches to allow alternative feed 
paths and disconnect switches to minimize outage 
areas
BPA, West Oregon Electric Coop, 
local PUDs 5 Years X X X X X
Long-Term     
#3
Encourage new developments to include underground 
power lines
Columbia County Land 
Development Services, cities ongoing X X X X X
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
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8.0 LANDSLIDES 
8.1 Landslide Overview and Definitions  
The term “landslide” refers to a variety of slope instabilities that result in the downward 
and outward movement of slope-forming materials, including rocks, soils and artificial fill. 
Four types of landslides are distinguished based on the types of materials involved and on 
the mode of movement. These types of landslides are illustrated in Figures 8.1 to 8.4 and 
described below. 
Rockfalls are abrupt movements of masses of geologic materials (rocks and 
soils) that become detached from steep slopes or cliffs. Movement occurs by 
free-fall, bouncing and rolling. Falls are strongly influenced by gravity, 
weathering, undercutting or erosion. 
Rotational Slides are those in which the rupture surface is curved concavely 
upwards and the slide movement is rotational about an axis parallel to the 
slope. Rotational slides usually have a steep scarp at the upslope end and a 
bulging “toe” of the slid material at the bottom of the slide. Rotational slides 
may creep slowly or move large distances suddenly. 
Translational Slides are those in which the moving material slides along a 
more or less planar surface. Translational slides occur on surfaces of 
weaknesses, such as faults and bedding planes or at the contact between firm 
rock and overlying loose soils. Translational slides may creep slowly or move 
large distances rather suddenly. 
Debris Flows (also called debris torrents) are surficial movements in which 
loose soils, rocks and organic matter combine with entrained water to form 
slurries that flow rapidly downslope or within a stream channel. They may 
travel hundreds to thousands of feet.  
All of these types of landslides may cause road blockages by dumping debris on road 
surfaces or road damages if the road surface itself slides downhill. Utility lines and pipes 
are prone to breakage in slide areas. Buildings impacted by slides may suffer minor 
damage from small settlements or may be completely destroyed by large ground 
displacements or by burial in slide debris. Also, as evidenced by 1996 winter storms in 
Oregon, landslides may also result in injuries or fatalities. 
There are three main factors that determine susceptibility (potential) for landslides: 
1. slope steepness, 
2. soil/rock characteristics or landform shape, and 
3. subsurface water. 
Loose, weak rock or soil is more prone to landslides than is more competent rock or 
dense, firm soils. For landslides, the term competent rock means solid, coherent rock with 
good bearing strength that is less prone to landslides. Finally, water saturated soils or rock 
with a high water table are much more prone to landslides because the water pore 
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Figures 8.1 to 8.4  
Major Types of Landslides 
 
The water content of soils/rock is a major factor in determining the likelihood of sliding for 
any given slide-prone location. Thus, the vast majority of landslides happen during rainy 
months, when soils are saturated with water. 
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Landslides may happen at any time of the year. In addition to landslides triggered by a 
combination of slope stability and water content, landslides may also be triggered by 
earthquakes. Areas prone to seismically triggered landslides are generally the same as 
those prone to ordinary (i.e., non-seismic) landslides. As with ordinary landslides, 
seismically triggered landslides are more likely for earthquakes that occur when soils are 
saturated with water. 
Debris flows and landslides are a very common occurrence in hilly areas of Oregon, 
including Columbia County. Many landslides occur in undeveloped areas and thus may go 
unnoticed or unreported. For example, the Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral 
Industries (DOGAMI) conducted a statewide survey of landslides from four winter storms 
in 1996 and 1997 and found 9,582 documented landslides, with the actual number of 
landslides estimated to be many times the documented number. For the most part, 
landslides become a problem only when they impact developed areas and have the 
potential to damage buildings, roads, or utilities. 
8.2 Landslide Hazard Assessment for Columbia County 
The February 1996 winter storm contributed to landslides throughout western Oregon, 
including Columbia County. The February storm was an intense, long duration rainfall 
event that was preceded by long periods of winter rainfall and a heavy snowfall in the 
mountains. A tropical jet stream flow brought intense warm rain that melted the snow, 
which contributed to the timing and runoff from the already wet soil. This resulted in 
numerous slope failures on slopes that were already slide-prone. 
Some of the significant slides in Columbia County that affected roads during this 1996 
event are listed below in Table 8.5. Other identified slide problem areas in Columbia 
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Table 8.5 
Slide Problem Areas for February 1996 Winter Storm 
1996 Slide Locations1
north side of Highway 30 just east of Clatskanie
west side of Highway 30 near Prescott
west side of Highway 30 at two location just south of Goble
west side of Highway 30 near Tide Creek Road
south side of Colvin Road near Marshland
Johnson Road and Olson Road south of Clatskanie
Rainier Road, west of Rainier
Neer City Road just east and south of Rainier
Nicolai Road and Nicolai Cutoff Road west of Goble
Tide Creek Road west of Deer Island
Pittsburg Road west of Columbia City
Meissner Road west of Shiloh Basin
Canyon Road and Mtn. View Road west of Scappoose
Scappoose-Vernonia Road just east of Pittsburg
Scappoose-Vernonia Road west of Chapman
Scappoose-Vernonia Road east of Walker Road
1 Hand drawn map provided by John Clouse, former Columbia County 
Emergency Management Director.  
 
Table 8.6 
Other Slide Problem Areas 
Apiary Road 4 locations between milepost 8.0 and milepost 16.2
Emergency Transportation Routes Slide Problem Areas
Scappoose-Vernonia Road 19 locations between milepost 1.9 and milepost 16.6
 
 
Other Slide Problem Locations
Vernonia1
     Bridge St. between California Ave. and Texas Ave.  
     Corey Hill: towers for radio, cable, cellular
Tide Creek Road. Mileposts 0.3 and 2.8
Nicolai Road, Milepost 1.4
Nicolai Cutoff Road, Milepost 0.5
Colvin Road, Milepost 0.1 to 3.0
Near City Road, Milepost 9.0
Meissner Road, Milepost 3.6
Oester Road, Milepost 0.5
Mustola Road, Milepost 0.25
1 Chief Workman, August 23, 2004
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ODF Study of 1996 Winter Storm Landslides 
The Oregon Department of Forestry conducted a 3-year study of the impacts and 
landslides for two 1996 winter storms (ODF, Storm Impacts and Landslides of 1996: Final 
Report, June, 1999). This highly technical study is primarily focused on identifying specific 
slope and forest characteristics that relate to probabilities and severities of landslides. The 
ODF study included eight study areas, one of which was in Columbia County, a 3.4 
square mile area near Vernonia. The Vernonia study area included 19 slides, 3 on roads 
and 16 in non-road areas. This ODF study provides important technical data on 
landslides, but does not provide a detailed inventory of landslide prone areas in Columbia 
County, outside of the very small study area. This study is thus of limited use for mitigation 
planning purposes. 
General conclusions drawn from the ODF study include the following. The highest hazard 
for shallow rapid landslides in western Oregon occurs on slopes of over 70% to 80% 
steepness (depending on landform and geology). There is a moderate risk of these 
landslides on slopes between 50% to 70%. Landslides that entered stream channels 
during the storms of 1996 typically occurred in very steep landscapes, or adjacent to 
stream channels. Even landslides that initiate as relatively small debris slides can mobilize 
into debris flows that mobilize large volumes of material and move long distances. 
Landslide characteristics vary greatly according to local landscape and geologic factors. 
Debris flows that were not initiated by up-slope landslides were uncommon. A debris flow 
occurs when landslides move downslope, scouring or partially scouring soils from the 
slope along its path. 
DOGAMI Earthquake–Induced Landslide Maps 
For Columbia County, the Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries 
(DOGAMI) has produced hazard maps for earthquake-induced landslides for three 
communities in Columbia County: Columbia City, St. Helens and Scappoose (Relative 
Earthquake Hazard Maps for Selected Urban Areas in Western Oregon, IMS-7, 1999). 
Areas prone to earthquake induced landslides are generally also prone to non-earthquake 
induced landslides as well. However, these DOGAMI maps have low spatial resolution, 
with large areas of significant slope characterized as moderate or high landslide potential. 
These maps do not identify specific locations of active slides. 
These DOGAMI landslide maps are shown as Figures 8.7 and 8.8. 
It is also important to note that while an earthquake may trigger numerous landslides, the 
return interval of major earthquake-induced landslides may be several hundred years, 
while the return interval for major storm-induced landslides may be only about 10 years. 
Therefore, for Columbia County the probability of occurrence for major storm-induced 
landslides greatly exceeds that for earthquake-induced landslides. 
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Figure 8.7 
DOGAMI Landslide Hazard Map for St. Helens and Columbia City 
 
 
For St. Helens and Columbia City, there is one small area mapped as high landslide 
potential and significant areas mapped as medium landslide potential. These maps are 
based on available data and should not be over interpreted to represent exact locations of 
landslides. Not all areas within given categories of landslide potential may be as 
classified: some areas may have higher potential and some areas may have lower 
potential.  
Detailed site-specific geotechnical studies are necessary to determine the level of 
landslide hazard at any specific location. More detailed landslide hazard assessment at 
specific locations requires a site-specific analysis of the slope, soil/rock and groundwater 
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characteristics at a specific site. Such assessments are often conducted prior to major 
development projects in areas with moderate to high landslide potential, to evaluate the 
specific hazard at the development site. 
Figure 8.8 
DOGAMI Landslide Hazard Map for Scappoose 
 
 
The Scappoose landslide maps shows significant portions of the hilly areas in the western 
portion of Scappoose as being in medium landslide potential areas. The caveats noted 
above for the St. Helens map also apply to the Scappoose map. Both maps are from 
DOGAMI’s publication Relative Earthquake Hazard Maps for Selected Urban Areas in 
Western Oregon (IMS-7, 1999). 
NOAA/Oregon Climate Service Debris Flow Maps 
NOAA and the Oregon Climate Service have prepared debris flow maps for all counties in 
western Oregon. These maps show numerous areas within Columbia County subject to 
debris flows. 
Columbia County Landslide Hazard Map 
Ideally, a county-wide landslide hazard map for all types of landslides could be developed 
for Columbia County, using the existing maps described above, slope data, rainfall data, 
soil/rock data, as well as historical data on active slide areas. However, such a county-
wide map does not currently exist. 
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8.3 Landslide Risk Assessment for Columbia County 
In this section, we review a methodology for estimating landslide losses due to winter 
storm induced landslides. Winter storms with intense rainfalls are the most common 
trigger for landslides in Oregon, including landslides within Columbia County. Major 
storms with intense rainfall can result in numerous landslides in slide-prone areas.  
Of course, at any given slide-prone location, landslides can occur with or without winter 
storms, but such occurrences are isolated and not likely to result in the type of fairly 
widespread landslide impacts that are possible during winter storms. Widespread 
landslides can also be triggered by earthquakes, especially if the earthquake occurs 
during the rainy season when soils are saturated. However, since the probability of storm-
induced landslides is greater than that for earthquake-induced landslides, it makes sense 
to focus mitigation efforts on storm related landslide hazards. See Chapter 10 
(Earthquakes) for further commentary on earthquake-triggered landslides. 
As with any risk assessment, a quantitative landslide hazard assessment requires overlay 
of landslide hazard (frequency and severity of landslides) with the inventory exposed to 
the hazard (value and vulnerability) by considering: 
1. Extent of landslide susceptible areas, 
2. Inventory of buildings and infrastructure in landslide susceptible areas, 
3. Severity of winter storm event (inches of rainfall in 24 hours), 
4. Percentage of landslide susceptible areas that will move and the range of 
movements (displacements) likely, and 
5. Vulnerability (amount of damage for various ranges of movement). 
For Columbia County, many high landslide potential areas are in hilly forested areas 
owned by timber companies. Landslides in these areas may damage or destroy some 
timber and impact logging roads.  
Many of the major highways in Columbia County are at risk for landslides at one or more 
locations with a high potential for road closures and damage to utility lines. Especially in 
the interior portions of Columbia County, with a limited redundancy of the road network, 
such road closures may isolate some communities. In addition to direct landslide 
damages to roads and highways, affected communities are also subject to the economic 
impacts of road closures due to landslides, which may disrupt access/egress to/from 
communities.  
In addition, portions of most communities in Columbia County are in moderate or high 
landslide potential areas (cf. DOGAMI maps referenced above). In these areas, landslides 
may damage homes, utilities and roads in the area, and pose some level of life safety risk 
for residents. 
For debris flows, Oregon has a warning system developed by the Department of Forestry 
(ODF), the Department of Geology and Mineral Industries (DOGAMI), the Office of 
Emergency Management (OEM), and the Department of Transportation (ODOT). 
Throughout the rainy season, ODF meteorologists will forecast storms and monitor rainfall 
at several locations in western Oregon. The warning system will be activated during 
expected and actual periods of intense rainfall that may trigger debris flows. 
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Debris flow advisories alert people to the possibility of intense rainfall that could trigger 
debris flows. Debris flow warnings are issued when a rainfall threshold is reached or 
nearly reached, particularly at night, when debris flows are more difficult to detect. 
The potential impact of debris flows and landslides on Columbia County are summarized 
below in Table 8.9. 
Table 8.9 
Potential Impacts of Debris Flows and Landslides on Columbia County 
Inventory Probable Impacts
Portion of Columbia County affected
Landslides and debris flows are possible in any of the higher slope 
portions of Columbia County, including much of the interior of the 
county.
Buildings
Buildings at high risk include those situated below steep slopes or 
at the mouth of drainage basins.  Most buildings in landslide 
potential areas are residential; the inventory of landslide prone 
buildings (including critical facilities) in Columbia County is not yet 
determined.  
Streets within communities Minor road closures possible from landslides; limited impact because of short detour routes within communities.
Roads within and to/from Columbia Coun
Potential closures of major highways due to landsides, including 
Highway 30 in several locations and most of the interior highways.  
Potential to isolate communites, especially in the interior portions of 
the county.
Electric power Potential for localized loss of electric power due to landslides affecting power lines in or near Columbia County
Other Utilities Potential outages of water, wastewater and natural gas from pipe breaks from landslides. Probable impacts are very localized.
Casualties Landslides that impact buildings or roads could result in a small number of casualties (deaths and injuries)  
8.4 Mitigation of Landslide Risk 
In terms of public safety there are two broad types of landslides to be concerned about: 1) 
those that can sometimes be solved by engineering methods (such as road fill failures and 
slow moving landslides, and 2) those that can typically only be solved through prudent 
location of buildings, roads, and utilities (debris flows, debris torrents). It is important to 
make this distinction to understand that some landslide problems do not lend themselves 
to engineering solutions. 
Mitigation of landslide risks is often quite expensive. In some cases, slope stability can be 
improved by addition of subsurface drainage to reduce pore water pressure, by 
construction of appropriate debris dams, retaining walls or by other types of geotechnical 
remediation. In some cases, buildings can be hardened to reduce damages. An 
alternative mitigation strategy for already built buildings or infrastructure with high potential 
for landslide losses is to relocate the facilities outside of known slide areas. 
Mitigation of landslide risk can also be accomplished by effective land use planning to 
minimize development in slide-prone areas. Generally, such land use planning requires 
rather detailed geotechnical mapping of slide potential so that high hazard areas can be 
demarcated without unnecessarily including other areas of low slide potential. 
The impacts of slide damage on road systems can also be partially addressed by 
identifying areas of high slide potential or of repetitive past slide damages so that 
alternative routes for emergency response can be pre-determined. 
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The following table contains landslide mitigation action items from the master Action Items 
table in Chapter 4.
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Table 8.10 





































































Landslide Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Complete the inventory of locations where critical 
facilities, other buildings and infrastructure are subject 
to landslides
Columbia County Land 
Development Services, cities (public 
works)
1-2 Years X X X X X
Long-Term     
#1
Consider landslide mitigation actions for slides 
seriously threatening critical facilities, other buildings 
or infrastructure
Columbia County Hazard Mitigation 
Advisory Committee 5 Years X X X X X
Long-Term     
#2
Limit future development in high landslide potential 
areas
Columbia County Land 
Development Services, cities Ongoing X X X X X
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
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9.0 WILDLAND/URBAN INTERFACE FIRES 
Fire has posed a threat to mankind since the dawn of civilization. Fires may cause 
significant damage to property and may also result in deaths and injuries. For the 
purposes of mitigation planning, we consider three types of fires: structure fires, wildland 
fires, and wildland/urban interface fires. 
Structure fires are fires in urban, suburban or rural areas where structures (and contents) 
are the primary fire fuel. Structure fires predominantly affect residential and other ordinary 
buildings. However, structure fires may also affect other types of structures, including bulk 
fuel storage or hazmat facilities. Fires affecting these types of facilities may be particularly 
hazardous to both firefighters and nearby residents. 
Fires on pipelines and transportation fires (road, rail, air) generally have similar 
characteristics to fires at hazmat sites or structures. 
Wildland fires are fires where vegetation (grass, brush, trees) is the primary fire 
fuel. 
Wildland/urban interface fires are fires where the fire fuel includes both 
structures and vegetation. 
This chapter considers all types of fires. However, the emphasis is on wildland/urban 
interface fires because such fires are analogous to natural disasters in that they may 
affect large developed areas and large numbers of people. Thus, wildland/urban interface 
fires are of special concern for mitigation planning. Most structure fires are limited to one 
structure. Structure fires involving bulk fuel, hazardous materials, pipelines, and 
transportation fires have many similarities in response strategies and impacts to the more 
general discussion of Hazmat Incidents, as discussed in Chapter 14. Wildland fires, by 
definition, affect wildland with generally limited impacts on developed areas. 
In 1999, according to National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) data there were over 
30,000 fire agencies in the United States. Nearly 90% of these are all volunteer or mostly 
volunteer fire districts with only about 11% being career or mostly career fire fighting 
agencies. However, the career fire agencies tend to serve large communities. Thus, about 
60% of the total population in the United States is served by career agencies, while about 
40% is served by volunteer fire districts. 
In Oregon, historical fire statistical data are generally good because each local fire agency 
is required to file reports of every fire incident with the State Fire Marshal’s Office. 
National fire statistics are available through the National Fire Incident Reporting System 
(NFIRS) that is maintained by the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA). National fire data are 
published by the USFA and by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), a private 
association. THE NFIRS database contains incident reports from 49 states and over 
11,000 fire agencies and includes about one-third of all reported fires that occur annually 
in the United States. 
Columbia County includes a mix of forest, brush, grasslands, and agricultural land, as well 
as developed land. Vegetation patterns for lands surrounding population centers in 
Columbia County vary, but all of the cities and all of the smaller rural communities have 
forested areas in close proximity to developed areas.  
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The following 17 communities in Columbia County have been designated as “Interface 
Communities” that are within or adjacent to areas subject to serious wildfire hazards and 
are in the vicinity of Federal lands. 
Table 9.1 











1 Federal Register, Volume 66, pp. 
43383-43435. August 21, 2001  
9.1 Fire Primer 
For this section of the multi-hazard mitigation plan, the focus is on wildland/urban interface 
fires. However, to provide a context for the discussion of wildland/urban interface fires, we 
first briefly review the characteristics of all three types of fires. 
9.1.1 Structure Fires 
Structure fires are fires in urban, suburban or rural areas where structures (and contents) 
are the primary fire fuel. Ever since the first volunteer fire agency was established in the 
United States in 1648, the primary focus of most fire agencies has been to reduce the risk 
of structure fires. Historically, structure fires have posed the greatest threat to both 
property and life safety.  
In dealing with structure fires, fire agencies have three primary objectives: first, minimize 
casualties; second, prevent a single structure fire from spreading to other structures; and 
third, minimize damage to the structure and contents. 
In recent decades, the rate of structure fires (number of fires per year per 1,000 
structures) and the total number of structure fires have declined sharply even though the 
number of structures has increased with increasing population. This decrease in structure 
fires is attributed to a number of factors, most importantly better building codes that have 
reduced both the numbers of ignitions and the likelihood that a small fire will quickly 
spread. Building code improvements include better wiring, smoke detectors, better design 
of furnaces, reduced use of portable heating devices, and the widespread use of fire 
resistant materials such as sheet rock and non-flammable roofs.  
In addition to the building code improvements, fire suppression capabilities have also 
improved over the decades. Improved water systems provide greater and more reliable 
water flows for fire suppression efforts. Improved fixed fire protection systems including 
notification systems, sprinklers, and fire barriers along with better training, better 
communication equipment, better fire fighting equipment and apparatus have also all 
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contributed to improved fire suppression capabilities. Widespread use of smoke detectors 
has also reduced the number of casualties by providing occupants more warning time for 
evacuation. In recent decades, a decline in the percentage of smokers in the United 
States has also had a beneficial impact on the rate of accidental ignitions from careless 
handling of smoking materials. 
The decrease in the number of structure fires in recent decades has been accompanied 
by a corresponding decrease in the numbers of deaths from structure fires as shown 
below in Table 9.2. 
 
Table 9.2 









1 Fire deaths are as estimated by the National Fire Protection Association (www.nfpa.org), 
with 2000 and 2002 Oregon data from Oregon Office of State Fire Marshal. 
Despite the dramatic reductions over the decades, structure fires still cause a great deal 
of damage and many casualties. NFPA estimates for 2002 are that structure fires caused 
about 3,380 deaths and $10 billion in property damage.  
In addition to dealing with structure fires, urban, suburban and rural fire agencies also deal 
with other common types of fires including vehicle fires, trash fires, and small debris or 
vegetation fires. For 2002, NFPA estimates for total fire agency responses to fires are as 
summarized below in Table 9.3. 
Table 9.3 
2002 NFPA Fire Statistics 
 
Type of Fire Fire Agency 
Responses 
Structure Fires 519,000 
Vehicle Fires 329,500 
Fires Outside Structures 71,000 
Rubbish Fires 204,000 
Wildland Fires 399,000 
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The complete NFPA fire statistics estimates are given in their report “Fire Loss in the 
United States During 2002,” that is downloadable from their website (www.nfpa.org). 
Additional data are available at the USFA website (www.usfa.fema.gov). 
9.1.2 Wildland Fires 
Wildland fires are fires where vegetation (grass, brush, or trees) is the primary fire fuel. 
Wildland fires in Oregon typically occur in national or state forests and parks or in forest 
tracts of private land that may be owned by forest industries or by other private owners. 
By definition, wildland fires generally involve few or no structures. Fires that involve a 
mixture of vegetation and structures are considered wildland/urban interface fires and are 
discussed below in Section 9.1.3. 
Fire suppression strategy for wildland fires is significantly different than for structure fires. 
For wildland fires, the most common suppression strategy is to contain the fire at its 
boundaries, to stop the spread of the fire and then to let the fire burn itself out. Fire 
containment typically relies heavily on natural or manmade fire breaks. Water and 
chemical fire suppressants are used primarily to help make or defend a fire break, rather 
than to put out an entire fire, as would be the case with a structure fire. 
Fires that are purely wildland fires, without threatening structures, nevertheless cause 
timber resource losses and environmental and ecological damage. Wildland fires kill 
wildlife and damage habitat. Areas that have burned are also subject to erosion and 
landslides due to loss of ground cover. These effects also may negatively impact water 
quality by increasing turbidity. Wildland fires also may result in large fire suppression 
costs, with a potential for casualties among firefighting personnel. Historically, fire 
suppression strategy for wildland fires has generally been to try to minimize the acreage 
burned in each wildland fire, by applying the maximum available fire suppression 
resources and trying to contain each fire as quickly as possible. 
In recent years, however, fire suppression strategy for wildland fires in federal forests has 
evolved substantially in two important aspects. First, to a greater extent than previously, 
wildland fires are being recognized as part of the natural ecology and natural life cycles of 
wildlands. Fires create open spaces with different habitats for both plants and animals 
than existed previously. Second, the emphasis on maximum suppression of wildland fires 
has resulted in many fires being smaller than would naturally occur. Because of the 
reduction in frequent, smaller fires, many wildland areas have developed extraordinarily 
high fuel loads. Thus, the potential for very large, catastrophic wildland fires may actually 
be increased by the effective suppression of smaller fires. In recent years, evolving 
strategies for dealing with wildland fires have focused more attention on fuel 
management. Strategies include more controlled burns and greater tolerance for allowing 
smaller fires to burn, with the objective of reducing fuel loads of smaller vegetation and 
thus reducing the potential for larger fires. 
The above fire strategies are most applicable to lands managed as wilderness of natural 
areas. Fire protection strategies for commercial forest lands focus more on the value of 
wood fiber and thus fire protection for such areas is intended to minimize acreage burned 
and therefore to minimize value lost. The value protected is both the market value of the 
standing timber and the lost opportunity if a stand of timber is lost. 
Wildfires may be started by natural causes, such as lightning strikes. US Forest Service 
data for the United States indicate that about 13% of wildfires are started by lightning. 
About 25% of wildfires are arson, while the rest are due to a variety of manmade causes 
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including debris burns, discarded smoking materials, sparks from vehicles, sparks from 
power lines and so on. In Columbia County, because of local weather conditions, the 
proportion of wildfires started by lightning is significantly lower than the national data 
referenced above and the proportion of fires due to arson is also lower. 
Wildfire hazard depends on three main factors: vegetative fuel load, weather, and 
topography. 
There are several parameters that define the fire potential of vegetation. Vegetative fuel 
loads are typically expressed as tons per acre. The greater the amount of fuel loading the 
greater the amount of energy that will be released in a fire. Vegetative fuels are also 
classified by burn index, which is a measure of the amount of energy per pound of fuel. 
Fuels may also be classified by potential duration of burning. For example, wildfires fueled 
by grass may spread very quickly, but grass contains relatively little fuel energy and tends 
to burn out quickly. Wildfires fueled by larger vegetation may spread more slowly, but 
larger vegetation contains more fuel energy and tends to burn for a longer duration.  
Moisture content of vegetative fuels is also a major determinant of wildland fire potential. 
The lower the moisture content the greater the fire potential. Moisture content at any given 
time depends on antecedent (before the given time) weather conditions. The moisture 
content of larger fuels (e.g., trees) depends on previous weather conditions over periods 
of several weeks or even months. The moisture content of smaller fuels (brush) depends 
on previous weather conditions over several days or a week or two. The moisture content 
of very small fuels (e.g., grasses ) depends largely on previous weather conditions over a 
few hours or a day or two. 
The fire hazard posed by vegetative fuel loads also depends on fuel continuity, both 
horizontally and vertically. Horizontal continuity, the distribution of fuels over the 
landscape, strongly affects the spread and containment of wildfires in a given geographic 
area. Vertical continuity of fuels, the linkage between fuels at ground level and tree 
crowns, also affects the fire potential. Forests with strong ladder fuels (understory growth 
between ground fuels and tree crowns) are more likely to have major fires involving tree 
crowns. Forests with limited ground fuels and little or no ladder fuels are much more likely 
to experience minor ground fires without a fire involving tree crowns. 
Weather also has a profound impact on wildland fire potential. Weather conditions of high 
temperatures, low humidity, and high winds may greatly accelerate the spread of a 
wildland fire and make containment difficult or impossible. Changes in weather conditions 
can greatly accelerate a fire’s spreading rate. Many casualties have occurred when 
firefighting personnel are trapped by sudden bursts of fire spread in response to changes 
in wind conditions. For many larger fires, containment is possible only with a little help 
from mother nature via lower temperatures, reduced winds or significant rainfall. 
Local topography is also a major factor in the spread of wildfires. Fires burn much more 
quickly up slope than they do down slope. Doubling a slope approximately doubles the 
rate of fire spread. Canyons, gulches and other local topographic effect can act as 
chimneys, intensifying fires in certain areas. Fires tend to slow at ridge tops and thus ridge 
tops are often chosen as locations for fire breaks. 
Suppression of wildland fires depends on the three main factors - vegetative fuel load, 
weather, and topography - that, in combination, govern fire potential. High fuel loads, hot, 
dry, windy weather and steep slopes increase fire potential and make fire suppression 
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much more difficult. Conversely, low fuel loads, cool, moist weather with low winds, and 
gentle slopes make fire suppression easier.  
In addition, however, fire suppression also depends on two other important factors: 
availability of fire suppression resources and access. Fire suppression resources include 
firefighting personnel, equipment and apparatus, as well as water and chemical fire 
suppressants. The greater the availability of fire suppression resources, the more likely it 
is that a given fire will be contained quickly. Fire suppression also depends on access. 
Fires in remote areas without ground access via roads are more difficult to fight and thus 
harder to contain than are fires with better access for fire suppression crews and 
apparatus. Access and therefore effective response is partially a function of land 
management objectives. Lands managed for natural conditions (wilderness) where roads 
have not been built or the existing roads have been vacated, tend to have a much poorer 
fire suppression response than commercial forest lands where road systems are 
maintained. 
In the 1930s, wildfires consumed an average of 40 to 50 million acres per year in the 
contiguous United States, according to US Forest Service estimates (US Forest Service, 
Managing the Impact of Wildfires on Communities and the Environment, September 8, 
2000). By the 1970s, the average acreage burned had been reduced to about 5 million 
acres per year. Over this time period, fire suppression efforts were dramatically increased 
and firefighting tactics and equipment became more sophisticated and effective. For the 
11 Western states, the average acreage burned per year since 1970 remained relatively 
constant at about 3.5 million acres per year. 
However, because of this pattern of more effective suppression of wildland fires, the 
patterns and characteristics of wildland fires are changing. Vegetation species that would 
have normally been minimized by frequent fires became more dominant. Over time, many 
species have become susceptible to disease and insects, leading to an increase in dead 
and dying trees. The resulting accumulation of debris has created the types of fuels than 
promote intense, rapidly spreading fires. In many areas introduction of non-native species 
has also added to the fuel load. Decades old patterns of logging and fire suppression 
have also changed the characteristics of forests. Older forests were typically less dense, 
with smaller numbers of larger, more fire-resistant trees. Newer forests are denser with 
larger numbers of smaller less fire-resistant trees. Younger trees have thinner bark and 
are more susceptible to fire injury and thus may also sustain more economic damage than 
an older stand. In combination these effects over the last several decades have resulted 
in many recent wildland fires that are hotter, faster, and larger than those experienced in 
the past.  
9.1.3 Wildland/Urban Interface Fires 
Wildland/urban interface fires are fires where the fuel load consists of both vegetation and 
structures. In Oregon, as elsewhere in the United States, recent patterns of development 
have lead to increasing numbers of homes built in areas subject to wildland fires. 
Development in areas subject to wildland fires may pose high levels of life safety risk for 
occupants as well as high levels of fire risk for homes and other structures. 
Urban or suburban areas may have a significant amount of landscaping and other 
vegetation. However, in such areas the fuel load of flammable vegetation is not 
continuous, but rather is broken by paved areas, open space and areas of mowed, often 
irrigated, grassy areas with low fuel loads. In these areas, the vast preponderance of all 
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significant fires are single structure fires. The combination of separations between 
buildings, various types of fire breaks, and generally low total vegetative fuel loads make 
the risk of fire spreading much lower than in wildland areas. Furthermore, most developed 
areas in urban and suburban areas have water systems with good capacities to provide 
water for fire suppression and organized fire agencies who typically respond quickly to 
fires, with sufficient personnel and apparatus to control fires effectively. Thus, in such 
areas the risk of a single structure fire spreading to involve multiple structures is generally 
quite low. 
Areas subject to wildland/urban interface fires have very different fire hazard 
characteristics. The defining characteristic of the wildland/urban interface area is that 
structures are built in areas with essentially continuous (and often high) vegetative fuel 
loads. In other words, structures are built in areas subject to wildland fires. When wildland 
fires occur in such areas, they tend to spread quickly and structures in these areas may, 
unfortunately, become little more than additional fuel sources for wildland fires. The siting 
of homes has also changed over time. Historically pioneering families built their homes in 
low lands, close to water and the fields they intended to work, while during the last 30 
years or so, rural homes have increasingly been built in locations chosen because of the 
view or other amenities. Thus, many newer homes are in locations more difficult to defend 
against wildland fires. 
The fire risk to structures and occupants in wildland/urban interface areas is high not only 
because of the high vegetative fuel loads but also because fire suppression resources are 
typically much lower than in urban or suburban areas. Homes in wildland/urban interface 
areas are most commonly on wells rather than on municipal water supplies. Thus, the 
availability of water for fire suppression is often severely limited. Less availability of water 
resources makes it more likely that a small wildland fire or a single structure fire in an 
urban/wildland interface area will spread before it can be extinguished. 
Furthermore, because many developments in interface areas have relatively low 
populations and are some distance from population centers, the availability of firefighting 
personnel and apparatus is generally lower than in more populated areas and response 
times are typically much longer. The longer typical response times arise in part because of 
greater travel distances and, thus, greater travel times, but also because most fire 
agencies in lower population density areas are entirely or largely composed of volunteer 
staff. Response times from volunteer staff fire agencies are typically longer than response 
times for career staff agencies, where fire stations are commonly staffed continuously. In 
some cases, narrow winding roads also impede access by fire fighting apparatus. As with 
water supplies, the lower availability of fire fighting personnel and apparatus and the 
longer response times increase the probability that a small wildland fire or a single 
structure fire in an urban/wildland interface area will spread before it can be extinguished. 
It is important to note however, that fire agencies in wildland/urban interface areas are 
often more experienced in dealing with such fires than are urban fire agencies. 
Furthermore, because of local placement, they are often closer to wildland/urban interface 
incidents than are the Oregon Department of Forestry or the U.S. Forest Service and 
Bureau of Land Management. 
Developments in urban/wildland interface areas often face high fire risk from a 
combination of high fire hazard (high vegetative fuel loads) and limited fire suppression 
capabilities. Unfortunately, occupants in many wildland/urban interface areas also face 
high life safety risk. High life safety risk arises from the high fire risk, especially from large 
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fires that may spread quickly and block evacuation. Life safety risk in interface areas is 
often exacerbated by limited roads (in the worst case only one access road) that are often 
narrow and winding and subject to blockage by a wildland fire. 
Life safety risk in interface areas is also often exacerbated by homeowners’ reluctance to 
evacuate homes quickly. Instead, homeowners often try to protect their homes with 
whatever fire suppression resources are available. Such efforts generally have very little 
effectiveness. For example, the water flow from a garden hose is too small to meaningfully 
impact even a single structure fire (once the structure is significantly engulfed by flames) 
and is profoundly too small to have any impact on a wildland fire. Unfortunately, home 
owners who delay evacuation in well meant but misguided attempts to save their homes 
often place their lives in grave jeopardy by delaying evacuation until it may be impossible. 
Major fires in the urban/wildland interface have the potential for enormous destruction and 
very high casualties. For example, the October 20, 1991 East Bay Fire in Oakland 
California burned 1,600 acres with 25 fatalities, 150 injuries, and over 3300 single-family 
homes and 450 apartment units destroyed. Total damages were over $1.5 billion. This fire 
was fueled by very high vegetative fuel loads and occurred on an unusually hot, dry, 
windy day. The fire spread extremely quickly, with over 800 homes engulfed by fire within 
the first hour, and completely overwhelmed initial fire suppression efforts. 
In October 1991, rural counties near Spokane Washington experienced 92 separate fires 
that burned about 35,000 acres and 114 homes. Between October 25 and November 3, 
1993, 21 major wildland fires broke out in California. These fires burned over 189,000 
acres and destroyed over 1,100 structures with 3 fatalities and hundreds of injuries. The 
worst wildland/urban interface fire in United States history as far as casualties are 
concerned occurred in 1871 in Peshtigo, Wisconsin. This fire burned over 1.2 million 
acres and killed over 1,200 people. In 2003, a series of wildland/urban interface fires in 
southern California (San Bernardino area) burned over 750,000 acres and destroyed over 
3,000 homes. These few examples dramatically illustrate the potential for disasters in the 
urban/wildland interface area. 
9.2 Measures of the Level of Fire Hazard 
There are several quantitative and semi-quantitative measures of the level of fire hazard. 
Most of these measures have been developed by the United States Forest Service in 
cooperation with other fire agencies. National maps of these fire hazard measures are 
available at the Forest Service website (www.fs.fed.us). These maps are updated very 
frequently, in some cases daily. All of the Forest Service Fire Danger maps and related 
technical maps are viewable at the website by going to the INDEX category, then to Fire, 
Wildland Fire Assessment System. 
The spatial resolution of the web-published maps is relatively low. For example, the 
Oregon data are based on about 90 reporting stations scattered across the state. Thus, 
these maps are intended to show regional differences in the level of fire hazard, rather 
than detailed local differences. However, as a regional guide to fire hazard levels, these 
maps are enormously useful and readily accessible. The ODF web site 
(www.odf.state.or.us) has local fire danger information for Columbia County, as well as 
any fire restrictions currently in effect. In addition, regulated use signs are also posted to 
inform the public and rural residents of fire restrictions due to fire danger. Local ODF 
offices also maintain and post local fire danger levels, using ODF’s four level fire danger 
classification described below. 
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The most useful major fire danger measures are briefly reviewed below. For reference, we 
note that the Forest Service website also has an extensive glossary of fire-related terms, 
which may be helpful for those unfamiliar with fire terminology and nomenclature. 
Observed Fire Danger Class Maps 
The USFS fire danger class is a five level fire danger classification scheme that is based 
largely on moisture content in fuels and weather conditions (temperature, humidity, wind). 
Daily nationwide maps are viewable and printable from the Forest Service website 
(www.fs.fed.us). This fire danger classification is widely used for purposes such as 
restricting campfires and outdoor burning and is widely reported in the media. The formal 
definitions of the five levels of danger are given below. 
USFS Fire Danger Classification (with Color Codes) 
LOW (dark green). Fuels do not ignite readily from small firebrands, although 
a more intense heat source, such as lightning, may start many fires in duff or 
punky wood. Fires in open cured grassland may burn freely a few hours after 
rain, but woods fires spread slowly by creeping or smoldering, and burn in 
irregular fingers. There is little danger of spotting. 
MEDIUM (light green or blue). Fires can start from most accidental causes, 
but with the exception of lightning fires in some areas, the number of starts is 
generally low. Fires in open-cured grassland will burn briskly and spread 
rapidly on windy days. Timber fires spread slowly to moderately fast. The 
average fire is of moderate intensity, although heavy concentrations of fuel, 
especially draped fuel, may burn hot. Short-distance spotting may occur, but is 
not persistent. Fires are not likely to become serious, and control is relatively 
easy. 
HIGH (yellow). All fine dead fuels ignite readily and fires start easily from most 
causes. Unattended brush and campfires are likely to escape. Fires spread 
rapidly and short-distance spotting is common. High-intensity burning may 
develop on slopes, or in concentrations of fine fuels. Fire may become serious 
and their control difficult, unless they are attacked successfully while small. 
VERY HIGH (orange). Fires start easily from all causes and, immediately after 
ignition, spread rapidly and increase quickly in intensity. Spot fires are a 
constant danger. Fires burning in light fuels may quickly develop high intensity 
characteristics such as long-distance spotting and fire whirlwinds when they 
burn into heavier fuels. 
EXTREME (red). Fires under extreme conditions start quickly, spread 
furiously, and burn intensely. All fires are potentially serious. Development into 
high-intensity burning will usually be faster and occur from smaller fires than in 
the very high danger class. Direct attack is rarely possible, and may be 
dangerous, except immediately after ignition. Fires that develop headway in 
heavy slash or in conifer stands may be unmanageable while the extreme 
burning condition lasts. Under these conditions, the only effective and safe 
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In Oregon, the Oregon Department of Forestry’s four level fire danger classification is 
widely used. These four levels are similar to the USFS levels described above, except for 
the omission of the Very High classification level: 
LOW (green) 
MODERATE (blue) 
HIGH (yellow), and 
EXTREME (red). 
Fire Potential Index Map 
This experimental product portrays a more quantitative measure of fire danger than the 
Fire Danger Classification map discussed above. This map is primarily of interest for fire 
service professionals and fire researchers. 
Other Maps 
The Forest Service website also provides several other types of technical maps which are 
intended for fire service professionals and fire researches. These maps and all of the 
more common maps summarized above can also be found at the FDR (Fire Danger 
Rating) web page which can be accessed via the search button on the Forest Service 
Home Page referenced above. 
9.3 Historical Data for Wildland Fires in Oregon 
The Oregon Department of Forestry website (www.odf.state.or.us) has a table of the most 
important historical fires in Oregon over the past 150 years. Of the 12 major fires, the five 
largest fires all occurred between 1848 and 1868. The two largest fires, the 1868 Coos 
Bay fire and the 1849 Siletz fire consumed 988,000 and 800,000 acres of wildland, 
respectively. The next four largest fires occurred between 1933 and 1945, with each fire 
consuming between 240,000 and 180,000 acres. The most recent fire listed, the 1987 
Silver Fire burned 97,000 acres. More recent major fires include the 2002 Biscuit Fire that 
burned nearly 500,000 total acres (with about 471,000 acres in Oregon and nearly 29,000 
acres in California) and the 2003 B&B Complex fire that burned 90,769 acres. However, 
none of these major fires occurred in Columbia County. 
The Oregon Department of Forestry website (www.odf.state.or.us) has several categories 
of wildland fire data listed, including: numbers of forest fires and numbers of acres burned 
in Oregon forest lands for 1986 to 2003. However, these ODF data are only for ODF-
responsibility lands and do not include forest lands where primary fire suppression 
responsibility is federal or local. These data, which will presumably be updated from time 
to time, provide one measure of wildland fire data for Oregon. For ODF responsibility 
lands in Oregon as a whole, the 10-year average number of wildland fires is 1,062. Since 
1986, the largest number of acres burned in one year was 99,060 in 2002, while the 
lowest number of ODF-responsibility acres burned in one year was 1,410 in 1997. For the 
entire state of Oregon, both the number of fires and the acres burned are higher than 
these ODF data alone. 
The United States Forest Service (Department of Agriculture), in cooperation with several 
agencies from the Department of the Interior, has recently published a report identifying 
wildland/urban interface communities within the vicinity of Federal lands that are a high 
 
 
January 3, 2005 9-121
risk from wildfire. As shown above in Table 9.1, every community in Columbia County is 
included on this at-risk list. 
The Oregon Department of Forestry website (www.odf.state.or.us) has an excellent map 
showing forest coverage and forest type throughout Oregon. Oregon Department of 
Forestry data on forest ownership areas are shown below in Table 9-4 for Oregon. 
Table 9.4 
Forest Land Ownership in Oregon 
Ownership Acres Percent of Total 
Federal 15,968,000 57.51% 
State 885,000 3.19% 
Other Public Lands 123,000 0.44% 
Tribal  414,000 1.49% 
Forest Industry 5,870,000 21.14% 
Other Private 4,506,000 16.23% 
Total 27,766,000 100.00% 
 
For Oregon as a whole, about 61% of the forest lands are public, 1.5% are tribal, with the 
remainder being privately owned. Of the privately owned forest land, about 57% is owned 
by the forest industry. Statewide, the Oregon Department of Forestry has responsibility for 
about 15.8 million acres of forest land, or about 57% of the total forests in Oregon. 
However, the overall forest ownership pattern for Columbia County is much different than 
the statewide pattern shown above in Table 9.4. Overall, Columbia County is 
approximately 90% forested (Atlas of Oregon, Vegetation Map, University of Oregon 
Press, 2002). Essentially the entire interior of the county is forested, along with much of 
the area along the Columbia River, except for the relatively small developed areas and 
relatively small areas of agricultural lands. This vegetation map is shown on the following 
page. 
Most of the vegetated areas in Columbia County are classified as Douglas Fir – Broadleaf 
Deciduous, with areas of Douglas Fir – Western Hemlock. Along the Columbia River 
Valley there are areas of Cottonwood-Willow Riparian, and Pasture Riparian Bottomland, 
with these classifications being as per the Atlas of Oregon. 
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Vegetation Codes for Columbia County Include: 
dd Douglas fir – broadleaf deciduous 
dh Douglas fir – western hemlock 
rc Cottonwood – willow riparian 
rb Pasture – riparian bottomland 
ag agricultural 
The portion of Clatsop State Forest in Columbia County covers about 6,400 acres in about 
a half dozen non-connected blocks of land. The remaining forest lands are predominantly 




January 3, 2005 9-123




January 3, 2005 9-124 
9.4 Urban/Wildland Interface Fire Hazards for Columbia County 
As discussed above (Section 9.1) portions of every community in Columbia County are 
subject to risk from wildland/urban interface fires. 
Overview and Background Information 
As discussed above in Section 9.1, wildland/urban interface fires are wildland fires in 
areas where structures provide additional fuel load. Thus, the fire hazard for 
wildland/urban interface fires is essentially the same as the fire hazard for wildland fires. 
In this context, fire hazard means the probability and severity of fires. Fire risk, the threat 
to people and the built environment, depends on the level of fire hazard and on the extent 
of development in fire-prone areas. 
The three primary factors governing the level of hazard for wildland fires or wildland/ 
urban interface fires are: fuels (type and load) weather and topography. For many 
communities in Columbia County, the fuel load in the nearby forested areas is generally 
high and relatively continuous across large geographic areas. Because of historical 
logging activities, much of the forest is composed of relatively young trees, with a high 
density of trees per acre. 
However, for Columbia County, a high percentage of forest lands are actively managed 
for timber. Such actively managed forest lands typically have lower fire risk because they 
are relatively free of dead and downed material that would pose higher fuel loading fire 
hazards. Intensively managed stands are healthy young stands that are marketed in 
shorter rotations. Harvest scheduling often includes multiple entries including thinning and 
salvage and final harvest operations of these stands have less breakage and efficient 
utilization. This results in minimal accumulation of heavy fuel load. In addition, forests 
within Columbia County are relatively free of major insect and disease problems which 
often plague other forests in Oregon. Stand replacement fires (high intensity timber fires) 
are rare within Columbia County. 
However, the harvest of timber does create a temporary dead fuel load (slash 
accumulations) that can pose an extreme fire risk for fire starts and fire spread. In 
particular, areas where logging occurs within the urban-interface may present higher 
potential for a large fire for a period following harvesting. Harvest units are usually 
scarified in windrows or piles to allow planting and reduce fire hazard. Some owners 
reduce hazard by prescribed fire but this is often problematic in the interface. Such areas 
are commonly scarified into piles and not burned. The most common fuel types that carry 
fire are grass, brush, recently harvested sites with logging slash, replanted units and 
reproduction to about 15 years of age and timber understory vegetation. 
Topography contributes to fire hazard because fires spread much more quickly up steep 
slopes. Weather is very important in governing the level of fire hazard. Rainfall amounts 
and patterns contribute to the level of fuel load and also to moisture levels in vegetation. 
During fires, temperature, humidity and wind speed are major factors governing the rate of 
spread of wildland fires and thus major factors governing the ease or difficulty with which 
a given fire is likely to be contained. 
Typical annual rainfall amounts for Columbia County are moderately high to high, with 
annual rainfalls ranging from about 40 inches to 60 inches. Wildland/urban fire hazards in 
Columbia County would be highest during prolonged periods of drought, especially after 
periods of normal to above normal rainfall, which would result in a combination of high fuel 
loads and unusually dry conditions. 
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Historical Fire Data 
The Oregon Department of Forestry (Jim Wolf) provided records for all wildland fires in 
ODF responsibility lands in Columbia County from 1970 to 2003. These records provide 
an useful resource to evaluate both the historical frequency and severity of wildland fires 
in Columbia County For this 34-year period, the ODF records show a total of 689 wildland 
fires for ODF responsibility lands in Columbia County, or an average of about 20 fires per 
year. These ODF data are summarized below in Table 9.5. 
Table 9.5 
ODF Fire Data for Columbia County 
Columbia County Total (acres) 420,480
ODF Responsibility (acres) 1 334,091
ODF Responsibility (% of county) 79.45%
Total ODF Fires 689
Fires Less than 1 acre 540
Fires 1 to 9 acres 134
Fires 10 acres or more 15
Largest fire (acres) 93
ODF Fires Per Year 20
Total Acres Burned 789
Average Acres Burned Per Year 23
     1 Michael Simek, ODF, Sept. 21, 2004.
ODF Fire Responsibility for Columbia County
ODF Fire Statistics (1970-2003)
 
In interpreting these data, it is important to keep in mind that these data are for ODF 
responsibility areas, along with ODF joint responses to fires in areas where the primary 
responsibility is provided by local fire agencies. However, for Columbia County, ODF 
responsibility lands include nearly 80% of the entire county and since these ODF data 
include the joint responses these data probably represent most of the wildland and 
wildland/urban interface fires in Columbia County. 
The ODF data show 689 fires over the 34-year time period, or an average of 20 fires per 
year. The total acres burned were only 789 or about 23 acres per year. Most of these fires 
were less than one acre (540), with 134 fires between 1 and 9 acres. Only 15 fires were10 
acres or more. The largest fire reported consumed 93 acres. 
Ideally, historical fire data should suffice to estimate the annual probably for fires in the 
wildland/urban interface areas of Columbia County. However, current data do not appear 
adequate to make credible calculations because the data for local, state, and federal 
responsibility areas are not commensurate and are not sortable by type of location 
(wildland, interface, developed areas). Nevertheless, the data reviewed above provide a 
general picture of the level of wildland/urban interface fire risk for Columbia County 
overall. 
However, there are several reasons why the fire risk may be higher than suggested 
above, especially in developing wildland/urban interface areas. 
1. Large fires may occur infrequently, but statistically they will occur. One 
large fire could significantly change the statistics. In other words, 34 years 
of historical data may be too short to capture large, infrequent wildland fire 
events. A seismic analogy is the Cascadia Subduction Zone earthquake 
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discussed in Chapter 10. This event has not occurred in the past 30 years 
and probably has not occurred since 1700. Nevertheless, large 
earthquakes have occurred in the past and are likely in the future. Thus, a 
34-year record does not completely reflect the hazard from large 
earthquakes or large wildland fires. 
2. The level of fire hazard depends profoundly on weather patterns. A several 
year drought period would substantially increase the probability of large 
wildland fires in Columbia County. For smaller vegetation areas, with grass, 
brush and small trees, a much shorter drought period of a few months or 
less would substantially increase the fire hazard. 
3. The level of fire hazard in wildland/urban interface areas, with the greatest 
risk for life safety and property, is likely significantly higher than for wildland 
areas as a whole. The probability of fires starting in interface areas is much 
higher than in wildland areas because of the much higher population 
density in interface areas. Most wildland or interface fires have human 
sources of ignition - arson, sparks from vehicles or electric lines, discarded 
smoking materials, or trash or debris fires that get out control, and so on. 
Thus, the probability of a given acre burning is probably higher in interface 
areas than for the wildland areas of Columbia County as a whole. 
Developments in wildland/urban interface areas face a range of levels of fire risk, 
depending on a number of factors. Developments that have all of most of the following 
attributes are at the highest level of risk: 
1. High vegetative fuel loads, with a high degree on continuity of fuel load 
(i.e., few significant firebreaks). Risk may be particularly high if the fuel load 
is grass, brush and smaller trees, subject to being at very low moisture 
levels in short duration drought periods. 
2. Higher slopes, which cause fires to spread more rapidly than in flatter 
terrain. 
3. Limited fire suppression capacity, including limited water supply capacity 
for fire suppression purposes, limited fire fighting personnel and apparatus, 
and typically long response times for fire alarms. 
4. Limited access for fire fighting apparatus and limited evacuation routes for 
residents at risk. 
5. Construction of structures to less than fully fire-safe practices, and 
6. Lack of maintenance of firebreaks and defensible zones around structures. 
Overall, the threat of wildland fire and/or wildland/urban interface fires appears moderate 
to moderately high for Columbia County, in large part because of the typically high levels 
of rainfall. 
However, for portions of Columbia County, depending on specific conditions in 
developments in wildland/urban interface areas, the threat may be moderate to high, 
especially during periods of drought. The specific level of risk for each development 
depends on the risk factors as summarized above. A comprehensive evaluation of the 
level of risk for developments in wildland/urban interface areas requires a specific 
evaluation of the risk attributes listed above for each development area. 
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9.5 Fire Protection Service Providers and Areas with High Potential for 
Wildland/Urban Interface Fires  
Fire protection services within the developed areas of Columbia County are provided by 
ODF and five local agencies: 
Oregon Department of Forestry 
Clatskanie Rural Fire Protection District 
Columbia River Fire and Rescue 
Mist-Birkenfeld Rural Fire Protection District 
Scappoose Rural Fire Protection District 
Vernonia Rural Fire Protection District 
Each of the fire protection service providers in Columbia County was surveyed to 
determine areas of special concern with high potential for wildland/urban interface fires. 
Many of these identified areas of special concern are likely to be high priority areas for 
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Table 9.6 
Areas of Special Concern for Wildand/Urban Interface Fires 
Community Areas of Special Concern 1
Clatskanie
Conyers Creek drainage area, area NE of Clatskanie and 
populated areas in the interface adjoining natural cover and 
wildland fuels.
Mist-Birkenfeld Fishhawk Lake area and other rural areas in the interface adjoining natural cover and wildland fuels.
Rainier Populated areas of the interface adjoining natural cover and wildland areas.
Scappoose
Chapman, Alder Creek, JP West, Mt. View, Callahan, 
Bonneville, and Wilkinson Roads.  Dutch Canyon, 
Pamarama Terrace and Raymond Creek subdivisions.2 
Populated areas of the interface adjoining natural cover 
and wildland areas.
St. Helens
Gray Cliffs and surrounding greater St. Helens area.  Areas 
involving oak, brush, and grass fuel types. Populated areas 
of the interface adjoining natural cover and wildland areas.
Vernonia Populated areas of the interface adjoining natural cover and wildland areas.
     1 Michael Simek, ODF, Sept. 21, 2004.
     2 Scappoose RFD, November, 2004  
The potential impacts of wildland/urban interface fires on Columbia County are 
summarized below in Table 9.7. 
Table 9.7 
Potential Impacts of Wildland/Urban Interface Fires On Columbia County 
Inventory Probable Impacts
Portion of Columbia County affected
Highest risk areas are residential areas bordering heavily vegetated 
wildland areas.  These areas include many of the smaller 
communities in Columbia County and portions of the larger 
communities (See Tables 9.1 and  9.6 above).
Buildings
Small wildland/urban interface fires could affect a few residential 
buildings.  Larger fires could effect entire neighborhoods and 
extreme events (cf. Oakland Hills 1991 fire) could affect hundreds 
of buildings
Streets within communities Minor road closures possible from fires; limited impact because of short detour routes within communities.
Roads within and to/from Columbia 
County
Potential closures of major highways due to fires, especially roads 
in the interior of Columbia County.
Electric power Potential for localized loss of electric power due to fires affecting power lines in or near Columbia County
Other Utilities
Generally minor or no impacts on other utilities from fires, except 
for possible loss of telephone service due to fires affecting phone 
poles/lines.
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9.6 Mitigation Strategies 
9.6.1 General Strategies 
This section outlines suggested strategies for reducing the level of risk to both property 
and life safety in wildland/urban interface development areas that may be at high risk from 
wildland/urban interface fires. The suggested mitigation strategy has four elements: 
1. reduce the probability of fire ignitions, 
2 reduce the probability that small fires will spread, 
3 minimize property damage, and 
4. minimize the life safety risk. 
Reduce the probability of fire ignitions 
Efforts to reduce the probability of fire ignitions should focus on manmade causes of 
ignition through a combination of fire prevention education, enforcement, and other 
actions. Fire prevention education actions could include efforts to heighten public 
awareness of fire dangers, especially during high danger time periods and better 
education about fire safe practices, such as careful disposal of smoking materials, and 
adhering to restrictions on burning of rubbish and debris. Fire prevention enforcement 
action could include strict enforcement of burning restrictions and vigorous investigation 
and prosecution of arson cases. An important physical action to reduce the probability of 
ignitions is to maintain or upgrade tree-trimming operations around power lines to 
minimize fires starting by sparking from lines to vegetative fuels. 
Reduce the probability that small fires will spread. 
Possible mitigation actions to reduce the probability that small fires will spread include 
enhancement of water supply and fire suppression capabilities for high risk areas, 
expansion of existing firebreaks, creation of new firebreaks and expanding defensible 
spaces around structures in wildland/urban interface areas. Geographical area specific 
pre-emergency planning by jurisdiction should also be conducted to help optimize fire 
response strategies. 
Minimize Property Damage 
The education and action items discussed above may help to reduce future property 
damages by reducing the number of fire ignitions and by reducing the probability that a 
small fire will spread. In addition, specific fire safe building practices should be 
implemented (if not yet implemented) or enforced vigorously (if not yet vigorously 
enforced). Fire safe building practices have two main elements: first, design of structures, 
and second, creation of defensible spaces around structures. 
The USFA (www.usfa.fema.gov) and other organizations have many sources of 
information about fire safe practices in the wildland/urban interface. For example, the 
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) has an excellent “Firewise” communities 
program with an excellent, highly informative website (www.firewise.org). The firewise 
website can also be reached from the main NFPA website (www.nfpa.org). The Firewise 
website has very informative publications and videos for local officials and homeowners to 
help understand, evaluate, and improve the fire safety of structures at risk from 
wildland/urban interface fires. Similar information is also available at the FireFree site by 
the Safeco Insurance Company: (www.safeco.com/safeco/about/giving/firefree.asp) 
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The NFPA Firewise construction and firewise landscaping checklists are particularly 
recommended as concise summaries of the primary fire-safe designs and practices for 
homeowners at risk from wildland/urban interface fires. The NFPA’s Firewise Construction 
Checklist, makes the following main recommendations (among others): 
1. site homes on as level terrain as possible, at least 30 feet back from cliffs or ridge 
lines, 
2. build homes with fire-resistant roofing materials, such as Class-A asphalt 
shingles, slate or clay tiles, concrete or cement products, or metal. 
3. build homes with fire-resistant exterior wall cladding, such as masonry or 
stucco, 
4. consider the size and materials for windows; smaller panes hold up better 
than larger ones, double pane and tempered glass windows are more fire 
resistant than single pane windows; plastic skylights can melt and allow 
access for burning embers, 
5. prevent sparks and embers from entering vents by covering vents with wire 
mesh no larger than 1/8", box eaves, and minimize places to trap embers 
on decks and other attached structures, and 
6. keep roofs, eaves, and gutters free of flammable debris. 
The NFPA’s Firewise Landscaping Checklist includes the following main 
recommendations (among others), based on a four-zone planning concept around the 
house: 
1. Zone 1 should be well irrigated area of closely mowed grass or non-flammable 
landscaping materials such as decorative stone, at least 30' in all directions 
around the home, 
2. Zone 2 should be a further irrigated buffer zone with only a limited number 
of low-growing, fire-resistant plants, 
3. Zone 3, further from the house, can include low growing plants and well-
spaced, well-pruned trees, keeping the total vegetative fuel load as low as 
possible, and 
4. Zone 4 is the natural area around the above three landscaped zones. This 
area should be thinned selectively, with removal of highly flammable 
vegetation and removal of ladder fuels that can spread a grass fire 
upwards into tree tops. 
Minimize Life Safety Risk 
The mitigation actions above may help to minimize life safety risk by helping to reduce the 
number of ignitions, by reducing the probability that small fires will spread, and by 
encouraging more fire-safe practices of building construction and fire-safe landscaping. 
These practices are meritorious for reducing the fire hazards to structures. However, they 
may also give homeowners a false sense of life safety security. A false sense of security 
may encourage people to stay in homes at risk during wildfires, rather than evacuating 
immediately at the first fire warning. 
The most important action to minimize life safety risk during wildland/urban interface fires 
is immediate evacuation. However, evacuations must be directed by the responsible fire 
agencies to ensure both egress for residents and access for fire apparatus and personnel. 
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Uncontrolled evacuations can sometimes block access and thus potentially increase fire 
spread. Thus, reducing life safety risk requires public education and emergency planning 
to encourage and expedite warnings and evacuations (voluntary or mandatory). 
Life safety risk during wildland/urban interface fires is exacerbated by limited evacuation 
routes. Improving evacuation roads (widening, straightening) and, most importantly, 
providing as many alternate evacuation routes as possible can significantly reduce 
evacuation times and lower the probability that residents seeking to evacuate may be 
trapped by fire-blocked routes. 
Further information on fire safety measures for homeowners living in or near the wildand 
urban interface is available from local offices of the Oregon Department of Forestry and 
from local fire agencies. 
9.6.2 Community Wildfire Protection Plans 
The incentives for communities subject to wildland/urban interface fires to engage in 
comprehensive forest planning and prioritization was given new impetus with the 
enactment of the Healthy Forest Restoration Action (HFRA) in 2003. To be eligible for 
federal funding for future risk reduction measures, communities must complete a 
Community Wildfire Protection Plan (CWPP). 
Community Wildfire Protection Plans may address issues such as wildfire response, 
hazard mitigation, community preparedness or structure protection. The minimum 
requirements for a CWPP include: 
• A CWPP must be collaboratively developed by local and state government 
representatives, in consultation with federal agencies and other interested parties. 
• A CWPP must identify and prioritize areas for hazardous fuel reduction treatments 
and recommend the types and methods of treatment that will protect one or more 
at-risk communities and essential infrastructure. 
• A CWPP must recommend measures that homeowners and communities can take 
to reduce the ignitability of structures throughout the area addressed by the plan. 
The following table contains wildland/urban interface fire mitigation action items from the 
master Action Item table in Chapter 4. 
 
 
January 3, 2005 9-132 
Table 9.8 





































































Wildland/Urban Interface Fire Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Identify specific parts of Columbia County at high risk 
for urban/wildland urban interface fires because of 
fuel loading, topography and prevailing construction 
practices
County Fire Defense Board, fire 
agencies 1-2 Years X X X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Identify evacuation routes and procedures for high 
risk areas and educate the public
County Fire Defense Board, fire 
agencies, law enforcement, County 
Roads, public works
Ongoing X X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Develop Community Wildand Fire Protection Plans for 
all at-risk communities County, cities, fire agencies, ODF 1-2 Years X X X X X
Long-Term     
#1
Encourage fire-safe construction practices for existing 
and new construction in high risk areas
County Land Development 
Services, city building departments, 
fire agencies
Ongoing X X X X X
Long-Term     
#2
Enhance home landscape cleanup (defensible space) 
and debris disposal programs
County Land Development 
Services, city building departments, 
fire agencies
Ongoing X X X X X
Long-Term     
#3
Identify potential fuel breaks and fuel reduction zones 
and implement mitigation actions
County Land Development 
Services, city building departments, 
fire agencies
Ongoing X X X X X
Long-Term     
#4
Implement SB360 Wildland Urban Interface Act of 
1997 in Columbia County
County Land Development 
Services, city building departments, 
fire agencies
5-10 years X X X X X
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline















Historically, awareness of seismic risk in Oregon has generally been low, among both the 
public at large and public officials. This low level of awareness reflected the low level of 
seismic activity in Oregon, at least in recent historical time. However, over the past 
several years, awareness of seismic risk in Oregon has significantly increased. Factors in 
this increased awareness include the 1993 Scotts Mills earthquake in Clackamas County 
and the February 28, 2001 Nisqually earthquake in Pierce County, Washington. There has 
been an increase in widespread publicity about possible large magnitude earthquakes on 
the Cascadia Subduction Zone with projected losses possibly exceeding $12 billion, with 
over 30,000 destroyed building and 8,000 lives lost in the event of a magnitude 8.5. Also, 
Oregon has recently changed the Seismic Zonation in the Oregon Building Code which 
increased seismic design levels for new construction in western Oregon. 
Before reviewing the levels of seismic hazard and seismic risk in Columbia County, we 
first present a brief earthquake “primer” that reviews some basic earthquake concepts and 
terms. 
10.1 Earthquake Primer 
In the popular press, earthquakes are most often described by their Richter Magnitude 
(M). Richter Magnitude is a measure of the total energy released by an earthquake. In 
addition to Richter magnitude, there are several other measures of earthquake magnitude 
used by seismologists, but such technical details are beyond the scope of this discussion. 
The Scotts Mills (Oregon) earthquake was M = 5.6, while the Northridge (California) 
earthquake was about M = 6.7. Great earthquakes, for example, on the San Andreas 
Fault or on the Cascadia Subduction Zone, may have magnitudes of 8 or greater. 
It is important to recognize that the Richter scale is not linear, but rather logarithmic. A M8 
earthquake is not twice as powerful as a M4, but rather thousands of times more powerful. 
A M7 earthquake releases about 30 times more energy than a M6, while a M8 releases 
about 30 times more energy than a M7 and so on. Thus, great M8 earthquakes may 
release thousands of times as much energy as do moderate earthquakes in the M5 or M6 
range. 
The public often assumes that the larger the magnitude of an earthquake the “worse” the 
earthquake. Thus, the “big one” is the M8 earthquake and smaller earthquakes (M6 or 
M7) are not the “big one”. However, this is true only in very general terms. Larger 
magnitude earthquakes affect larger geographic areas, with much more widespread 
damage than smaller magnitude earthquakes. However, for a given site, the magnitude of 
an earthquake is NOT a good measure of the severity of the earthquake at that site. 
Rather, the intensity of ground shaking at the site depends on the magnitude of the 
earthquake and on the distance from the site to the earthquake. An earthquake is located 
by its epicenter - the location on the earth’s surface directly above the point of origin of the 
earthquake. Earthquake ground shaking diminishes (attenuates) with distance from the 
epicenter. Thus, any given earthquake will produce the strongest ground motions near the 
earthquake with the intensity of ground motions diminishing with increasing distance from 
the epicenter. 
Thus, for a given site, a smaller earthquake (such as a M6.5) which is very close to the 
site could cause greater damage than a much larger earthquake (such as a M8) which is 




However, earthquakes at or below M5 are not likely to cause significant damage, even 
locally very near the epicenter. Earthquakes between about M5 and M6 are likely to cause 
some damage very near the epicenter, with the extent of damage typically being relatively 
minor (e.g., the 1993 Scotts Mills earthquake). Earthquakes of about M6.5 or greater can 
cause major damage (e.g., the Northridge earthquake), with damage usually concentrated 
fairly near the epicenter. Larger earthquakes of M7+ cause damage over increasingly 
wider geographic areas with the potential for very high levels of damage near the 
epicenter. Great earthquakes with M8+ can cause major damage over wide geographic 
areas. For example, a M8+ on the Cascadia Subduction Zone could affect the entire 
Pacific Northwest from British Columbia, through Washington and Oregon, and as far 
south as Northern California. 
The intensity of ground shaking varies not only as a function of M and distance but also 
depends on soil types. Soft soils may amplify ground motions and increase the level of 
damage. Thus, for any given earthquake there will be contours of varying intensity of 
ground shaking. The intensity will generally decrease with distance from the earthquake, 
but often in an irregular pattern, reflecting soil conditions (amplification) and possible 
directionality in the dispersion of earthquake energy. 
There are many measures of the severity or intensity of earthquake ground motions. A 
very old, but commonly used, scale is the Modified Mercalli Intensity scale (MMI), which is 
a descriptive, qualitative scale that relates severity of ground motions to types of damage 
experienced. MMIs range from I to XII. 
More useful, modern intensity scales use terms that can be physically measured with 
seismometers, such as the acceleration, velocity, or displacement (movement) of the 
ground. The most common physical measure, and the one used in this Mitigation Plan, is 
Peak Ground Acceleration or PGA. PGA is a measure of the intensity of shaking, relative 
to the acceleration of gravity (g). For example, 1.0 g PGA in an earthquake (an extremely 
strong ground motion) means that objects accelerate sideways at the same rate as if they 
had been dropped from the ceiling. 10% g PGA means that the ground acceleration is 
10% that of gravity and so on. 
Damage levels experienced in an earthquake vary with the intensity of ground shaking 
and with the seismic capacity of structures. Ground motions of only 1 or 2% g are widely 
felt by people; hanging plants and lamps swing strongly, but damage levels, if any, are 
usually very low. Ground motions below about 10% g usually cause only slight damage. 
Ground motions between about 10% g and 30% g may cause minor to moderate damage 
in well-designed buildings, with higher levels of damage in poorly designed buildings. At 
this level of ground shaking, only unusually poor buildings would be subject to potential 
collapse. Ground motions above about 30% g may cause significant damage in well-
designed buildings and very high levels of damage (including collapse) in poorly designed 
buildings. Ground motions above about 50% g may cause high levels of damage in many 
buildings, even those designed to resist seismic forces. 
10.2 Seismic Hazards for Columbia County  
Earthquakes in Western Oregon, and throughout the world, occur predominantly because 
of plate tectonics - the relative movement of plates of oceanic and continental rocks that 
make up the rocky surface of the earth. Earthquakes can also occur because of volcanic 




The Cascadia Subduction Zone is a geologically complex area off the Pacific Northwest 
coast from Northern California to British Columbia. In simple terms, several pieces of 
oceanic crust (the Juan de Fuca Plate, Gorda Plate and other smaller pieces) are being 
subducted (pushed under) the crust of North America. This subduction process is 
responsible for most of the earthquakes in the Pacific Northwest as well as for creating the 
volcanoes in the Cascades. Figure 10.1 shows the geologic (plate-tectonic) setting for 
Oregon. 
There are three source regions for earthquakes that can affect Columbia County: 
1. “interface” or “subduction zone” earthquakes on the boundary between the 
subducting oceanic plates and the North American plate, 
2. “intraslab” or “intraplate” earthquakes within the subducting oceanic plates, 
which are also known as “Benioff Zone” or deep zone earthquakes, and 
3. “crustal” earthquakes within the North American Plate. 
The geographic and geometric relationships of these earthquake source zones are shown 
in Figure 10.2 
The “interface” earthquakes on the Cascadia Subduction Zone may have magnitudes of 8 
or greater, with probable recurrence intervals of 500 to 800 years. The last major 
earthquake in this source region probably occurred in the year 1700, based on current 
interpretations of Japanese tsunami records. Such earthquakes are the great Cascadia 
Subduction Zone earthquake events that have received attention in the popular press. 
These earthquakes typically occur about 20 to 60 kilometers (12 to 40 miles) offshore 
from the Pacific Ocean coastline. Ground shaking from such earthquakes would be very 
strong near the coast and moderately strong ground shaking would be felt throughout 












The “intraslab” earthquakes, which are also called “intraplate” or “Benioff Zone” earthquakes, 
occur within the subducting oceanic plate. These earthquakes may have magnitudes up to 
about 7.5, with probable recurrence intervals of about 500 to 1000 years (recurrence 
intervals are poorly determined by current geologic data). These earthquakes occur quite 
deep in the earth, about 30 or 40 kilometers (18 to 25 miles) below the surface with 
epicenters that would likely range from near the Pacific Ocean coast to about 50 kilometers 
(30 miles) inland. Epicenters from these types of earthquakes could be located in Clatsop 
County or perhaps western Columbia County. Ground shaking from such earthquakes would 
be very strong near the epicenter and moderately strong ground shaking would be felt 





“Crustal” earthquakes within the North American plate are possible on faults mapped as 
active or potentially active as well as on unmapped (unknown) faults. Historically observed 
crustal earthquakes in Oregon from 1841 to 2002 are shown in Figure 10-3 (DOGAMI, Map 
of Selected Earthquakes for Oregon, 1841 through 2002, Open-File Report 03-02, 2003). 
During this time period, several dozen, mostly small, earthquakes have occurred in Columbia 
County as shown on Figure 10.3. Larger earthquakes in Multnomah, Washington, and 
Clackamas County are also shown, along with a large number of earthquakes associated 
with volcanic activity at Mount St. Helens. There are no mapped active crustal faults in 
Columbia County, although several active crustal faults are shown in nearby counties. 
The nearest large crustal fault is the Portland Hills Fault. Geologic studies of this fault 
suggest that one or two large (perhaps M6.5) earthquakes have occurred in the past 12,000 
to 15,000. Thus, the recurrence interval for such events is likely to be very long, in the range 
of 5,000 to 10,000 years. A major earthquake on the Portland Hills Fault would have 
significant impacts on Columbia County, albeit with a low probability of occurrence. 
Furthermore, based on the historical seismicity in Western Oregon and on analogies to other 
geologically similar areas, small to moderate earthquakes up to M5 or M5.5 are possible 
almost anyplace in Western Oregon, including in Columbia County. Such earthquakes would 
be mostly much smaller than the Scotts Mills earthquake up to about the magnitude of that 
1993 earthquake. The possibility of larger crustal earthquakes in the M6+ range cannot be 
ruled out. However, in the absence of known, mapped faults, the probability of such events is 
likely to be very low. 
Because the probability of large crustal earthquakes (M6 or greater) affecting Columbia 
County is so low and because any damage in smaller crustal earthquakes is likely to be 
minor and very localized, crustal earthquakes are not considered significant for hazard 
mitigation planning purposes. Therefore, our analysis focuses on the larger, much more 





Earthquake Epicenters from 1841 to 2002 
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The characteristics of the subduction zone earthquakes affecting Columbia County are 
summarized in Table 10.4 below. The maximum magnitudes are estimated from the 
length and width of the mapped fault plane or from similar earthquakes elsewhere in the 
Pacific Northwest (for the intraslab earthquakes). Recurrence intervals are based on 
current best estimates. 
Table 10.4 






Cascadia Subduction Zone 
(interface earthquake) 




7.5 500 to 1000 
10.3 Other Aspects of Seismic Hazards in Columbia County 
Most of the damage in earthquakes occurs directly because of ground shaking which 
affects buildings and infrastructure. However, there are several other aspects of 
earthquakes that can result in very high levels of damage in localized sites: liquefaction, 
landslides, dam failures and tsunamis. 
10.3.1 Soil Effects 
Liquefaction is a process where loose, wet sediments lose strength during an earthquake 
and behave similarly to a liquid. Once a soil liquefies, it will tend to settle and/or spread 
laterally. With even very slight slopes, liquefied soils tend to move sideways downhill 
(lateral spreading). Settling or lateral spreading can cause major damage to buildings and 
to buried infrastructure such as pipes and cables. 
In general, areas of high liquefaction potential largely follow river and stream drainage 
channels, marshy areas and areas near lakes. In addition, similar soil conditions may 
occur in areas where lakes or streams existed in the past but have now been filled in by 
natural or human-caused processes. 
In earthquakes, liquefaction, settling or lateral spreading does not occur in all such areas 
or in all earthquakes. However, in larger earthquakes with strong ground shaking and long 
duration shaking, liquefaction is likely in many of these high liquefaction potential areas. 
Settlements of a few inches or more and lateral spreads of a few inches to several feet 
are possible. Even a few inches of settlement or lateral spreading is likely to cause 
significant to major damage to buildings or infrastructure. 
For Columbia County, county-wide maps of areas known or likely to be affected by these 
soils effects do not yet exist. DOGAMI Maps of relative liquefaction potential for St. Helens 
and Scappoose are shown below as Figures 10-5 and 10-6. 
  




Relative Liquefaction Potential for St. Helens 
 
 
For St. Helens, large areas are shown as “medium” liquefaction potential, with several 
small areas near the Columbia River shown as “high” liquefaction potential. 
These maps are based on available data and should not be over interpreted to represent 
exact locations of soils subject to liquefaction. Not all areas within given categories of 
liquefaction potential may be as classified: some areas may have higher potential and 
some areas may have lower potential. Detailed site-specific geotechnical studies are 
necessary to determine the level of liquefaction, settlement or lateral spread hazard at any 
specific location.
  




Relative Liquefaction Potential for Scappoose 
 
 
For Scappoose, large areas are shown as having “high” or “medium” liquefaction potential 
(same color codes as Figure 10-4 above). The caveats noted above for the St. Helens 
map also apply to the Scappoose map. Both maps are from DOGAMI’s publication 
Relative Earthquake Hazard Maps for Selected Urban Areas in Western Oregon (IMS-7, 
1999). 
10.3.2 Landslides 
Earthquakes can also induce landslides, especially if an earthquake occurs during the 
rainy season and soils are saturated with water. The areas prone to earthquake-induced 
landslides are largely the same as those areas prone to landslides in general. As with all 
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landslides, areas of steep slopes with loose rock or soils are most prone to earthquake-
induced landslides. 
Figures 8.7 and 8.8 (Chapter 8) show areas of St. Helens, Columbia City and Scappoose 
subject to earthquake-induced (and other) landslides. To date, relatively limited 
development has occurred in most of these high landslide potential areas although some 
portions have been developed as residential areas. See Chapter 8 for further discussion 
of landslide hazards. 
10.3.3 Dam Failures 
Earthquakes can also cause dam failures in several ways. The most common mode of 
earthquake-induced dam failure is slumping or settlement of earthfill dams where the fill 
has not been properly compacted. If the slumping occurs when the dam is full, then 
overtopping of the dam, with rapid erosion leading to dam failure is possible. Dam failure 
is also possible if strong ground motions heavily damage concrete dams. In a few cases, 
earthquake-induced landslides into reservoirs have caused dam failures. 
Earthquake-induced dam failures are addressed in more detail in Chapter 12 which 
covers dam failures that could affect Columbia County. 
10.3.4 Tsunamis and Seiches 
Tsunamis, which are often incorrectly referred to as “tidal waves,” result from earthquakes 
which cause a sudden rise or fall of part of the ocean floor. Such movements may 
produce tsunami waves, which have nothing to do with the ordinary ocean tides. In the 
open ocean, far from land, in deep water, tsunami waves may be only a few inches high 
and thus be virtually undetectable, except by special monitoring instruments. These 
waves travel across the ocean at speeds of several hundred miles per hour. When such 
waves reach shallow water near the coastline, they slow down and can gain great heights. 
Tsunamis affecting the Oregon coast can be produced from very distant earthquakes off 
the coast of Alaska or elsewhere in the Pacific Ocean. For such tsunamis, the warning 
time for the Oregon coast would be at least several hours. However, interface 
earthquakes on the Cascadia Subduction Zone can also produce tsunamis. For such 
earthquakes the warning times would be very short, only a few minutes. Because of this 
extremely short warning time, emergency planning and public education are essential 
before such an event occurs. 
For Columbia County, the impact of possible tsunamis would be limited to minor increases 
in water level in the tidal reach of the lower Columbia River. 
Another earthquake phenomenon is “seiches” which are waves from sloshing of inland 
bodies of water. Seiches have caused damages to shorefront structures and to dams. 
However, for Columbia County, the potential for seiches of sufficient magnitude to cause 
significant damage to upstream dams appears low. 
10.4 Risk Assessment for Scenario Earthquakes 
For regional planning purposes, FEMA’s HAZUS-MH (Hazards U.S. Multi-Hazard) 
software has been used to make estimates of county-wide damages in Columbia County 
from a major earthquake on the Cascadia Subduction Zone. HAZUS is an extensively 
peer-reviewed nationally-applicable loss estimation methodology which draws heavily on 
census and other nationally-available data on buildings and infrastructure. 
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The scenario earthquake considered was a M9.0 Cascadia Subduction Zone Interface 
Earthquake. A smaller M7.5 Cascadia Subduction Zone Intraplate (Benioff Zone) 
Earthquake would have similar impacts on Columbia County because although the 
earthquake magnitude is smaller, the epicenter would be closer to Columbia County. 
Summary results from HAZUS-MH include the following: 
Buildings: more than 50% of the approximately 16,000 buildings in Columbia County will 
have some earthquake damage, with about 28% having at least moderate damage. 
Nearly 600 buildings are estimated to be a complete loss. Total building and contents 
losses are estimated at about $274 million. 
Emergency Shelter Needs: at least 4,000 people are likely to require emergency shelter, 
based on an estimated 1,800 buildings (predominantly residential) with extensive or 
complete damage. Based on experience in major earthquakes elsewhere in the United 
States, approximately 1/3 of displaced people will need public emergency shelter, with the 
rest finding shelter with relatives, friends, or in commercial lodgings. 
Casualty estimates are shown below in Table 10.7. These estimates should not be 
interpreted literally, but rather as statistical calculations of the approximate level of 
expected casualties for Columbia County. Deaths and injuries are lower for a night time 
earthquake because more people are in wood frame residential buildings at night than 




Casualties 2  PM 2 AM
Minor Injuries1 198 128
Major Injuries2 64 29
Deaths 17 4
1 requiring medical attention
2 requiring hospitalization  
 
Water Systems: loss of service to about 3,600 households, with about 750 pipe leaks 
and 190 pipe breaks. 
Wastewater Systems: about 600 pipe beaks and 150 pipe breaks. 
Natural Gas Systems: about 640 pipe leaks and 160 pipe breaks. 
Electric Power: minor damage but probably only very limited or no loss of service. 
Total damages to utilities and transportation infrastructure are estimated to be about $28 
million, with an additional $77 million in economic impacts of temporary loss of service. 
10.5 Probable Impacts of Major Earthquakes on Columbia County 
The potential impacts of major earthquakes on Columbia County are summarized below in 
Table 10.8. 
  




Potential Impacts of Major Earthquakes on Columbia County 
Inventory Probable Impacts
Portion of Columbia County affected
Entire County and surrounding region, highest levels of ground 
shaking and damage percentages likely in western Columbia 
County  
Buildings
Many buildings will have no damage or light to moderate damage, 
with heavy damage concentrated in vulnerable buildings (wood 
frame buildings with cripple walls, unreinforced masonry, etc.).  
Total building damage estimated to be about $274 million.
Streets within Columbia County
Minor road damage possible in areas of soft soils.  Many bridges 
may have significant damage, 3% to 5% may be in complete 
damage state.
Roads to/from Columbia County
Minor road damage possible in areas of soft soils.  Many bridges 
may have significant damage, 3% to 5% may be in complete 
damage state.
Electric power Minor outages possible for a few hours after the earthquake.
Water utilities Loss of water service for about 25% of the population of Columbia County, with most service restored in about 7 days.
Other Utilities
Natural gas system damages and outages similar to water 
systems.  Phone systems (land and cellular) will have system 
overload for about 72 hours, then most customers will have normal 
service.
Emergency Shelter Needs About 4000 people may need emergency shelter.
Casualties
About 17deaths for daytime earthquake or 4 deaths for nighttime 
earthquake.  Daytime injuries about 260; nighttime injuries about 
160.  
 
The above summary of potential impacts is for major earthquakes on the Cascadia 
Subduction Zone, as shown above in Tables 10.7 and 10.8. Smaller earthquakes would 
have substantially smaller impacts on Columbia County than shown above. 
In addition, there is a low probability that a major earthquake could result in substantial 
damage or failure of the major dams upstream of Columbia County. If dam failure were to 
occur, however, the impact on Columbia County is likely to be relatively minor (cf. Chapter 
12 Dams). 
10.6 Earthquake Risk Assessment: Technical Guidance 
For planning purposes, it is sometimes useful to consider three levels of earthquake risk 
assessment. 
A Level One Risk Assessment means that nationally available data are used. 
For example, FEMA’s HAZUS loss estimation software uses national data and 
HAZUS risk assessments for a community are Level One. The risk 
assessments presented in the previous section were Level One Assessments 
using HAZUS. 
A Level Two Risk Assessment is a more refined evaluation using local data 
such as soil maps, assessor’s records, local building code history and so on to 
more accurately reflect local conditions than when using only national data. 
Level Two Assessments are generally more accurate than Level One 
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Assessments, but still rely on generalized, typical data, rather than building 
specific data. 
A Level Three Risk Assessment is building- or facility-specific, using detailed 
data for each facility. A Level Three Risk Assessment cannot be done for an 
entire community, but rather is typically done for a single building or a few 
buildings or other facilities that may be particularly vulnerable or for which 
mitigation of seismic hazards is a high priority. 
10.6.1 Level Two Risk Assessment 
The Level One earthquake loss estimates presented above are based on census-tract 
level data. For a given community, a more accurate loss estimate could be obtained by 
incorporating Level Two local data into the loss calculations. Such data could include: 
1. better inventory data, 
2. spatial distribution of inventory within census tracts, 
3. overlay of soils information with inventory to identify areas subject to 
amplification, liquefaction, settling and displacements, and 
4. refinement of building fragility curves to reflect local inventory. 
Such Level Two loss estimates would be more accurate than the Level One assessments 
presented above. However, the Level One estimates probably provide accurate enough 
estimates of the approximate magnitude of losses for emergency planning purposes. 
Furthermore, conducting a Level Two loss estimate would require very intensive data 
collection and processing efforts, without providing enough detail for specific mitigation 
projects. Therefore, Level Two risk assessments may not be as useful for Columbia 
County as the Level Three Assessments suggested below. 
10.6.2 Level Three Risk Assessment 
The potential damages and losses from earthquakes affecting Columbia County are very 
high. However, the probability of such earthquakes is relatively low and many types of 
buildings, such as wood frame homes, are generally expected to perform reasonably well 
in earthquakes. Therefore, widespread mitigation of seismic hazards is probably not called 
for in the case of most ordinary or typical buildings. That is, seismic mitigation actions are 
probably necessary only for a small percentage of the total building stock in Columbia 
County. 
Furthermore, buildings constructed since the early 1990s generally meet current seismic 
design requirements and will generally perform fairly well in future earthquakes. Similarly, 
new buildings will be built in accordance with current Seismic Zone 3 requirements and 
thus the seismic capacity of the building stock in Columbia County will gradually improve 
over time as the existing stock is gradually replaced and/or upgraded. 
However, for some types of buildings which are more vulnerable or more important than 
typical buildings, seismic retrofit may be highly desirable. Prime candidates for possible 
seismic retrofits include: 
• any buildings that are substantially more vulnerable than typical buildings (e.g., 
unreinforced masonry buildings), 
• buildings on soft soil sites, and 
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• essential service facilities such as major medical facilities, police and fire stations, 
schools, and emergency shelters. 
Specific buildings may be substantially more vulnerable than typical buildings because of 
their structural system. Examples of vulnerable building types include: unreinforced 
masonry, precast concrete frame, concrete or steel frame with unreinforced masonry infill 
walls, concrete moment resisting frame, and precast concrete tiltup walls. 
Buildings may also be substantially more vulnerable than typical buildings because of their 
design characteristics. Examples include buildings with soft first stories (taller than other 
stories and/or with large expanses of windows without shear walls) and buildings with 
major configurational irregularities, as well as wood frame buildings with cripple wall 
foundations or with sill plates not bolted to the foundation. Thus, we suggest that Level 
Three risk assessments focus primarily on such buildings, especially for essential service 
facilities. 
A Level Three assessment provides a building-specific evaluation, more accurate than 
generic assessments based on typical buildings. Ideally, a Level Three assessment would 
include a site specific seismic hazard analysis, taking into account soil conditions, and a 
building-specific evaluation of the seismic vulnerability of each building under evaluation. 
In addition to buildings, there are other critical facilities which may be vulnerable to 
seismic damage, including utility and transportation system infrastructure. Minimizing 
earthquake damage to such facilities is particularly important to a community because 
loss of function of critical utility or transportation system infrastructure may have a very 
large economic impact on the community. Facilities that should have a high priority for 
Level Three Risk Assessments include: electric power substations (especially high voltage 
substations), water and waste-water treatment plants, water reservoirs, bulk fuel storage 
tanks and hazmat storage tanks, dams and bridges. For utilities in general, non-structural 
mitigation measures are often very cost-effective and should have a high priority. 
For buildings, utilities and other important facilities, the seven-step Mitigation Planning 
methodology outlined in Chapter 1 is appropriate. For prioritizing between mitigation 
projects, the principles of benefit-cost analysis apply to mitigation projects for all hazards, 
including seismic hazard mitigation. FEMA has software available to conduct such 
analyses of prospective earthquake hazard mitigation projects. 
10.7 Other Earthquake Risk Comments for Columbia County 
A “windshield” survey means a quick, preliminary seismic risk evaluation of a building or 
other facility, based on readily observable external attributes. A windshield survey may 
literally be done from a vehicle, but more commonly includes a quick walk around 
inspection. Conclusions drawn from such preliminary evaluations must be interpreted 
carefully as giving only a general indication of the probable level of seismic risk posed by 
the building or facility. 
The following comments are based on a very limited windshield type survey of Columbia 
County’s population centers. 
Overall, a majority of the building inventory in Columbia County is residential, with most 
residential structures being wood frame buildings. In general, wood frame buildings 
perform well in earthquakes, with a few notable exceptions. Wood frame buildings with the 
following characteristics are generally substantially vulnerable to major seismic damage: 
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1. sill plates not bolted to foundation, 
2. cripple wall perimeter systems, and 
3. buildings on steep slopes, partially supported on “stilts.” 
Cripple wall perimeter systems are short wooden walls which raise the first floor elevation 
above grade by typically about 2 to 4 feet. Unbolted sill plates and cripple wall 
construction are common in pre-WW2 construction. Visual inspection and the general 
vintage of building stock in Columbia County suggest that there are likely significant 
numbers of buildings in Columbia County with cripple wall foundations or with unbolted sill 
plates. 
Unreinforced masonry buildings are also subject to major damage in earthquakes. 
Columbia County has at least several dozen masonry buildings (most commercial or 
industrial in the older central business districts of most communities) which may be 
unreinforced or reinforced masonry. Some of these buildings may be highly vulnerable to 
earthquake damage and thus should have a high priority for detailed evaluation, 
especially those buildings with high occupancies or important functions. 
A detailed inventory of wood frame buildings with the above noted seismic deficiencies 
and inventory of unreinforced masonry buildings would be useful to further quantify the 
level of risk posed by such structures in Columbia County. 
10.7.1 Existing Earthquake Mitigation Activities 
Columbia County encourages employers and individuals to meet the requirements of:  
Senate Bill 13: Seismic Event Preparation Signed by Governor Kitzhaber on 
June 14, 2001, requiring each state and local agency and persons employing 
250 or more full-time employees to develop seismic preparation procedures 
and inform their employees about the procedures. Further, the bill requires 
agencies to conduct drills in accordance with the State Office of Emergency 
Management guidelines. These drills must include “familiarization with routes 
and methods of exiting the building and methods of duck, cover, and hold 
during an earthquake. 
Senate Bill 14: Seismic Surveys for School buildings Signed by the Governor 
on July 19, 2001, requiring the State Board of Higher Education to provide for 
seismic safety surveys of buildings that have a capacity of 250 or more 
persons and are routinely used for student activities. 
Senate Bill 15: Seismic Surveys for Hospital Buildings Signed by the Governor 
on July 19, 2001 requiring the Health Division to provide for seismic safety 
surveys of hospital building that contain an acute in-patient care facility. 
Seismic surveys shall also be conducted on fire stations, police stations, 
sheriffs’ offices, and similar facilities subject to available funding. Surveys 
should be completed by January 1, 2007. 
Columbia County plans on integrating HAZUS multi-hazard data sets into the new GIS 
program once it goes live in 2005. 
Incorporate the Regional Emergency Management Groups post earthquake Emergency 
Transportation Routes plan in all appropriate planning documents. 
  
January 3, 2005  
 
10-150
Encourage property owners to purchase earthquake hazard insurance and consider non-
structural and structural mitigation activities for their homes and businesses. 
10.8 Earthquake Hazard Mitigation Projects: General Examples 
There are a wide variety of possible hazard mitigation projects for earthquakes. The most 
common projects include: structural retrofit of buildings, non-structural bracing and 
anchoring of equipment and contents, and strengthening of bridges and other 
infrastructure components. 
The seismic hazard (frequency and severity of earthquakes) is moderate in Columbia 
County. However, the risk (potential for damages and casualties) may be fairly high 
because some buildings and infrastructure may be highly vulnerable to earthquake 
damages. The risk assessment methodology outlined above for earthquakes provides the 
basis for identifying the high risk facilities that then become the primary targets for 
mitigation. 
Structural retrofit of buildings should not focus on typical buildings, but rather on buildings 
that are most vulnerable to seismic damage. Priorities should include buildings on soft soil 
sites subject to amplification of ground motion and/or liquefaction and especially on critical 
service facilities such as hospitals, fire and police stations, emergency shelters, and 
schools. 
Non-structural bracing of equipment and contents is often the most cost-effective type of 
seismic mitigation project. Inexpensive bracing and anchoring may protect very expensive 
equipment and/or equipment whose function is critical such as medical diagnostic 
equipment in hospitals, computers, and communication equipment for police and fire 
services and so on. For utilities, bracing of control equipment, pumps, generators, battery 
racks and other critical components can be powerfully effective in reducing the impact of 
earthquakes on system performance. Such measures should almost always be 
undertaken before considering large-scale structural mitigation projects. 
The strategy for strengthening bridges and other infrastructure follows the same principles 
as discussed above for buildings. The targets for mitigation should not be typical 
infrastructure but rather specific infrastructure elements that have been identified as being 
unusually vulnerable and/or are critical links in the lifeline system. For example, vulnerable 
overpasses on major highways would have a much higher priority than overpasses on 
lightly traveled rural routes. 
The following is a list of critical facilities that need seismic upgrades. These buildings will 
be prioritized for funding of seismic mitigation projects working through the Hazard 
Mitigation Advisory Committee, the County, Cities, and Special Service Districts.
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Emergency Operations Centers Courthouse, 230 Strand, St. Helens 1800's URM No 
Columbia 911 Dispatch Center 58611 McNulty Way 1999 wood Yes 
County Courthouse 230 Strand St. 1800's URM No 
CLATSKANIE 
Fire Stations 280 S.E. 3rd St. 1973 Wood No 
 Alston, 76015 Atkins Rd. 1953 wd/block No 
 Mayger Fill, 80694 Mayger Hill Rd. 1940's wd/block No 
 Quincy, 79704 Quincy-Mayger Rd. 1960's wd/block No 
Police Stations 195 S.E. 2nd St. 1970's wood No 
Ambulance Services CFD, 280 S.E. 3rd St. 1973 Wood No 
City Hall 95 S. Nehalem St. No wood No 
COLUMBIA CITY 
Fire Stations 400 G St.  Wood No 
Police Stations 1840 2nd St. #1 50-60 Wood No 
City Hall 1840 2nd St. #2 50-60 Wood No 
MIST-BIRKENFELD 
Fire Stations 12525 Hwy 202 1999 Steel Yes 
 Fishawk, 71288 Northshore Drive 1989 wood No 
     
Ambulance Services MBFD 12525 Hwy 202 1999 Steel yes 
Emergency Operations Centers MBFD 12525 Hwy 202 1999 Steel yes 
RAINIER 
Fire Stations 211 2nd St.   No 
 Fernhill, 73153 Doan Rd.   No 
 Goble, 69321 Nicolai Rd.   No 
Police Stations 106 B St. #1   No 
Ambulance Services CRFR, 211 2nd St.   No 
City Hall 106 B St. #2   No 
SCAPPOOSE 
Fire Stations 52751 Columbia River Hwy 1986 wd/block No 
 19260 NW Cleetwood, Portland 1988 wood No 
 27713 Chapman Rd 1970 wd/steel No 
Police Stations 33568 E Columbia 1950/60 block No 
Ambulance Services 52751 Columbia River Hwy 1986 wd/block No 
Emergency Operations Centers 52751 Columbia River Hwy 1986 Wd/block No 
Emergency Shelters 
Scappoose. High School 
 33700 S.E. High School Way. 1971 block No 
City Hall 33568 E. Columbia Ave. 1950/60 block No 
  




Fire Stations Admin, 270 Columbia Blvd.   No 
 105 S. 12th St. 1930-60  No 
 Deer Island, 33710 Canaan Rd. 1973  No 
 Fairgrounds, 58798 Saulser Rd. 1973  No 
 Maint. Facility, 58555 McNulty Wy. 1993 Steel  
Police Stations 150 S. 13th St.   No 
Ambulance Services CRFR, 105 S. 12th St.   No 
 CRFR, 58798 Saulser Rd.   No 
City Hall 265 Strand St.  URM no 
 
The following table contains earthquake mitigation action items from the master Action 






Fire Stations 555 Bridge St. #1  wood/steel no 
Police Stations 1001 Bridge St. #1  Wood/blk yes 
City Hall 1001 Bridge St. #2  Wood/blk yes 
Police Stations 1001 Bridge St. #1  Wood/blk yes 
City Hall 1001 Bridge St. #2  Wood/blk yes 
 CRFR, 58798 Saulser Rd.   No 
  









































































Earthquake Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Complete inventory of public and commercial 
buildings that may be particularly vulnerable to 
earthquake damage
County, cities, special districts 1-2 Years X X X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Complete inventory of wood-frame residential 
buildings that may be particularly vulnerable to 
earthquake damage, including pre-1940s homes and 
homes with cripple wall foundations.
County, cities 1-2 Years X X X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Disseminate FEMA pamphlets to educate 
homeowners about structural and non-structural 
retrofitting of vulnerable homes and encourage retrofit
Columbia County Hazard Mitigation 
Advisory Committee Ongoing X X X X
Short-Term     
#4
Complete seismic vulnerability analysis of important 
public facilities with significant seismic vulnerabilities County, cities, special districts 1-2 Years X X X X X
Long-Term     #1 Obtain funding and retrofit important public facilities with significant seismic vulnerabilities County, cities, special districts 10 years X X X X X
Long-Term     #2 Retrofit bridges that are not seismically adequate for lifeline transportation routes ODOT, County, cities, roads X X X X X
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
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11.0 VOLCANIC HAZARDS 
11.1 Overview 
The Cascades, which run from British Columbia through Washington and Oregon into 
northern California, contain more than a dozen major volcanoes and hundreds of smaller 
volcanic features. In the past 200 years, seven of the Cascade volcanoes in the United 
States have erupted, including: Mt. Baker, Glacier Peak, Mt. Rainier, Mount St. Helens, 
Mt. Hood, Mt. Shasta, and Mt. Lassen. 
Over the past 4,000 years (a geologically very short time period) there have been three 
eruptions of Mt. Hood, four eruptions in the Three Sisters area, and two eruptions in the 
Newberry Volcano area and minor eruptions near Mt. Jefferson, at Blue Lake Crater, in 
the Sand Mountain Field (Santiam Pass), near Mt. Washington, and near Belknap Crater. 
During this time period, the most active volcano in the Cascades has been Mount St. 
Helens with about 14 major eruptions and many smaller eruptions. 
Many other volcanoes are deemed active or potentially active. The Smithsonian 
Institution’s Global Volcanism Project lists 20 active volcanoes in Oregon and 7 in 
Washington. These volcanoes are listed below in Tables 11.1 and 11.2 
Table 11.1 
Active Volcanoes in Oregon 
Volcano Type Last Eruption
Mt. Hood Stratovolcano 1866
Mt. Jefferson Stratovolcano
950                     
main volcano inactive for 
>10,000 years
Blue Lake Crater Crater 1490 BC
Sand Mountain Field Cinder cones 1040 BC?
Mt. Washington Shield volcano 620                     main volcano inactive
Belknap Field Shield volcanoes 460?
North Sister Field Complex volcano 350
South Sister Complex volcano 50 BC?
Mt. Bachelor Stratovolcano 5800 BC
Davis Lake Volcanic field 2790 BC?
Newberry Volcano Shield volcano
620                     
crater formation 300,000 to 
500,000 years ago
Devils Garden Volcanic field unknown
Squaw Ridge Lava Field Volcanic field unknown
Four Craters Lava Field Volcanic field unknown
Cinnamon Butte Cinder cones unknown
Crater Lake Caldera
2290 BC                 
Crater formation about      
7,700 years ago
Diamond Craters Volcanic field unknown
Saddle Butte Volcanic field unknown
Jordan Craters Volcanic field 1250 BC
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Table 11.2 
Active Volcanoes in Washington 
Volcano Type Last Eruption
Mt. Baker Stratovolcano 1880
Glacier Peak Stratovolcano 1700 + 100
Mt. Rainier Stratovolcano 1825 (?)
Mt. Adams Stratovolcano 950 AD (?)
Mount St. Helens Stratovolcano 1991                    (eruptions started in 1980)
West Crater Volcanic field 5760 BC (?)
Indian Heaven Shield volcanoes 6250 BC + 100  
On a longer geological time scale, volcanic activity in the Cascades has been very 
widespread. A DOGAMI report on prehistoric and historic volcanic eruptions in Oregon 
(see website below) notes that, in the Cascades as a whole, over 3,000 large and small 
volcanoes have erupted over the past five million years. Within historical times, between 
1843 and 1860 there were a series of 21 eruptions in the Cascades and there is some 
scientific speculation that the Northwest may be entering another period of volcanic 
activity. 
A great deal of general background information on Oregon and Washington volcanoes 




Smithsonian Institution             
(Global Volcanism Project) www.volcano.si.edu/gvp
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The numerous volcanoes of the Cascades differ markedly in their geological 
characteristics. The largest volcanoes are generally what geologists call composite or 
stratovolcanoes. These volcanoes may be active for tens of thousands of years to 
hundreds of thousands of years. In some cases, these large volcanoes may have 
explosive eruptions such as Mount St.. Helens in 1980 or Crater Lake about 7,700 years 
ago. The much more numerous sites of volcanic activity are generally what geologists call 
mafic volcanoes. This type of volcano is typically active for much shorter time periods, up 
to a few hundred years, and generally forms small craters or cones. Mafic volcanoes are 
not subject to large explosive events. 
11.2 Volcanic Hazard Types 
In Oregon, awareness of the potential for volcanic eruptions was greatly increased by the 
May 18, 1980 eruption of nearby Mount St. Helens in Washington which killed 57 people. 
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In this eruption, lateral blast effects covered 230 square miles and reached 17 miles 
northwest of the crater, pyroclastic flows covered six square miles and reached 5 miles 
north of the crater, and landslides covered 23 square miles. Ash accumulations were 
about 10 inches at 10 miles downwind, 1 inch at 60 miles downwind, and ½ inch at 300 
miles downwind. Lahars (mudflows) affected the North and South Forks of the Toutle 
River, the Green River, and ultimately the Columbia River as far as 70 miles from the 
volcano. Damage and reconstruction costs exceeded $1 billion. 
Volcanic eruptions often involve several distinct types of hazards to people and property, 
as well evidenced by the Mount St. Helens eruption. Major volcanic hazards include: lava 
flows, blast effects, pyroclastic flows, ash flows, lahars, and landslides or debris flows. 
Some of these hazards (e.g., lava flows) only affect areas very near the volcano. Other 
hazards may affect areas 10 or 20 miles away from the volcano, while ash falls may affect 
areas many miles downwind of the eruption site. 
Lava flows are eruptions of molten rock. Lava flows for the major Cascades 
volcanoes tend to be thick and viscous, forming cones and thus typically 
affecting areas only very near the eruption vent. However, flows from the 
smaller mafic volcanoes may be less viscous flows that spread out over wider 
areas. Lava flows obviously destroy everything in their path. 
Blast effects may occur with violent eruptions, such as Mount St. Helens in 
1980. Most volcanic blasts are largely upwards. However, the Mount St. 
Helens blast was lateral, with impacts 17 miles from the volcano. Similar or 
larger blast zones are possible in future eruptions of any of the major 
Cascades volcanoes. 
Pyroclastic flows are high-speed avalanches of hot ash, rock fragments and 
gases. Pyroclastic flows can be as hot as 1500oF and move downslope at 100 
to 150 miles per hour. Pyroclastic flows are extremely deadly for anyone 
caught in their path. 
Ash falls result when explosive eruptions blast rock fragments into the air. 
Such blasts may include tephra (solid and molten rock fragments). The largest 
rock fragments (sometimes called “bombs”) generally fall within two miles of 
the eruption vent. Smaller ash fragments (less than about 0.1”) typically rise 
into the area forming a huge eruption column. In very large eruptions, ash falls 
may total many feet in depth near the vent and extent for hundreds or even 
thousands of miles downwind. 
Lahars or mudflows are common during eruptions of volcanoes with heavy 
loading of ice and snow. These flows of mud, rock and water can rush down 
channels at 20 to 40 miles an hour and can extend for more than 50 miles. For 
some volcanoes, lahars are a major hazard because highly populated areas 
are built on lahar flows from previous eruptions. 
Landslides or debris flows are the rapid downslope movement of rocky 
material, snow and/or ice. Volcano landslides can range from small 
movements of loose debris to massive collapses of the entire summit or sides 
of a volcano. Landslides on volcanic slopes may be triggered by eruptions or 
by earthquakes or simply by heavy rainfall. 
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11.3 Volcanic Hazards for Columbia County 
Several of the active volcanoes in Oregon and Washington (See Tables 11.1 and 11.2) 
are located relatively near Columbia County, including Mount St. Helens and Mt. Hood. 
Approximate distances from St. Helens to four relatively nearby volcanoes are shown 
below in Table 11.4. 
Table 11.4 
Distances from St. Helens 
Volcano Distance (miles)
Mount St. Helens 38
Mt. Hood 63
Mt. Adams 70
Mt. Rainier 86  
 
Among these relatively nearby volcanoes, Mount St. Helens is the most active. Mt. Hood 
and Mt. Rainier are definitely active and Mt. Adams is potentially active. 
Columbia County is approximately 40 miles from Mount St. Helens, and further away from 
the other volcanoes. We review the volcanic hazards posed by Mount St. Helens, the 
nearest, most active volcano that may affect Columbia County. 
The USGS analysis of Volcano Hazard Zonation for Mount St. Helens, Washington was 
published in 1995 (Open-File Report 95-497). The USGS study of volcano hazards in the 
vicinity of Mount St. Helens includes three hazard zones, shown on the map which 
accompanies the USGS report: 
Flowage Hazard Zone 1 (proximal hazard zone) is limited to the immediate 
area around the Mount St. Helens including all areas within about 5 miles of 
the volcano summit and some areas extending to about 10 miles away. The 
proximal hazard area is the area subject to the most intense volcanic hazards 
including lava flows, tephra flows, pyroclastic flows, landslides and debris flows 
and lahars. Fortunately, this area is predominantly wilderness with very low 
population. 
Flowage Hazard Zone 2 (distal hazard zones) are river valleys extending 
away from the proximal hazard zone that are subject to pyroclastic flows and 
lahars. Areas subjected to these hazards include a ring around Zone 1, 
extending downstream along the North and South Forks of the Toutle River 
and along the Kalama River. 
Flowage Hazard Zone 3 includes the intermediate and lower reaches of river 
valleys that could be inundated by lahars, including the North and South Forks 
of the Toutle River and along the Kalama River, extending downstream to the 
Cowlitz River and to the Columbia River. 
Of these Mount St. Helens volcanic hazards zones, only Zone 3 affects significant 
population centers (in Washington State). None of these volcanic hazard zones of Mount 
St. Helens affect Columbia County directly. 
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However, to a much lower extent, volcanic activity at Mount St. Helens could affect 
Columbia County in several ways: 
1. Debris flows, landslides, and lahars into the river valleys near Mount St. Helens 
will affect the Columbia River at Longview and further downstream. In severe 
events, navigation in the Columbia River may be affected and dredging may be 
required to maintain channel depths. 
Depending on the volume of volcanic ash ejected by an eruption and on prevailing wind 
directions at the time of eruption, various thicknesses of ash falls may affect Columbia 
County. Possible impacts of ash falls include: 
a. Clean-up and debris removal, 
d. Possible respiratory problems for at-risk population such as elderly, young 
children or others with respiratory problems, 
e. Possible impacts on public water supplies drawn from surface waters, including 
degradation of water quality (high turbidity) and possible increased 
maintenance requirements at water treatment plants, and 
f. Possible electric power outages from ash-induced short circuits in distribution 
lines, transmission lines, and substations. 
Thus, the extent of volcanic hazards for most of Columbia County appears limited to the 
possibility of minor ash falls from eruptions from Mount St. Helens (or lesser ash falls from 
more distant volcanoes), along with possible impacts on navigation in the Lower Columbia 
River. In all but the most extreme events, ash falls for most communities are likely to be 
very minor with an inch or less of ash likely. In the 1980 Mount St. Helens eruption, 
Columbia County received about 1” to 1.5” of ash. 
The following maps show probabilistic data on ash fall in western Oregon, taking into 
account all of the active volcanoes (USGS Open File Report 9-437, Plate 1, 1999). 
Interpolating between the map contours of Figure 11.5, the annual probability of 1 
centimeter (about 0.4 inch) or more of volcanic ash ranges from about 1/3000 in eastern 
Columbia County to about 1/6000 in western Columbia County. In other words the return 
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Figure 11.5 

















Annual Probability of 10 Centimeters (about 4 inches) or More of Volcanic Ash 
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Interpolating between the map contours of Figure 11.6, the annual probability of 10 
centimeters (about 4 inches) or more of volcanic ash ranges from about 1/7500 in eastern 
Columbia County to about 1/15000 in western Columbia County. In other words the return 
period for such ash falls are about 7,500 to 15,000 years for various locations within 
Columbia County. 
The low probabilities of significant ash falls (i.e., long return periods) arise because ash 
falls in Columbia County require volcanic eruptions producing ash and wind directions that 
deposit ash westward from the volcanoes. 
The probable impacts of potential volcanic eruptions on Columbia County are summarized 
below in Table 11.7. 
Table 11.7 
Probable Impacts of Potential Volcanic Eruptions on Columbia County 
Inventory Probable Impacts
Portion of Columbia County Affected Entire County and surrounding region may be affected by ash falls from some eruptions.
Buildings Negligible impact, other than minor cleanup required
Streets within Columbia County Negligible impact, other than minor cleanup required
Roads to/from Columbia County Negligible impact, other than minor cleanup required
Electric Power Temporary power outages likely from short circuits caused by ash falls
Other Utilities
Negligible impact, other than minor cleanup required for most 
utilities.  Potential to impact water treatment plants which may 
require additional maintenance to deal with high turbidity water
Columbia River Navigation
Potential sedimentation in Columbia River from large eruptions, 
especially of Mt. St. Helens and Mt. Hood, could impact river traffic 
and require dredging to restore channel depths.
Casualties Some potential for health impacts, especially for frail people with respiratory problems.  
11.4 Mitigation of Volcanic Hazards 
Mitigation of volcanic hazards is predominantly in the areas of monitoring volcanic activity, 
warnings and evacuation, and emergency response. That is, there are few, if any, 
practical physical measures to mitigate the direct impacts of volcanic activity. 
The USGS actively monitors volcanic activity in the Cascades via networks of seismic 
sensors (which can detect earthquakes related to magma movements) as well as very 
accurate ground surface measurements, such as that which has detected the very small 
bulge on South Sister. The USGS also has a volcanic warning system with several levels 
of alert as a potential eruption becomes more likely and more imminent.  
For the Cascades, the USGS volcano warning system (www.usgs.gov) has three levels. 
Level One (Volcanic Unrest) means anomalous conditions that could be indicative of an 
eventual volcanic eruption. Level Two (Volcanic Advisory) means that processes are 
underway that have a significant likelihood of culminating in hazardous volcanic activity, 
but when the evidence does not indicate that a life- or property-threatening event is 
imminent. Level Three (Volcano Alert) means that monitoring or evaluation indicate that 
precursory events have escalated to the point where a volcanic event with attendant 
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For most of Columbia County, which is located well outside of any of the likely direct 
hazard zones for any Cascades volcanic events, mitigation for volcanic activity is likely a 
low priority. In the event of a minor ash flow, public warnings directing people (especially 
those with respiratory problems) to remain indoors, and minor cleanup are most likely the 
only necessary responses for most volcanic effects impacting Columbia County. In 
addition, water treatment plants should be evaluated to ensure that they can handle 
possible high turbidity events from volcanic ash falls into water supplies. 
The following table includes the volcanic hazards mitigation action items from the master 
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Table 11.8 





































































Volcanic Hazards Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Update public emergency notification procedures for 
ash fall events
CEPA, CCOM, local emergency 
services agencies 1-2 Years X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Update emergency response planning for ash fall 
events
CEPA, CCOM, local emergency 
services agencies 1-2 Years X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Evaluate capability of water treatment plants to deal 
with high turbidity from ash falls and upgrade 
treatment facilities and emergency response plans to 
deal with ash falls
local water agencies 1-2 Years X X X X X
Short-Term     
#4
Evaluate ash impact on storm water drainage system 
and develop mitigation actions if necessary public works agencies 1-2 Years X X X X
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
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12.0 DAM SAFETY 
12.1 Overview of Dams 
Dams are manmade structures built to impound water. Dams are built for many purposes 
including water storage for potable water supply, livestock water supply, irrigation, or fire 
suppression. Other dams are built for flood control, recreation, navigation, hydroelectric 
power or to contain mine tailings. Dams may also be multifunction, serving two or more of 
these purposes. 
 
The National Inventory of Dams, NID, which is maintained by the United States Army 
Corps of Engineers, is a database of approximately 76,000 dams in the United States. 
The NID does not include all dams in the United States. Rather, the NID includes dams 
that are deemed to have a high or significant hazard potential and dams deemed to pose 
a low hazard if they meet inclusion criteria based on dam height and storage volume. Low 
hazard potential dams are included if they meet either of the following selection criteria: 1) 
exceed 25 feet in height and 15 acre-feet of storage, or 2) exceed 6 feet in height and 50-
acre feet of storage. There are many thousands of dams too small to meet the NID 
selection criteria. However, these small dams are generally too small to have significant 
impacts if they fail and thus are generally not considered for purposes of risk assessment 
or mitigation planning. 
This NID potential hazard classification is solely a measure of the probable impacts if a 
dam fails. Thus, a dam classified as High Potential Hazard does not mean that the dam is 
unsafe or likely to fail. The level of risk (probability of failure) of a given dam is not even 
considered in this classification scheme. Rather, the High Potential Hazard classification 
simply means that there are people at risk downstream from the dam in the inundation 
area, if the dam were to fail. The NID potential hazard classification system for dams is as 
summarized below in Table 12.1. 
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Table 12.1 
NID Hazard Potential Classification for Dams1 
Hazard Potential 
Classification 
Loss of Human Life Economic, Environmental, or Lifeline 
Losses 
Low None expected Low and generally limited to dam owner 
Significant None expected Yes 
High Probable, one or more 
expected 
Yes, but not necessary for this 
classification. 
 
Dams assigned the low hazard potential classification are those where failure or mis-
operation results in no probable loss of human life and low economic and/or 
environmental losses. Losses are principally limited to the dam owner’s property. 
Dams assigned to the significant hazard potential classification are those where failure or 
mis-operation results in no probable loss of human life but can cause economic loss, 
environmental damage, or disruption of lifeline facilities. Significant hazard potential dams 
are often located in predominantly rural or agricultural areas. 
Dams assigned to the high hazard potential classification are those where failure or mis-
operation will probably cause loss of human life. Failure of dams in the high classification 
will generally also result in economic, environmental or lifeline losses, but the 
classification is based solely on probable loss of life. 
Of the dams in the NID, nearly 60% are privately owned. In addition to the dams in the 
NID, there are many thousands of dams too small to meet the selection criteria for the 
NID. Most of these small dams are also privately owned.  
The NID is available online through several links at FEMA and the United States Army 
Corps of Engineers. However, since September 11, 2001, access is somewhat restricted. 
Basic NID information and links to the database are available at 
http://crunch.tec.army.mil/nid/webpages/nid.cfm 
12.2 Dam Primer 
In the simplest terms, dams are impervious structures that block the flow of water in a 
river or stream and thereby impound water behind the dam. Dams have been built for 
thousands of years from a wide range of materials, including earth, stone, masonry, wood, 
and concrete. Large modern dams are almost always embankment dams (built primarily 
from soil, rock, or mixtures) or concrete dams. 
Large modern dams almost always have control mechanisms such as gated spillways or 
outlet pipes for releasing water in a controlled fashion. Typically, dams are operated to 
smooth natural variations in water flow. During high water flow periods, water is stored 
behind a dam, while in low water flow periods, water is released to increase flows. 
Controlled releases typically result in lower peak (flood) flows and higher minimum flows 
than in uncontrolled streams. The specific patterns of water storage and release vary from 
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dam to dam, depending on the primary purpose(s) of the dam and on a wide variety of 
economic, regulatory and environmental considerations. 
12.2.1 Dam Nomenclature and Types of Dams 
Modern dams, whether embankment dams or concrete dams, are typically constructed on 
a foundation, which may be concrete, natural rock or soils, or compacted soils. Dams are 
usually constructed along a constricted part of a river valley to minimize cost. Dams are 
also connected to the surrounding natural valley walls, which become the abutments of 
the dam structure itself. 
Embankment dams are commonly termed earthfill or rockfill dams, depending on the 
primary material used in their construction. Historically, a wide range of earth and rock 
materials have been used to construct embankment dams, with various construction 
techniques including hydraulic fill and compaction. Embankment dams are broad flat 
structures, typically at least twice as wide at the base as their height. In cross section, 
embankment dams are typically trapezoidal, with a wide flat base, sloping slides and a 
narrower flat top. 
Depending on the permeability of the materials used in an embankment dam, impervious 
layers may be added to the upstream side of the structure or in the center core of the 
structure. Embankment dams are subject to erosion by running water. Thus, modern 
embankment dams always have erosion-resistant materials used in the water release and 
control mechanisms of the dam. Typically, concrete spillways with concrete or steel gates 
are used to control releases. Many dams also have outlet pipe systems with concrete or 
steel pipes as part of the water release control system. 
Modern concrete dams fall into two major classes: gravity dams and arch dams. Concrete 
gravity dams are designed on principles similar to embankment dams. Concrete gravity 
dams are broad structures, generally triangular in shape with a flat base, a narrow top, a 
flat upstream side and a broad sloping downstream side. Much of these dams’ capacity to 
impound water arises from the weight of the dam. Typically, gravity dams are keyed into 
bedrock foundations and abutments to increase the stability of the dam. 
Concrete arch dams rely primarily on the strength of concrete to impound water. Concrete 
arch dams are much thinner in cross section than concrete gravity dams and are always 
convex on the upstream side and concave on the downstream side because concrete is 
much stronger in compression than in tension. With this arch design, the pressure of 
impounded water compresses the concrete and makes the dam stronger. Like concrete 
gravity dams, concrete arch dams are also keyed into bedrock foundations and abutments 
to provide stability. A less common variation of a concrete arch dam is a concrete buttress 
dam. Buttress dams are arched or straight dams with additional strength provided by 
buttresses perpendicular to the long axis of the dam. 
An excellent introduction to dam nomenclature and descriptions of types of dams is given 
in the FEMA publication: Dam Safety: An Owner’s Guidance Manual.3 For further details, 
the reader is referred to this publication and the references therein. 
12.2.2 Dam Failure Modes 
Dam failures can occur at any time in a dam’s life; however, failures are most common 
when water storage for the dam is at or near design capacity. At high water levels, the 
water force on the dam is higher and several of the most common failure modes are more 
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likely to occur. Correspondingly, for any dam, the probability of failure is much lower when 
water levels are substantially below the design capacity for the reservoir. 
For embankment dams, the most common failure mode is erosion of the dam during 
prolonged periods of rainfall and flooding. When dams are full and water inflow rates 
exceed the capacity of the controlled release mechanisms (spillways and outlet pipes), 
overtopping may occur. When overtopping occurs, scour and erosion of either the dam 
itself and/or of the abutments may lead to partial or complete failure of the dam. Especially 
for embankment dams, internal erosion, piping or seepage through the dam, foundation, 
or abutments can also lead to failure. For smaller dams, erosion and weakening of dam 
structures by growth of vegetation and burrowing animals is a common cause of failure. 
For embankment dams, earthquake ground motions may cause dams to settle or spread 
laterally. Such settlement does not generally lead, by itself, to immediate failure. However, 
if the dam is full, relatively minor amounts of settling may cause overtopping to occur, with 
resulting scour and erosion that may progress to failure. 
For any dam, improper design or construction or inadequate preparation of foundations 
and abutments can also cause failures. Improper operation of a dam, such as failure to 
open gates or valves during high flow periods can also trigger dam failure. For any dam, 
unusual hydrodynamic (water) forces can also initiate failure. Landslides into the reservoir, 
which may occur on their own or be triggered by earthquakes, may lead to surge waves 
which overtop dams or hydrodynamic forces which cause dams to fail under the 
unexpected load. Earthquakes can also cause seiches (waves) in reservoirs that may 
overtop or overload dam structures. In rare cases, high winds may also cause waves that 
overtop or overload dam structures. 
Concrete dams are also subject to failure due to seepage of water through foundations or 
abutments. Dams of any construction type are also subject to deliberate damage via 
sabotage or terrorism. For waterways with a series of dams, downstream dams are also 
subject to failure induced by the failure of an upstream dam. If an upstream dam fails, 
then downstream dams also fail due to overtopping or due to hydrodynamic forces. 
An excellent review of the common mechanisms for dam failures is given in the FEMA 
publication: Dam Safety: An Owner’s Guidance Manual.3 For further details, the reader is 
referred to this publication and the references therein. 
A National Research Council study4 of dam failures in the United States and Western 
Europe from 1900 to 1969 compiled historical data on the observed probability of failure 
as a function of type of dam. Dam failures are quite common in the United States. For 
example, FEMA data from Tropical Storm Alberto (1994) show 230 dam failures in the 
State of Georgia from this single event.5 Fortunately, most dam failures are of small dams 
where the failure poses little or no risk to life safety and only minor, localized property 
damage. Most failures are of dams that are too small to be included in the NID database 
or dams in the NID Low Hazard Potential Category. 
However, in the United States between 1960 and 1997 there were 23 dam failures that 
caused at least one death, with total fatalities from these 23 failures estimated at 318 
people.5 Since 1874, there have been six dam failures in the United States which killed 
over 100 people.2 The worst dam failure, in terms of casualties, was the 1889 Johnstown 
Pennsylvania dam failure which killed over 2,200 people. Three of the high fatality dam 
failures occurred in the 1970s: Black Hills, South Dakota, Big Thompson River, Colorado, 
and Buffalo Creek, West Virginia. These three failures alone resulted in an estimated 514 
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deaths.2 (Note: the published death statistics in this paragraph from these two FEMA 
sources are inconsistent, but these differences are not significant for the present 
purposes). 
12.3 Oregon Dam Data 
The National Inventory of Dams (NID) lists 812 dams in Oregon and 675 dams in 
Washington. Of these NID dams, 5 are in Columbia County and there is one dam in 
Clatsop County which is located upstream of Birkenfeld. The statistical breakdown of 
these dams by NID Potential Hazard Categories is shown below in Table 12.2. 
Table 12.2 
Numbers of Dams by NID Potential Hazard Categories 
 
NID Hazard Oregon Columbia 
County1 
High 128 0 
Significant 151 2 
Low 521 4 
Undetermined 12 0 
Total 812 6 
 
1 Includes one dam In Clatsop County 
For Oregon, there are 128 dams in the High Potential Hazard Category. In Columbia 
County, there are no dams in the High Potential Hazard Category. The 6 dams in 








(acre feet) Hazard EAP
Fish Hawk Lake1 Fishhawk Creek Birkenfeld Fishhawk Lake Rec. Club RE 1969 1650 S N
Vernonia Log Pond Nehalem River Vernonia ODFW RE/ER 1924 170 S N
Fisher Reservoir Sly Creek, Trib to None Betsy Johnson RE 1971 36 L N
Petes Slough Reservoir Petes Slough None State Highway Division RE 1980 2000 L N
Salmonberry Reservoir Salmon Creek Trenholm City of St. Helens RE 1960 61 S N
Sherman Stock Reservoir Sly Creek, Trib to Warren Jeff and Beverly Heller RE 1952 36 S N
     1 Clatsop County  
The NID dam type classification includes the following types of dams: 
RE rockfill/earthfill embankment dams, primarily rockfill (fill >3” size) 
ER rockfill/earthfill embankment dams, primarily earthfill (fill <3” size) 
RE/ER combination of the above two types. 
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NID Hazard levels are High (H), Significant (S), and Low (L) as summarized in Table 12.1 
above. The EAP column in Table 12.3 indicates whether or not the dam has an 
emergency action plan, which is required for large dams, but is not required for smaller 
dams such as those listed above. 
None of these dams in Columbia County or affecting Columbia County are in the NID High 
Potential Hazard classification. All are relatively small dams, with relatively limited impacts 
downstream if they were to fail. Dams in the significant and low potential hazard 
categories do not pose a life safety threat and the risk of property damage is minimal or 
low. 
12.4 Dam Failure Hazard Assessment: Columbia County 
As noted above, the local dams in Columbia County (and Clatsop County) pose only 
limited risk to the residents of Columbia County. However, in addition to these small, local 
dams, there are numerous large dams upstream on the Columbia River and on the major 
tributaries of the Columbia, including the Willamette River, the Snake River and others. 
Most of the dam failure risk for Columbia County comes from potential failures of these 
large dams upstream on the Columbia River and/or tributaries. For example, there are 22 
major dams on the Columbia River (about 40 million acre feet of flood control storage) and 
11 major dams on the Willamette River (about 1.7 million acre feet of flood control 
storage), as well as other dams on other tributaries. 
As an example, Table 12.5 shows dam data for some of the major dams on the Willamette 
River and its tributaries. These dams are included here, as examples of upstream dams 
whose failure would affect downstream areas, including Columbia County to at least some 
extent. 
Table 12.5 
Sample Data on NID High Hazard Potential Dams Upstream of Columbia County 








Lane Cottage Grove Coast Fork Willamette 50,000 1942 RE Y Corps
Lane Dexter Middle Fork Willamette 29,900 1955 RE Y Corps
Lane Fall Creek Fall Creek 125,000 1965 ER Y Corps
Lane Dorena Row River 131,000 1949 RE Y Corps
Lane Lookout Point Middle Fork Willamette 477,700 1953 RE Y Corps
Lane Blue River Dam Blue River 89,000 1968 RE Y Corps
Lane Hills Creek Middle Fork Willamette 356,000 1962 RE Y Corps
Lane Cougar South Fork McKenzie 219,000 1964 ER Y Corps
Lane Fern Ridge Long Tom 121,000 1941 RE Y Corps
 
Terms used in Table 12.5 are identical to those defined above for Table 12.4. 
These dams were completed between 1941 and 1968. All dams are rockfill/earthfill 
embankment dams, except Cougar which is an earthfill/rockfill embankment dam. All 
dams are operated by the US Army Corps of Engineers and all have emergency 
operations plans in place. All Corps dams are maintained on a regular schedule and 
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undergo regular inspections, with major re-inspections every five years. Furthermore, the 
Corps is highly experienced in the construction, operation, and maintenance of dams. 
On the Columbia River and other tributaries, the major dams are all classified as NID High 
Potential hazard. As noted previously, the NID classification as High Potential Hazard 
means only that there is probable loss of life if one of these dams fails. The NID 
classification contains no information whatsoever about the safety or lack of safety of a 
given dam and no information about the probability of failure. The Columbia River Dams 
are primarily concrete gravity dams and most were built from the 1930s to 1960s. 
For embankment dams, as discussed above, the most common failure modes are 
overtopping, foundation failures, and seepage through the dam. For concrete dams, the 
most common failure modes are overtopping and foundation failures. Under normal or 
flood conditions, failure of the Corps operated dams appears highly unlikely. Failure is 
perhaps possible, however, in extreme flood events well above the design basis, 
especially if the reservoirs were close to full at the onset of flooding. The spillway 
capacities could be exceeded with a potential for overtopping failures. 
There are, however, two other circumstances that may pose significant threats to any of 
these dams: landslides and earthquakes. 
A major landslide into a reservoir, whether triggered by seismic activity or not, could 
result in a large surge wave that could result in dam failure from a combination of 
overtopping and hydrodynamic forces. 
A major earthquake, either a Cascadia Subduction Zone earthquake, or a smaller, 
interplate or intraplate earthquake in Western Oregon, could cause sufficient damage 
to these dams to pose a risk of failure. 
12.5 Risk Assessment 
Most of the major dams which pose a potential life safety hazard for Columbia County are 
operated by the United States Army Corps of Engineers. The Portland District of the 
Corps, Geotechnical Engineer Branch, Concrete and Dam Safety Section has safety 
responsibilities for these dams. A variety of dam safety related information is available on 
the Portland District’s web site at www.nwp.usace.army.mil. Under the Corps normal dam 
operating practices, dams are inspected annually, with a more complete evaluation every 
five years on a rotating schedule. 
12.5.1 Flood Damage to Dams 
All of the Corps dams were designed and built with specific flood capacities. Current dam 
designs are based on Standard Project Floods. Standard Project Floods, as defined in the 
Corps Engineer Manual 1110-2-1411 (March 1, 1965) are floods resulting from the 
Standard Project Storm. In turn, the Standard Project Storm is defined, somewhat 
imprecisely, as the most severe flood-producing rainfall-snowmelt, depth-area-duration 
event that is considered “reasonably characteristic” of the drainage basin. Discussions 
with Corps staff in the Portland District Office indicated that the Standard Project Flood is 
approximately a 500-year flood event. 
The Corp dams’ discharge design levels include the combination of spillway discharge 
capacity and reservoir outlet pipe discharge capacity. As an example, for the Hills Creek 
Dam, the Standard Project Flood is 64,500 cubic feet per second. The maximum 
controlled discharge capacity of the dam is 151,760 cubic feet per second, or nearly two 
  
January 3, 2005 
 12-12 
and one-half times the Standard Project Flood discharge. These data are included on the 
Hills Creek Project, Emergency Response Flowchart7. At discharges beyond the 
maximum controlled discharge capacity of the dam, the dam would be overtopped, 
discharges would be uncontrolled, and there would be a high probability of damage to the 
dam, with some potential for dam failure. The large margin of safety in the discharge 
capacity of the dam suggests that the Hills Creek Dam likely has the capacity to withstand 
floods at least as large as a 1,000 year flood event without expected damage. The other 
Corps dams located upstream of Columbia County have similar margins of flood design 
safety. 
12.5.2 Earthquake Damage to Dams 
Most of these major dams on the Columbia River and its tributaries were designed and 
built in the 1930s to 1960s. Seismic design considerations were thus significantly lower 
than current seismic design considerations. As an example, a summary tabulation of the 
seismic design basis and inspection history of the major Willamette River dams is given 
below in Table 12.6 (Corps of Engineers, Portland District Office, March, 2001). 
Table 12.6 
Seismic Design, Evaluation and Inspection Data 
Corps of Engineers Dams 
Seismic Design Basis  
Dam 
Date of Last 
Seismic 
Evaluation Original Current 
Date of Last 
Periodic 
Inspection 
Cottage Grove 1981 None 0.21 g 1997 
Dexter 1981 0.10 g 0.21 g 1996 
Fall Creek 1981 0.10 g 0.21 g 1999 
Dorena 1981 none 0.21 g 1997 
Lookout Point 1981 0.10 g 0.21 g 1999 
Blue River 1994 0.10 g 0.24 g 1996 
Hills Creek 2000 0.10 g 0.22 g 1999 
Cougar 1994 0.10 g 0.24 g 1997 
Fern Ridge 2001 none 0.35 g 2000 
 
As shown in Table 12.6, the Corps has conducted at least preliminary seismic evaluations 
of all of these dams. However, some of these evaluations were conducted in the 1980s 
and thus do not reflect current understanding of the seismic hazard in Oregon or current 
state-of-the-art seismic evaluation engineering principles. The Corps has an ongoing 
regular inspection program and an ongoing seismic evaluation program. Presumably, 
updated seismic evaluations of these dams will be completed over the next few years. 
Seismic considerations were completely absent in the design of two of these dams: 
Dorena and Fern Ridge. The others were explicitly designed or probably designed to 
ground shaking levels of 0.10 g, which is the maximum seismic design level for any of the 
Corps dams in western Oregon. In contrast, the current Corps seismic design levels for 
  
January 3, 2005 
 12-13 
dams at these sites (i.e., if new dams were to be built today) would be 0.21 g to 0.24g for 
the dams in eastern Lane County and 0.35 g for Fern Ridge . Thus, current seismic 
design requirements are for levels of ground shaking about two times higher than the 
probable design levels for most of these dams and about three times higher for Fern 
Ridge. 
The many other major dams upstream of Columbia County, on the Columbia River and its 
tributaries have seismic design levels similar to the dams on the Willamette River, and 
similar potential seismic shortcomings. 
Seismic evaluations of dam safety are a highly technical, highly specialized art. Separate 
evaluations must be done for each dam. The evaluation requires a detailed analysis of the 
design and construction of the dam, an analysis of the current condition of materials and 
components, geotechnical analysis of the foundation and site, and a site-specific seismic 
hazard analysis. For emergency planning purposes, a seismic evaluation should include 
the probabilities of failure for a scenario earthquake such as a large magnitude event on 
the Cascadia Subduction Zone. 
The probability of catastrophic failure of these dams is impossible to estimate with any 
accuracy, from present data. Most likely, the probability is less than 0.1% per year (less 
than once in 1,000 years, on average) and perhaps substantially less. However, the 
consequences of failure are so high that careful evaluation is certainly warranted. 
12.5.3 Dam Failure Inundation Maps 
The USACE inundation maps for the lower Columbia River show inundation areas with a 
spillway design flood and with a spillway design flood plus dam failure. Spillway design 
floods are generally based on what the USACE determines to be the Probable Maximum 
Precipitation and the corresponding Probable Maximum Flood conditions. No frequency is 
explicitly attached the these probable maximum values, but such flood events would 
typically be roughly 5,000 or 10,000 year flood events (Bruce Duffe, USACE, August 16, 
2004). 
Inundation data from the USACE report “Guidelines for Flood Emergency Plans with 
Inundation Maps, Bonneville Dam, Columbia River, Oregon and Washington” (USACE 
Portland District, 1989) are summarized in Table 12.7 below. This table also includes 
flood elevation data from the FEMA Flood Insurance Study for Columbia County (FEMA, 
August 16, 1988). The USACE data includes the effects of upstream dams as well as the 
Bonneville Dam. The data shown below are for Mile 87, just east of St. Helens, with 
numerical values interpolated from data in the USACE report and from the FEMA flood 
profile graph for the Columbia River. 
As shown in Table 12.7, dam failure alone results in flood elevations on the lower 
Columbia, under normal reservoir conditions, that are below the 10-year flood elevation. 
The spillway design flood is a truly extreme event, with flood elevations about 24 feet 
higher than the 500-year flood. The spillway design flood with dam failure is only about 0.2 
feet higher than the spillway design flood alone. 
For Columbia County, inundation areas for the spillway design flood only and the spillway 
design flood with dam failure are shown on Plates 21 to 27 in the USACE report for 
Bonneville dam, referenced above. Inundation areas for the spillway design flood and dam 
failure are almost indistinguishable from the inundation areas with spillway design flood 
only. Either of these truly extreme flood events would inundate much of the low lying 
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areas along the Columbia, as shown in Plates 21 to 27. For reference, a portion of Plate 
22 near St. Helens is shown below as Figure 12.8. 
 
Table 12.7 
Columbia River Flood Data at Mile 87 






Spillway design flood3 49.8
Spillway design flood  
and dam failure3
50.0
1 FEMA FIS for Columbia County
2 Dam failure at normal full pool
3 Flood inundation data below Bonneville Dam, 
US Army Corps of Engineers, Guidelines for 
Flood Emergency Plans, Bonneville Dam, 
Portland District, 1989.  
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Figure 12.8 
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The potential impacts of dam failures on communities in Columbia County are 
summarized below in Table 12.9. 
 
Table 12.9 
Probable Impacts of Potential Dam Failures on Columbia County 
Inventory Probable Impacts
Portion of Columbia County affected Direct impacts limited to mapped inundation areas for very unlikely complete dam failures at the same time as extreme flood events.
Buildings Heavy damage in inundation areas, if the above scenario occurs.
Streets within Columbia County Damage and closures in inundation areas, if the above scenario occurs.
Roads to/from Columbia County Damage and closures in inundation areas,  if the above scenario occurs.
Electric power Damage and loss of service in inundation areas,  if the above scenario occurs.
Other Utilities
Damage and loss of service in inundation areas,  if the above 
scenario occurs..  Potential for major damage to water and 
wastewater treatment plants in extreme events
Casualties
Potential for casualties (deaths and injuries) in extremely unlikely 
major dam failures concurrent with extreme floods, depending on 
warning time available and effectiveness of evacuations
 
 
In interpreting the above potential impacts of dam failure on Columbia County, it is 
essential to remember that dam failures alone, even of the major dams on the Columbia 
River, would have only very minor impacts. Only if dam failures occur concurrently with 
extreme flood events (such as 5,000 or 10,000 year ) events are the full areas shown on 
the USACE dam failure inundation maps likely to be flooded. 
12.6 Mitigation Strategies 
Possible dam failures affecting Columbia County are very low probability events, but the 
potential casualties and economic impacts are high for truly extreme events with dam 
failures concurrent with extreme floods. The combination of low probability but large 
impacts makes analysis of such situations difficult from both a technical and a public 
policy perspective. The evaluation is difficult technically because it requires detailed 
engineering analysis of each dam and careful probabilistic risk analysis. As always, 
communication with the public must be non-alarmist, but factual, realistic and informative. 
Recommendations 
1. The first step in mitigation planning for dam safety is emergency planning. 
Emergency planners in Columbia County should obtain copies of the 
inundation maps for each of the major dams to familiarize themselves with 
the areas of potential flooding. For emergency planning, the estimated 
flood depths and the time periods from dam failure are particularly 
important. Flood depths and flood times both vary markedly with distance 
downstream from the dam locations. For emergency planning, key 
elements include community emergency notification procedures and 
evacuation planning (routes and traffic control). Because of the very large 
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numbers of potential evacuees, training seminars and scenario exercises 
are strongly recommended. 
2. All dams have Emergency Action Plans. These plans should be reviewed 
to ensure that they are complete and up to date. Emergency planning 
officials in each county should be fully informed of the detailed 
consequences of the potential failure of each dam. Public notification and 
evacuation plans should be updated and tested. For some types of dam 
failures, for example, those due to extreme floods, there may be some 
warning time. Decision making procedures, protocols, and procedures for 
issuing watches, warnings, and evacuation notices should be reviewed and 
updated and coordinated among all responsible federal, state, and local 
agencies. 
3. Because of the age of these dams, the seismic design basis is significantly 
below current seismic design requirements. Preliminary seismic 
evaluations have been done but without sufficient detail to evaluate the 
probabilities of dam failures. Because of the extreme consequences of 
potential failure of one or more of these dams, we recommend that detailed 
seismic evaluations be conducted for all of these dams. 
The table on the following page contains dam safety mitigation action items from the 
master Action Items table in Chapter 4. 
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Dam Safety Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Prepare high resolution maps of dam failure 
inundation areas and update emergency response 
plans, including public notification and evacuation 
routes
County Land Development 
Services, city building departments, 
local emergency service agencies
1-2 Years X X X
Long-Term     
#2
Encourage the Corps of Engineers to complete 
seismic vulnerability assessments for dams upstream 
of heavily populated areas in Columbia County and to 
make seismic improvements as necessary
Columbia County Hazard Mitigation 
Advisory Committee, US Army 
Corps of Engineers
Ongoing X X X X X
Long-Term     
#3
Evaluate the adequacy of dike systems for both floods 
and earthquakes and implement mitigation measures 
if necessary
Local Dike Districts, US Army Corps 
of Engineers Ongoing X X X X X
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
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13.0 DISRUPTION OF UTILITY AND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS  
The previous chapters dealt with each of the major natural hazards impacting Columbia 
County including floods, winter storms, landslides, wildland/ urban interface fires, 
earthquakes and volcanic hazards. These chapters evaluated each of the hazards and the 
risk arising from the hazards as they impact the buildings, infrastructure and people of 
Columbia County. 
Each of these hazards may result in not only damage to buildings but also damage to and 
disruption of utility and transportation systems. Mitigation projects may be implemented to 
reduce or avoid such damage and disruptions and a few examples were discussed in the 
previous chapters. In this sense, evaluating the potential damage and disruption of utility 
and transportation systems from each hazard is part of the risk assessment for each 
locality affected by a natural hazard. 
However, disruption of utility and transportation systems may have impacts on the 
affected community which are far broader than the direct damage and corresponding 
direct loss of service. In this sense, disruption of utility and transportation systems may be 
viewed almost as a hazard. As for other hazards, the probability, duration, and extent of 
such outages can be assessed and the impacts (risk) associated with such outages can 
be quantified. Among the major utilities, loss of electric power generally has the most 
widespread impact on other utilities and on the community as a whole. Therefore, this 
chapter deals with electric power outages in more detail than for the other utility and 
transportation systems. 
13.1 Transportation Systems 
Streets, roads, and highways are subject to closure during flood events because of high 
water levels on road surfaces. This type of closure may occur during either a major flood 
event on the larger rivers and streams in Columbia County and surrounding areas or 
during win included most of the major routes in the interior of the county and numerous 
secondary roads. 
For Columbia County, Chapter 7 (Winter Storms) identified some of the most problematic 
areas where major arteries and other roads have been repeatedly affected by winter 
storms (primarily localized flooding). 
Some sites of road closures are difficult to mitigate without large scale flood control 
projects. However, mitigation is possible at many locations with high potential for road 
closures. Common measures include raising the road surface to reduce the probability of 
water overtopping the road or improving local drainage (e.g., culvert upsizings).  
Risk assessments for road closures must include a measure of the importance of the road 
for transportation as well as an evaluation of the direct physical damages to the road. In 
many cases, the disruption of transportation has a larger economic impact that the direct 
physical damages.  
To evaluate and prioritize hazard mitigation projects for roads, we suggest three 
measures of the relative importance of a road: 
1. number of vehicle trips per day, 
2. detour time around a road closure, and 
3. road use as primary access/egress, including emergency vehicles. 
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The number of vehicle trips per day is an obvious measure of the importance of a road. All 
other factors being equal, a road with 500 trips per day is more important than a road with 
50 trips per day and thus should have a higher priority for mitigation projects. However, a 
better measure of the importance of a road is obtained if the detour time is also 
considered. If traffic loads were equal, a mitigation project on a road where a closure 
required a one-hour detour would have a higher priority than a road where a closure only 
required a five minute detour. More accurately, it is the combination of traffic load and 
detour time that provides a measure of the impact of road closure. The product of number 
of trips per day and the detour time gives a measure of the number of vehicle-hours of 
delay that result from a closure. Consider the following example: 
Table 13.1 
Calculation of Vehicle-Hours of Delay from Road Closures 





Delay per day of 
Closure 
A 500 0.10 50 
B 100 1.00 100 
In this example, Road A has fives times the traffic of Road B, but because the detour time 
is much longer for a closure on B than on A, the number of vehicle-hours of delay is 
greater on Road B than on Road A. On this basis, mitigation of the hazard causing the 
closure would have a higher priority on Road B than on Road A. 
The number of vehicle hours of delay is a proxy for the economic impact of the closure. 
The current FEMA value (for benefit-cost analysis purposes) for the economic impact of 
lost time due to road closures is $32.23 per vehicle hour of delay (What is a Benefit?, 
FEMA 2001). This value is based on national average wage and benefits level and 
national average vehicle occupancy data, along with the assumption that an hour of 
leisure time is worth the same to a person as an hour of work (a common economic 
assumption). Then, for example, 100 vehicle hours of delay per day has an estimated 
economic impact of $3,223 and so on. For the vast majority of roads, with “typical” traffic 
loads, using an economic value of $32.23 per vehicle per hour of delay provides a 
reasonable measure of the economic impact of road closures. Everything else being more 
or less equal, roads which serve as primary access/egress routes and/or serve many 
emergency vehicles may be given a higher priority for mitigation. 
For completeness, we note that roads are networked systems and a more accurate 
analysis of the relative priority of mitigation projects to reduce road closures should 
consider the network characteristics of a local road system. However, network analysis is 
complex, requires specialized expertise and is expensive. Network analysis may be 
justified for very expensive projects, such as a multi-million dollar relocation of a bridge to 
reduce the potential for flood washouts. However, the simple three parameter prioritization 
methodology suggested above is probably sufficient for evaluation of most small to 
medium sized mitigation projects. 
Rail systems are subject to the same sorts of closures as are road systems. Evaluation 
and prioritization of mitigation projects for rail systems would follow a methodology closely 
analogous to that discussed above for road systems, with economic impact parameters 
appropriate for a rail system. 
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Other transportation systems (air, ports, ferry) are also subject to disruption due to the 
impacts of hazards. The analysis of such systems is roughly similar to that discussed 
above, but mitigation projects for such systems are encountered far less frequently than 
are mitigation projects for roads. Moreover, most such projects are not directly applicable 
to or a low priority for Columbia County and are thus not considered further. 
13.2 Utility Systems - Overview 
Evaluation of hazard mitigation projects for utility systems have some commonalities 
between systems that we briefly review before addressing each major utility system in 
turn. 
Utility systems such as potable water, wastewater, natural gas, telecommunications, and 
electric power are all networked systems. That is, they consist of nodes and links. Nodes 
are centers where something happens - such as a pumping plant, a treatment plant, a 
substation, a switching office and the like. Links are the connections (pipes or lines) 
between nodes. 
Risk assessments for utility systems are similar to risk assessments for buildings, in that 
the inventory of utility components is overlaid on the hazard map and the vulnerability of 
utility components is evaluated for the hazards impacting the utility. A major difference 
arises, however, because of the networked nature of utilities. As a simple example, 
consider an electric utility which suffers damage to 10% of its transmission lines. The 
extent of service outage might be essentially zero if there are redundant lines with 
sufficient capacity to handle the demand for electric power. Or, the extent of service 
outage might be 100% if the damaged lines provide the sole power feed for a community. 
Thus, the operating characteristics and network characteristics (especially the amount of 
redundancy) must be considered. 
In conducting risk assessments or evaluating hazard mitigation projects for utility systems, 
the networked nature of such systems must be considered. The extent or lack of 
redundancy for particular elements in a system profoundly affects the extent to which a 
given level of damage results in system outages. 
The general procedure for conducting a risk assessment or evaluating a hazard mitigation 
project for a networked utility system is outlined below in six steps. 
1. Overlay utility system components with hazard maps, 
2. Estimate the vulnerability of each component to impacts from each hazard, 
3. From the estimated amount of damage to the system and the system’s 
network operating characteristics, estimate the extent and duration of 
service outage, 
4. From the damage estimates and the resources available, estimate the 
restoration time, 
5. From the service outage (number of customers and duration) estimate the 
economic impacts of such loss of service, and 
6. If a mitigation project is being evaluated estimate the reduction in direct 
damages and the reduction in service interruption attributable to mitigation 
project. 
An important caveat for conducting risk assessments or evaluation of hazard mitigation 
projects for networked utility systems is that specialized expertise is often required. The 
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analyst must thoroughly understand the operating characteristics of utility system 
components and their vulnerability to each hazard as well as thoroughly understand the 
network operating characteristics of the system as a whole. In the absence of sufficient 
experience and expertise risk assessments or evaluation of hazard mitigation projects 
may produce inaccurate and misleading results. 
CAVEAT: conducting risk assessments or evaluation of hazard mitigation projects 
of networked utility systems often requires specialized expertise to 
produce meaningful results. 
For reference, a detailed discussion of how to evaluate seismic hazard mitigation projects 
for water systems is given in the American Society of Civil Engineers monograph 
“Guidelines for the Seismic Upgrade of Existing Water Transmission Facilities,” (J. 
M. Eidinger, editor, 1999; chapter by K. A. Goettel “Seismic Upgrades of Water 
Transmission Systems: When Is It Worth It?”). Very similar principles apply to evaluating 
hazard mitigation projects for other utility systems for any type of hazard. 
The following sections briefly review utility systems with emphasis on identifying the 
system components which are most vulnerable to damage and loss of service from 
hazards covered in this Mitigation Plan: flooding, winter storms, landslides and 
earthquakes. Such components are thus logical targets for high priority mitigation projects 
whenever important components are subject to the hazards. 
13.3 Potable Water Systems 
Water treatment plants, including those in Columbia County, are often located in flood 
prone areas and are subject to inundation when raw water enters the filters, sedimentation 
or flocculation basins, resulting in loss of capability to treat incoming raw water properly. 
Water system control buildings and pump stations may also be subject to flood damages. 
Public or private water systems with wells as the water source are subject to outages 
when flood waters contaminate well heads; this is a common problem for smaller water 
systems. 
Water transmission or distribution pipes are rarely damaged by flood waters, unless there 
are soil settlements or major erosion, because the lines are sufficiently pressurized (for 
water quality) to prevent intrusion of flood waters. Water transmission or distribution pipes 
are, however, subject to breakage when they cross landslide areas or in earthquakes. 
Water treatment plants are also subject to earthquake damages to the building and to 
process and control equipment. 
Water systems, including Columbia County’s water systems, are also highly vulnerable to 
electric power outages. Many water systems include pumped storage systems where 
water is pumped to storage tanks which are typically located 60 to 200 feet above the 
elevation of water system customers. Such tanks generally contain no more than 1 or 2 
days of storage beyond typical daily usage (for reasons of water quality). Thus, electric 
power outages of more than 1 or 2 days may result in loss of potable water due to the 
inability of pumping plants to pump water. The most logical mitigation projects to minimize 
such outages are to provide back-up generators at key pumping plants or to provide quick 
connects so that portable generators (if available) can be quickly installed. Water 
treatment plants are also subject to outages due to loss of electric power. 
Common mitigation projects for water systems include flood protection for treatment 
plants, providing back-up power, moving pipes from active landslide areas, and seismic 
upgrades for treatment plants. 
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13.4 Wastewater Systems 
Wastewater systems are often highly vulnerable to flood impacts. Rising water may cause 
collection pipes to backup and overflow. Intrusion of storm water into collection systems 
may result in flows that exceed treatment plant capacities, resulting in release of untreated 
or only partially treated flows. Treatment plants are often located in flood plains, at low 
elevations, to facilitate gravity flow. However, such locations also facilitate flood damages. 
Wastewater treatment plans may be inundated, resulting in full or partial plant shutdown 
or plant bypass with corresponding release of untreated or only partially treated flows. 
Lift stations and treatment plants are also subject to loss of function due to electric power 
outages, with resulting overflows or releases. Collection pipes are also subject to 
breakage due to landslides. However, such impacts are not particularly common, since 
most wastewater collection systems are in more urbanized areas with only selected areas 
subject to slides. Wastewater pipes are, however, subject to breakage in earthquakes. 
Wastewater treatment plants are also subject to earthquake damages to the building and 
to process and control equipment. 
Common mitigation projects for wastewater systems include flood protection for 
wastewater treatment plants, providing back-up power for nodes such as lift stations, 
moving collection pipes from active landslide areas, and seismic upgrades for treatment 
plants. 
13.5 Natural Gas Systems 
Natural gas transmission and distribution pipes are not usually affected by flooding, 
because the pipes are pressurized. However, compressor stations may be subject to 
inundation damage or loss of electrical power to run electrical and mechanical equipment. 
Transmission and distribution pipes are also subject to rupture in slide areas. Buried utility 
pipes are very subject to failure in small ground movements. Movements as small as an 
inch or two are often sufficient to break the relatively brittle pipe materials. Possible 
mitigation projects for natural gas systems include providing back-up power for important 
nodes (e.g., compressor stations) and moving pipes from active landslide areas. 
The potential for fire or explosions from failure of natural gas lines is addressed in Chapter 
14 Hazmat. 
13.6 Telecommunications Systems 
Telephone (land lines and cellular) systems, broadcast radio and TV systems, and cable 
TV systems may all be vulnerable to damages and services outages from hazards. 
However, in general, such systems have proved to be somewhat less vulnerable to 
service outages than other utility systems. System nodes (broadcast studios, switching 
offices and such) are subject to flooding if located in flood-prone areas. However, because 
of the importance of such facilities, few are located in highly flood-prone sites. 
Similarly, few such facilities are likely to be located in landslide prone areas. Cellular 
towers in hilly areas, however, may be more subject to landslide hazards. 
Buried communications (copper and fiber optic) and cable television cables are usually 
flexible enough to accommodate several feet of ground movement before failure. Thus, 
while major landslides may rupture such cables, minor settlements or small slides are not 
nearly as likely to impact such cables as they are to break buried gas or water pipes. 
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Above ground communications and cable television cables are subject to wind-induced 
failures from tree falls and pole failures. However, such failures are about ten times less 
common than failures of electric power lines. The better performance of communications 
cables arises in part because the electrical cables are always highest on the poles, thus a 
falling branch is usually first resisted by the power cables. Also, because the voltage 
levels in communications cables are much lower than those in power cables, the 
communication cables are not subject to “burn down” or shorting if wind-swayed cables 
touch each other or get too close. 
Some telecommunications facilities are subject to failure as a result of loss of electric 
power. However, key facilities almost always have backup battery power and/or 
generators. Therefore, telecommunications facilities are generally much less vulnerable to 
outages from loss of electric power than are water or wastewater systems. 
Possible mitigation projects for telecommunications systems include flood proofing of 
important nodes, adding back-up power, relocating facilities out of active slide areas and 
seismic retrofits. 
13.7 Electric Power Systems 
The electric power system is central to the functioning of a modern society. The impacts of 
loss of electric power are large: residential, commercial and public customers are all 
heavily dependent on electric power for normal functioning. Furthermore, as discussed 
above, other utility systems, especially water systems, are heavily dependent on electric 
power for normal operations. Loss of electric power, therefore, may have large impacts on 
affected communities, especially if outages are prolonged. 
Electric power for Columbia County is distributed by Portland General Electric, the West 
Oregon Electric Co-Op, the Columbia River PUD, and the Clatskanie PUD. 
Electric power systems have somewhat complex operating characteristics, which are 
briefly summarized here. Electric power systems have three main parts: generation, 
transmission, and distribution. 
Generation is the production of electric power. Generating plans can be hydroelectric, 
fossil fuel (oil, gas, or coal), nuclear, or various renewable fuels (wind, solar, biomass, 
etc.). Most of the electric power consumed within Columbia County is produced elsewhere 
and transmitted via high-voltage transmission lines into the county. The Bonneville Power 
Administration (BPA) is the primary source of power for Columbia County. BPA’s power 
comes from hydroelectric facilities (57%) operated by the Corps of Engineers or the 
Bureau of Reclamation, from a nuclear plant (3%), from interchanges and wheeling (37%) 
of power transmitted by BPA but not owned by BPA and from other sources (3%). 
Through the Pacific Interties (high voltage AC or DC transmission lines) power is moved 
back and forth between California, the Pacific Northwest and western Canada. 
There is only one small (530 megawatt output) generating plant within Columbia County 
near Clatskanie. This plant is owned by the Port of St Helens, but is leased to and 
operated by Portland General Electric. The plan operates on either natural gas or diesel 
fuel. Power from this generating plant is transmitted by 230 KV above ground lines that 
feed into the BPA transmission system at a substation west of Rainier. 
The transmission system is a network of high voltage lines (500 kV and 230 kV) and 
substations which transmit power between generation plants and the local distribution 
system. The distribution system is a network of lower voltage lines and substations which 
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carries power from transmission system substations to neighborhoods and eventually to 
individual customers. 
Power outages in Columbia County are most likely to result from disruption of the 
transmission lines carrying power from outside Columbia County or within Columbia 
County, or damage to the local distribution lines within Columbia County. The generating 
plant system has sufficient redundancy so that failures of one or more plants do not 
usually lead to significant power outages. However, because of the limited generation 
capacity within Columbia County, major disruptions in the transmission system would 
result in substantial curtailment of available power. A major ice storm in the Columbia 
River area could conceivably fail all of the 500 kV transmission lines feeding Columbia 
County from the east.  
However, a severe ice storm with 2 to 4" of ice over much of Columbia County could 
result in failure of most 500 kV and 230 kV transmission lines to and within Columbia 
County. Such a failure, which is unlikely, but certainly not impossible, would probably 
entail widespread power outages for 2 to 5 days. 
The most frequent power outages, however, are due to failure of the local 
subtransmission or distribution system lines. Winter storms are the most frequent cause of 
significant electric power outages, with wind being the primary culprit. Electric distribution 
lines, the low voltage lines that deliver power to neighborhoods, are the most vulnerable 
electric system component in winter storms. Failures most commonly result from tree falls 
or from “burn downs” when wind-swayed cables touch or get too close to each other and 
short circuit. Distribution system failures may also be due to utility pole failures. 
Distribution lines may also fail due to ice loading in excess of design specifications or from 
landslides or debris flows or flooding which knock out utility poles. 
Failures of distribution system lines are thus the most common failure mode for electric 
power systems. Power system outages are more common and of longer duration in rural 
areas compared to urban or suburban areas. Rural areas are more prone to electric 
outages because they have a higher percentage of above-ground lines and are more 
likely to have hilly areas with high concentrations of trees and higher wind speeds than in 
flatter terrain. In rural areas, with lower population density, there is also a higher ratio of 
length of distribution lines per customer. With a longer length of exposed line, the 
probability of an outage is higher for a rural customer than for an urban customer. 
Once a portion of a power distribution circuit fails, all customers in that part of the circuit 
lose power. The duration of the power outage depends on the number of outages and the 
number of repair crews available for repairs. A typical power utility repair crew (2 or 3 
people with a cherry picker) can restore power to a distribution circuit with common types 
of damage in 1 or 2 hours after arriving at the damage site. 
Electric transmission lines (110 kV and higher) are less vulnerable to winter storm 
damage because of more robust design specifications. Also, such lines are usually higher 
above the ground and much less prone to tree branches falling on lines. Furthermore, 
because of the higher voltage (compared to distribution lines), power utilities must 
diligently pursue tree trimming programs to avoid flashovers from lines being too close to 
trees. Nevertheless, transmission lines do sometimes fail due to large tree falls, rapid 
growth of trees near lines, unusually high winds or heavy ice loads. 
Columbia County is subject to outages of electric power primarily due to line failures. One 
possible failure mode would be the transmission lines that feed Columbia County from the 
east. More common failure modes would be failures of the trunk distribution lines within 
Columbia County and failures of distribution circuits or service drops from distribution lines 
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to individual buildings. The local failures are most likely due to tree falls during wind storm 
events. 
Mitigation projects to reduce the frequency and duration of electric power systems include: 
augmenting tree trimming programs and hardening lines and poles in locations where ice 
loading or wind effects result in repeated outages. In some cases, adding connections to 
improve redundancy of power feed paths and adding disconnect switches to minimize 
areas affected by any given failure are also worthwhile. In addition to such “hard” 
mitigation possibilities, there are also “soft” or planning mitigation projects. For example, 
enhancing mutual aid agreements with nearby utilities can reduce the duration of major 
outages by increasing the number of crews and equipment for making repairs. Other 
planning/logistics measures such as ensuring that adequate supplies of parts and 
equipment are available may also reduce the duration of future outages. 
For Columbia County, augmenting tree trimming programs, especially for the transmission 
lines and the trunk distribution lines is probably the most effective mitigation measure. In 
selected locations upgrading lines and poles to better withstand loads from trees, wind 
and ice may also be appropriate. If there are key links in the systems that are highly prone 
to repetitive failures, undergrounding of limited portions of such links may also be 
appropriate. 
13.8 Impacts on Columbia County and Mitigation Action Items 
The probable impacts of disruption of transportation and utility systems on Columbia 
County, which were summarized above, are also covered in each of the other hazard 
Chapters (6 -12, 14, 15). Each of these chapters includes an impacts table which 
summarizes probable impacts on roads, bridges, and utility systems. A generalized 
summary of the probable impacts of utility disruptions and road closures on Columbia 
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Table 13.2 
Probable Impacts of Utility Disruptions and Road Closures 
Inventory Probable Impacts
Portion of Columbia County affected
Impacts may be localized for damage to local utility distribution 
systems or street closures, or effect the entire County for damage 
to transmission lines or closures of major highways to/from 
Columbia County
Buildings Negligible impacts to buildings, but loss of utilities may substantially affect function of buildings
Streets within Columbia County Some incidents may include temporary street closures
Roads to/from Columbia County Some incidents may include temporary road closures
Electric power
Some incidents may include temporary loss of electric power in 
localized parts of Columbia County or for the entire County.  
Duration of disruptions can range from an hour to up to a probable 
maximum outage of 1 or 2 days.
Other Utilities
Some incidents may include temporary loss of utilities in localized 
parts of Columbia County or for the entire County.  Duration of 
disruptions can range from an hour to up to a probable maximum 
outage of 1 or 2 days.
Casualties
Low potential for direct casualties, but some incidents such as loss 
of electric power during cold weather may require evacuations and 
displacement of people (especially fragile or special needs 
population) to temporary shelters.  
Within Columbia County, all of the dike districts rely heavily on pumping to keep dike 
areas dry, especially during flood periods and periods of heavy rainfall. Power outages 
longer than a few hours may have significant impacts on many of these dike districts, 
which generally have limited back-up power capabilities for the pumps. 
The following table contains action items for mitigation of disruptions of utility and 
transportation systems, from the master Action Items table in Chapter 4. See also the 
mitigation action items for Winter Storms (Chapter 7) which includes action items related 
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Table 13.3 





































































Utility and Transportation System Disruption Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Educate and encourage residents to maintain several 
days of emergency supplies for power outages or 
road closures
Columbia County Hazard Mitigation 
Advisory Committee, CEPA Ongoing X X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Review and update emergency response plans for 
disruptions of utilities or roads
local emergency service agencies, 
CEPA 1-2 Years X X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Ensure that all critical facilities in Columbia County 
have backup power and emergency operations plans 
to deal with power outages
local emergency service agencies, 
CEPA 1-2 Years X X X X
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
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14.0 HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 
14.1 Introduction 
For mitigation planning, hazardous materials may be defined simply as any materials that 
may have negative impacts on human health, animal health, or the environment. That is, 
exposure to hazardous materials may result in injury, illness, or death. The impacts of a 
hazardous materials exposure may be short-term with negative effects immediately or in a 
few seconds, minutes or hours or long-term with negative effects in days, weeks, or in 
some cases years after exposure. 
Hazardous materials vary widely in their toxicity to humans. Some hazardous materials 
are highly toxic so that even brief exposures to minute amounts may be dangerous or 
even fatal. Other hazardous materials are much less toxic and negative effects may occur 
only after a significant exposure to large quantities of a substance, or exposure to smaller 
quantities for a prolonged period of time. The technical term “toxic,” or “toxicity,” which is 
widely used to describe hazardous materials, is simply a synonym for the more common 
terms “poison” or “poisonous.” A toxic is thus defined as any substance that causes injury, 
illness, or death to living tissue by chemical activity. 
Hazardous chemicals are widely used in heavy industry, manufacturing, agriculture, 
mining, the oil and gas industry, high tech industries, forestry, and transportation as well 
as in medical facilities and commercial, public and residential buildings. There are literally 
hundreds of thousands of chemicals that may be hazardous to human health, at least to 
some extent. A typical single family home may contain dozens of potentially hazardous 
materials including fuels, paints, solvents, cleaning chemicals, pesticides, herbicides, 
medicines and others.  
However, for mitigation planning purposes, small quantities of slightly or moderately 
hazardous materials being used by end users are rarely the focus of interest. Rather, 
interest is focused primarily on larger quantities of hazardous materials in industrial use 
and on hazardous materials being transported, where the potential for accidental spills or 
releases is high. Situations involving extremely hazardous materials or large quantities of 
hazardous materials in locations where accidents may result in significant public health 
risk are of special concern for planning purposes. 
For mitigation planning purposes, the toxicity of particular hazardous materials is an 
important measure of the potential impact of hazardous materials on affected 
communities, but not the only important measure. Other characteristics of hazardous 
materials, especially the quantity of material and the ease of dispersal of the material may 
be as important as or more important than toxicity in governing the level of potential threat 
to a community. For example, a small quantity of a very toxic solid hazardous material 
used in a research laboratory may pose a much smaller level of risk for a community than 
a large quantity of a less toxic gaseous material in an industrial site located upwind from a 
populated area. 
The severity of any hazardous material spill or release incident for an affected community 
depends on several factors, including: 
a. the toxicity of the hazardous material, 
b. the quantity of the hazardous material spilled or released, 
c. the dispersal characteristics of the hazardous material, 
d. the local conditions such as wind direction and topography, and 
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e. the location of the spill or release in proximity to sensitive environmental areas 
such as a watershed that provides a community’s drinking water, and 
f. the efficacy of response and recovery actions. 
14.2 Effects of Hazardous Materials on Humans 
The principal modes of human exposure to hazardous materials include: 
a. Inhalation of gaseous or particulate materials via the respiratory (breathing) 
process, 
b. Ingestion of hazardous materials via contaminated food or water, 
c. Direct contact with skin or eyes. 
Exposure to hazardous materials can result in a wide range of negative health effects on 
humans and animals. Hazardous materials are generally classified by their health effects. 
The most common types of hazardous materials are summarized below. 
Flammable materials are substances where fire is the primary threat, although 
explosions and chemical effects listed below may also occur. Common examples 
include gasoline, diesel fuel, and propane. 
Explosives are materials where explosion is the primary threat, although fires and 
chemical effects listed below may also occur. Common examples include dynamite 
and other explosives used in construction or demolition. 
Irritants are substances that cause inflammation or chemical burns of the eyes, nose, 
throat, lungs, skin or other tissues of the body in which they come in contact. 
Examples of irritants are strong acids such as sulfuric or nitric acid. 
Asphyxiants are substances that interfere with breathing. Simple asphyxiants cause 
injury or death by displacing the oxygen necessary for life. Nitrogen is a good 
example. Nitrogen is a normally harmless gas that constitutes about 78% of the 
atmosphere. However, nitrogen releases in a confined space may result in 
asphyxiation by displacing oxygen. Chemical asphyxiants are substances that prevent 
the body from using oxygen or otherwise interfere with the breathing process. 
Common examples are carbon monoxide and cyanides. 
Anesthetics and Narcotics are substances which act on the body by depressing the 
central nervous system. Symptoms include drowsiness, weakness, fatigue, and 
incoordination, which may lead to unconsciousness, paralysis of the respiratory 
system and death. Examples include numerous hydrocarbon and organic compounds. 
Hazardous materials may also have a wide variety of more specialized impacts on human 
health. Other types of toxic effects are briefly summarized in Table 14.1. 
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Table 14.1 
Other Types of Hazardous Materials 
Type of Hazardous 
Material 
Effects on Humans 
Hepatotoxin Liver damage 
Nephrotoxin Kidney damage 
Neurotoxin Neurological (nerve) damage 
Carcinogen May result in cancer 
Mutagen May produce changes in the genetic material of cells 
Teratogen May have adverse affects on sperm, ova, or fetal tissue 
Radioactive materials May result directly in radiation sickness at high exposure 
levels or act as carcinogen, mutagen, or teratogen 
Infectious substances Biological materials such as bacteria or viruses that may cause 
illness or death 
 
Much of the information above was summarized from Chapter Six of the Handbook of 
Chemical Hazard Analysis Procedures1. The first few chapters of this handbook contain 
a concise summary of many of the technical aspects of hazardous materials. These 
chapters may be useful to readers seeking a more technical introduction to the 
nomenclature and science of hazardous materials. 
14.3 Classification System and Emergency Response Protocols 
A standardized system is used to classify and identify hazardous materials. The 2004 
Emergency Response Guidebook (A Guidebook for First Responders During the Initial 
Phase of a Dangerous Goods/Hazardous Material Incident)2 outlines the classification 
system. The 2004 Emergency Response Guidebook is an extremely useful reference 
book that provides standardized first response protocols and detailed reference sheets for 
the most common classes of hazardous materials. 
Hazardous material releases are predominantly accidental results of traffic accidents, 
equipment failures or human errors. In rare cases, hazardous material releases may result 
from deliberate actions of sabotage or terrorism. 
First responders for hazardous material incidents are generally public safety personnel 
(police or fire). The standard protocols for first responders are briefly summarized below, 
following guidance in the 2004 Emergency Response Guidebook. 
The primary guidance for first responders is to: 
a. resist rushing in, 
b. approach the incident site from upwind, uphill or upstream, and 
c. stay clear of all spills, vapors, fumes and smoke. 
Upon approaching the incident site, a three-step procedure is recommended: 
a. identify the material, 
b. find the materials three digit guide number, and 
c. read the numbered guide carefully and respond accordingly. 
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Identification of hazardous materials is by finding any one of the following: 
a. the four-digit ID number on a placard or orange panel, 
b. the four-digit ID number on a shipping document or package, or 
c. the name of the material on a placard, shipping document or package. 
Once identified by ID number or name, the material’s three-digit guide number is looked 
up in either the ID number index or the name index. Then, the procedures and 
precautions outlined in the guide for the identified class of material are carefully followed. 
For each class of material, the guides have critical information on potential hazards, 
suggested evacuation distances for small and large spills, and recommended emergency 
response actions, including first aid. For further technical details see the 2004 Emergency 
Response Guidebook. 
In Oregon, the Office of State Fire Marshal has defined standard response protocols for 
hazardous materials incidents in a series of Standard Operating Guidelines3. This series 
of about a dozen standard operating guidelines covers every main aspect of emergency 
response and recovery, including decisions to respond, levels of response, general 
response guidelines, mitigation methods, decontamination procedures, personal 
protective equipment, and others. 
In Oregon, there is a three-level response plan for hazardous material incidents involving 
first responders and specialized emergency response teams. 
First responders are local staff, generally public safety staff (police and fire) that are 
trained in basic procedures for the initial (first) response to hazardous materials incidents. 
The responsibilities of first responders including securing the incident scene and making a 
preliminary assessment of the potential severity of the hazardous material incident and 
the level of threat, if any, to persons at and outside of the immediate incident area. In 
Columbia County, most fire service first responders are trained to either the “Awareness” 
Level or “Operations” Level. 
Emergency response teams are specialized teams, composed primarily of public safety 
staff, with higher-level training and more specialized equipment for dealing with hazardous 
materials incidents than first responders. State of Oregon Hazardous Materials Team 
members are trained to the “Technician” Level or higher. Statewide, these emergency 
response teams respond to about 350 hazardous material incidents per year, or about 
one per day, on average (Standard Operating Guidelines, Team Background3). In Oregon, 
there are fourteen emergency response teams, generally with 18 members each. Each 
response team has a defined geographic area of primary responsibility. For Columbia 
County, the Hazardous Materials Response Team with primary responsibility is the HM06 
Portland Team which covers Columbia and Multnomah Counties. 
The three-level response plan for hazardous materials incidents is characterized as Level 
I Response, Level II Response and Level III response. The distinction between Levels I, II, 
and III depends on: 
a. class of hazardous material 
b. size of container 
c. fire/explosion potential 
d. leak severity and container integrity, and 
e. threat to life safety. 
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Level I Responses are those incidents readily controlled or stabilized by first 
responders. The HazMat Emergency Response Team personnel may provide 
technical assistance via telephone or on-site assistance, but full response by 
an Emergency Response Team is not required. 
Level II Responses are those incidents that require response from a HazMat 
Emergency Response Team for control or stabilization of the spill. The 
Emergency Response Team response level may be 2-4 personnel for 
identification of the material and guidance on appropriate response actions or 
the response level may be a small team response of 6-8 personnel. 
Level III Responses are those incidents that require special resources, 
including one or more full Emergency Response Teams and possibly other 
outside agencies for support. 
Further technical details of the Level I, II, and III responses are given in the State of 
Oregon Standard Operating Guidelines, Levels of Response to Hazardous Materials 
Incidents, T-003.3 A very useful glossary of technical terms used for hazardous materials 
incidents is given in the State SOG Glossary of Terms (Standard Operating Guidelines, 
Glossary of Terms, SOG-T-002.3) 
14.4 Statutory and Regulatory Context 
The manufacture, storage, use, transportation, and disposal of hazardous materials are 
subject to a myriad of federal, state, and local regulations. In the context of mitigation 
planning and emergency response, we focus on reporting requirements for chemicals 
subject to mandatory risk management planning and extremely hazardous substances 
subject to additional reporting and planning requirements. 
Oregon statutes governing hazardous materials are included in the following sections of 
the Oregon Revised Statutes: 
ORS Chapter 453, 453.001 to 453.185 and 453.605 to 453.807 
ORS Chapter 465, Hazardous Waste, Haz. Mat. I 
ORS Chapter 466, Hazardous Waste, Haz. Mat. II 
ORS Chapter 475, 475.405 to 475.495, Illegal Drug Clean-up 
ORS Chapter 480, Explosives, flammable materials, pressure vessels.  
Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act Amendments was designed to prevent accidental 
releases of hazardous substances. The rule establishes a list of chemicals and threshold 
quantities that identify facilities subject to subsequent accident prevention regulations. The 
listed substances have the greatest potential to pose the greatest hazard to public health 
and the environment in the event of an accidental release. 
The full list of Section 112(r) chemicals, including planning threshold quantities (TPQ) is 
given in the Office of State Fire Marshal’s Hazardous Substance Information System 
database (available on CD from OSFM). 
Hazardous materials may be released to the environment either routinely during 
manufacturing and other ongoing processes or accidentally. Certain types of businesses 
are required to report such releases annually for a specified list of chemicals. The 
paragraph below, quoted from the Office of State Fire Marshal, Hazardous Substance 
Information System (HSIS)4, summarizes the intent and content of the regulatory 
requirements for substances covered under the Toxic Release Inventory regulations. 
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“The Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) Program was established by section 113 
of the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA) of 
1986. Under this program certain businesses are required to submit reports 
each year on the amounts of toxic chemicals their facilities release into the 
environment, either routinely or as a result of accidents.” 
There are additional reporting and planning requirements for materials deemed to be 
extremely hazardous. The paragraphs below, quoted from the Office of State Fire 
Marshal, Hazardous Substance Information System (HSIS)4, summarize the intent and 
content of the regulatory requirements for extremely hazardous materials. 
“SARA Title III, section 302 requires owners and operators to notify the State 
Emergency Response Commission (SERC) regarding the presence of 
Extremely Hazardous Substances (EHS) at their facilities. Section 303 requires 
facilities that possess a threshold planning quantity (TPQ) of an EHS to 
develop a contingency plan in case of an accidental release, and assist 
emergency planners and emergency response organizations in developing a 
plan to protect the community from possible injury from a release of dangerous 
chemicals.” 
The full list of substances designated as Extremely Hazardous Substances (EHS) is given 
in the Office of State Fire Marshal’s Hazardous Substance Information System database 
(available on CD from OSFM). 
14.5 FIXED SITE HAZARDOUS MATERIALS LOCATIONS IN COLUMBIA 
COUNTY 
Hazardous materials at fixed sites are generally identified by a NFPA (National Fire 
Protection Association) placard, commonly referred to as the NFPA hazard diamond. 
These hazard placards contain standardized information on the fire hazards and health 
hazards of the hazardous materials. Technical details about these hazard placards are 
given in the publication NFPA 704: Standard for the Identification of the Fire Hazards of 
Materials for Emergency Response (1996). 
The Oregon Office of State Fire Marshal maintains a comprehensive listing of hazardous 
materials locations in Oregon4. Key data for Columbia County are shown below in Table 
14.2. 
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Table 14.2 










Columbia 610 256 124 32 28 4
1 Chemicals reportable under Section 112(r)
2 Chemicals reportable under Section 313, Toxics Release Inventory
3 Extremely hazardous substances
4 HSIS database appears incomplete, see text.  
 
For Columbia County, the HSIS database has hazardous materials reports for 610 
companies and other entities such as cities that have hazardous materials. Of these 
reporting locations, 256 or about 42%, have reportable quantities of hazardous materials. 
As shown in Table 14.2, Columbia County also has 124 sites with Section 112(r) 
chemicals, 32 sites with Section 313 Toxics Release Inventory chemicals, and 28 sites 
with Extremely Hazardous Substances. 
For mitigation planning purposes, Extremely Hazardous Substances are of special 
concern. The HSIS database for EHS in Columbia County appears possibly incomplete. 
For example, the EHS Facility list does not include 3 facilities which are on the EHS Pure 
Substance inventory list. Furthermore, there are only two water treatment plants listed; 
additional water or wastewater treatment plants in Columbia County may have chlorine or 
other EHS on site. 
More detailed information about hazardous materials can be found online in the State Fire 
Marshal’s Community Right-to-Know (CR2K) Hazardous Substance Information Program. 
Members of the public have the responsibility for informing themselves, getting involved 
with the planning and emergency response exercises and knowing the potential risks. 
Hazardous Substance Information System (HSIS) 
The Hazardous Substance Information System identifies hazardous substances that are 
used, stored, manufactured and/or disposed of at business sites in Oregon. The Office of 
State Fire Marshal (OSFM) annually surveys businesses and requires them to provide 
demographic information and report hazardous substances at or above reportable 
quantities. Businesses possessing reportable quantities of hazardous substances are 
required to report specific information including the chemical name, maximum amount and 
storage location. These businesses are also required to notify the OSFM within 30 days of 
any substantive changes that occur at the facility. 
Environmental Protection Agency Tier II Chemical Inventory Reporting 
By submitting the Office of State Fire Marshal Hazardous Substance Information Survey, 
Oregon businesses are complying with the EPA Tier II Chemical Inventory reporting 
requirements. To comply with Oregon reporting requirements, businesses must submit 
their chemical inventory information on a Hazardous Substance Information Survey. Tier II 
forms are not accepted. 
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 How to Access the Hazardous Substance Information Database 
The Office of State Fire Marshal's Hazardous Substance Information database is available 
online at http://www.sfm.state.or.us/CR2K/cr2k.htm. Scroll down to the “Community 
Right To Know” and click on the desired item. It is then possible to establish information 
parameters and run queries of our database and obtain the information. The database will 
be searched and the information will be displayed on the user’s computer, and then either 
print or save the data to their system. 
Limited Access Notification 
Due to potential security issues, information on hazardous substances that have hazard 
classes listed below is not provided by individual facility. This information can be 
requested by contacting the Office of State Fire Marshal’s, Community Right to Know Unit 
at SFM.CR2K@state.or.us. 
Class Description Class Description
1.1 Class A Explosives 1.5 Insensitive Explosives
1.2 Class B Explosives 2.3 Poison Gases
1.3 Class C Explosives 6.2 Etiologic Materials1
1.4 Blasting Agents 7.3 Radioactive Materials
1 Etiologic means disease causing  
14.6 Commentary on Inventory of Extremely Hazardous Substances (EHS) 
There are a total of at least 27 sites in Columbia County with reportable quantities of 
extremely hazardous substances (EHS). Data on the geographic distribution of EHS sites 
in Columbia County are summarized below in Table 14.3 
Table 14.3 
Geographic Distribution of Extremely Hazardous Substances (EHS) Sites 










Goble 1  
 
Of these 28 sites with EHS chemicals in Columbia County, 13 are telephone company 
sites which presumably contain small quantities of cleaning solvents. There are two forest 
product company sites and a PGE site which contain sulfuric acid and other chemicals, 
along with several commercial/industrial sites that appear likely to contain only small 
quantities of EHS. 
The Dyno Nobel Inc. facility in St. Helens appears to be the only facility in Columbia 
County which contains substantial quantities of EHS. The Company Report for this facility 
in the HSIS database lists a total of 58 chemicals, of which only six, anhydrous ammonia 
and ammonium hydroxide, ammonium nitrate, nitric acid, urea fertilizer, and urea 
  
January 3, 2005 14-11
ammonium nitrate solution appear to be present in large quantities. Of these six 
chemicals, only anhydrous ammonia and nitric acid are classified as EHS. 
As noted above in Section 14.1, the toxicity of particular hazardous materials is an 
important measure of the potential impact of hazardous materials on affected 
communities, but not the only important measure. Other characteristics of hazardous 
materials, especially the quantity of material and the ease of dispersal of the material may 
be as important, or more important, in governing the level of potential threat to a 
community. 
A full review of the potential public health impacts of accidents or deliberate acts at each 
of the above 28 sites is beyond the scope of this mitigation plan. For planning purposes, 
however, the Dyno Nobel Inc. site may warrant further evaluation, because of the 
combination of toxicity, quantity, and potential dispersal characteristics of chemicals at this 
site. In any case, first responders should be well informed about the proper response 
protocols for the chemicals present at this site in large quantities and emergency 
response plans should include evacuation plans in case of accidental releases. 
14.7 HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TRANSPORT: TRUCK SHIPMENTS, RAIL 
SHIPMENTS AND PIPELINES 
14.7.1 Overview and Truck Shipments 
Hazardous materials may be transported once or many times during their “life cycle” of 
raw materials, manufacturing, incorporation in other products, wholesale and retail trade, 
use, waste disposal, and recycling. The transport of hazardous materials may be local 
within a single city or across a state, across the country or internationally. 
For Columbia County, a general perspective on hazardous materials incidents is provided 
by annual statistics of hazardous materials incidents5, prepared by the Office of State Fire 
Marshal. These incident reports include all reported hazardous material incidents, at fixed 
sites and during transportation, except generally excluding: 
a. motor fuels which are spilled in quantities less than 42 gallons, 
b. sewage overflows, 
c. structure fires or other emergencies where hazardous substances are involved as 
exposures, if the quantities exposed are less than 42 gallons. 
Statewide incident data for 2000-2003 are summarized in Table 14.4 below from the 
OSFM Annual Incident Reports. For these four years, statewide incidents have ranged 
from 399 to 248 per year. Of the total hazmat incidents, an average of about 31% 
occurred on public roads in Oregon. The decreasing trend over these four years may 
reflect improved safety, or changes in reporting, or may just be a statistical fluctuation. 
Over this four year period there were a total of 1284 reported hazmat incidents, of which 
only 10 were in Columbia County (about 0.8% of the statewide total incidents). Incident 
data for Columbia County are shown below in Table 14.5. 
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Table 14.4 











1 reported incidents as per OSFM 
annual incident reports  
 
Table 14.5 











Drug lab chemicals, propane
Gasoline, unknown (2), inert powder
Motor oil, sand, no chemical involved
 
 
Most of the reported hazmat incidents involve a relatively small number of hazardous 
materials, as shown below in Table 14.6. These statewide data present a very useful 
overview of hazardous material incidents in Oregon. For Columbia County, the general 
pattern of hazardous materials is likely to be similar to the statewide pattern below. Most 
hazardous materials incidents in Columbia County are likely to be the most commonly 
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Table 14.6 
Hazardous Materials Incidents in 2000-20035 
Reported Categories of Hazardous Materials 
Chemical 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total Percent
Drug lab chemicals 66 50 20 35 171 13.32%
Diesel, gasoline, fuel oil 99 73 43 45 260 20.25%
Antifreeze, motor oil, 
hydraulic fluid, 
transmission fluid
29 16 8 6 59 4.60%
Natural gas 45 35 19 14 113 8.80%
Propane 14 7 10 4 35 2.73%
Unknown chemical 44 55 36 20 155 12.07%
No chemical involved 10 26 15 27 78 6.07%
Other chemicals 92 115 109 97 413 32.17%




The low number of hazmat incidents for Columbia County reflects the relatively low 
population of the county (corresponding too few shipments of fuels and other hazardous 
commodities relative to a more populated county). Another contributing factor may be the 
fact that there are no major interstate highways or major through roads between major 
population centers passing through Columbia County. 
For Columbia County, the most likely road/highway hazmat incidents involve the common 
chemicals shown above in Table 14.6. In addition, chemicals necessary for the forest 
products and fertilizer industry facilities in the county may also be involved in hazmat 
incidents, along with outgoing shipments of fertilizer products. Road/highway hazmat 
incidents are most likely along Highway 30 which connects most of the population centers 
in the county and most of the major industrial facilities using or shipping potentially 
hazardous materials. 
14.7.2 Rail Shipments 
There are 22 freight railroads currently operating in Oregon, according to 2004 data from 
the Oregon Department of Transportation website (www.odot.state.or). Addresses and 
contact information for all of these railroads are given on the above referenced website, as 
are website addresses for several of the larger railroads. 
The only freight railroad serving Columbia County is the Portland & Western line which 
runs from Astoria through Columbia County along the Highway 30 corridor to Portland. 
Specific data on hazmat shipments for this rail line were not available for this mitigation 
plan. However, the most likely chemicals for potential spills are probably generally similar 
to those noted above for road shipments within Columbia County. 
14.7.3 Pipelines 
There are two types of major fuel pipeline systems in Columbia County: 
1. the natural gas transmission lines which runs from gas fields in the Mist-
Birkenfeld area 
2. natural gas distribution systems run by utilities in the larger cities, along with the 
transmission lines feeding these local gas systems. 
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Natural gas transmission pipelines run from Mist-Birkenfeld towards the southeast to 
connect to transmission lines in the greater Portland area and north to connect to a 
transmission line running along the Highway 30 corridor. 
Each of the larger cities in Columbia County (including Scappoose, St. Helens, Columbia 
City, Rainier, Clatskanie, and Vernonia) and many smaller communities have local natural 
gas distribution systems connecting to transmission lines. 
The United States Department of Transportation Office of Pipeline Safety regulates 
interstate pipelines. USDOT imposes a broad range of standards and inspection 
requirements for pipeline design, material specifications, construction standards, 
maintenance and testing requirements. For the United States as a whole, a network of 
about 300,000 miles of natural gas transmission lines serve about 1.5 million miles of 
distribution system lines which serve about 160 million customers. Overall, the safety 
record of natural gas transmission pipelines is good with relatively few significant 
accidents. 
Columbia County also has a natural gas distribution system operated by Northwest 
Natural Gas. The natural gas pipeline systems of local gas utilities, including the systems 
in Columbia County, almost always follow road and street patterns because of established 
utility rights of way and because of the need to connect with each building served. Thus, 
for areas served by natural gas, the local street network is essentially identical to the 
natural gas distribution pipe network. 
Overall, the safety record of natural gas distribution pipelines is good with relatively few 
significant accidents. Natural gas is not toxic (i.e., not poisonous). However, natural gas 
can be an asphyxiant if it displaces oxygen in an enclosed space. Natural gas burns 
readily when ignited, but only when gas concentrations are between 4% and 15% in air. In 
its pure state, natural gas is both colorless and odorless. The strong odor normally 
associated with natural gas is an odorant deliberately introduced at low concentrations to 
serve as a warning of the presence of natural gas. The strong odorant is generally added 
to natural gas at the local distribution level, by local gas utilities, and is readily detectible in 
concentrations well below the explosive range. 
Fires and/or explosions from natural gas leaks in pipelines are rare. In part, the rarity of 
fires and/or explosions is due to the fact that natural gas is about 1/3rd less dense than 
ordinary air. Thus, leaking natural gas does not accumulate near the ground or “pond” in 
low-lying areas (as heavier gases such as liquefied natural gas or gasoline fumes may 
do). Instead, leaking natural gas rises rapidly and is dissipated by dilution in the 
atmosphere. The fires and /or explosions that do occur from natural gas leaks are 
generally in buildings where the confined space allows leaking gas to accumulate until 
ignited. Between 2000 and 2003 annual statistics of hazardous materials incidents5, 
prepared by the Office of State Fire Marshal, show a total of only 113 natural gas 
incidents statewide in Oregon. Most of these incidents were minor without casualties or 
significant damage. 
Pipeline breaks due to natural causes may occur due to landslides or earthquakes. 
Earthquake induced pipe breaks for natural gas transmission lines are most likely to occur 
in areas of soft soils subject to liquefaction and/or lateral spreading which cause 
significant pipe displacements. The most likely locations for such breaks during an 
earthquake are on slopes of soft ground near where pipelines cross rivers or streams. 
The most common man-made cause of pipeline breaks is pipeline rupture due to pipes 
breaking when heavy construction equipment is used to excavate for construction 
projects. Most such breaks occur in local distribution lines. Pipeline breaks can also be 
caused by deliberate actions of sabotage or terrorism. Although pipelines are not symbolic 
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targets with political, historical, and cultural significance, they are potential targets for 
terrorist actions. Major pipeline breaks could disrupt gas service over wide areas with 
resulting significant economic impacts. 
Natural gas utilities and local emergency responders are generally well prepared to deal 
with natural gas breaks, because such incidents occur frequently enough to have well-
standardized response procedures. Evacuations for natural gas distribution system 
pipeline ruptures are generally limited to the immediate area of the break. 
14.8 Reference Information for Hazardous Materials Incidents Emergency Response 
This section provides references to the appropriate Guide Number in the 2004 Emergency 
Response Guidebook, along with the corresponding initial isolation distances and 
protective action distances for a few common industrial chemicals. Initial isolation 
distances are given for both large and small spills. Protective action distances are given 
for both small and large spills and for day and night conditions. See Table 14.7 below; all 
of this information is from the 2004Emergency Response Guidebook. 
As per the 2004 Emergency Response Guidebook, small spills are defined as one that 
involves a single small package (e.g., a drum containing up to approximately 200 liters), a 
small cylinder or a small leak from a large package. A large spill is one that involves a spill 
from a large package or multiple spills from many small packages. For very large spills, 
that involve more than one tank car, cargo tank, portable tank or large cylinder, the large 
spill distances may need to be increased. 
As per the 2004 Emergency Response Guidebook, protective distances are defined in the 
downwind direction from the spill site. The width of the protective distance is equal to 50% 
of the downwind protect distance on each side of the wind direction. In other words, the 
total protect area is a square with sides equal to the defined protect distance. See Figure 
14.8 below from the 2004 Emergency Response Guidebook. 
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Figure 14.8 
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Table 14.7 
Extremely Hazardous Substances: Reference Data from 2000 Emergency Response Guide 
































Ammonia 125 Gases - corrosive 30 0.2 0.2 60 0.5 1.1 
Chlorine 124 Gases – toxic and/or corrosive - 
oxidizing 
30 0.3 1.1 275 2.7 6.8 
Hydrochloric 
acid1 
157 Substances – toxic and/or corrosive  
(non-combustible/water-sensitive) 
30 0.2 0.6 185 1.6 4.3 
Hydrofluoric acid` 157 Substances – toxic and/or corrosive  
(non-combustible/water-sensitive) 
30 0.2 0.6 125 1.1 2.9 
Sulfur dioxide 125 Gases – corrosive 30 0.3 1.1 185 3.1 7.2 
Sulfuric acid 137 Substances – water reactive - 
corrosive 
60 0.3 1.1 305 2.1 5.6 
 
1 For hydrochloric acid and hydrofluoric acid, the isolation and protect distances are for hydrogen chloride anhydrous and hydrogen 
fluoride anhydrous, respectively, because the 2000 ERG did not have specific listing for these acids. 
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See the 2004 Emergency Response Guide section on Introduction to the Table of Initial 
Isolation and Protective Action Distances (Page 311) for factors which may increase or 
decrease Protective Action Distances 
The 2004 Emergency Response Guidebook has excellent general guidance on the decision 
factors that govern protective actions appropriate for a given incident. This guidance is given 
below verbatim. 
The protective action distances given above in Table 14.7 are for general guidance only. For 
each specific hazardous material incident, the local jurisdiction Incident Commander, in 
consultation with the HazMat Response Team Branch Leader, makes incident specific decisions 
based on the specific conditions of each incident. 
PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION FACTORS TO CONSIDER 
“The choice of protective actions for a given situation depends on a number of factors. For some 
cases, evacuation may be the best option; in others, sheltering in-place may be the best course. 
Sometimes, these two actions may be used in combination. In any emergency, officials need to 
quickly give the public instructions. The public will need continuing information and instructions 
while being evacuated or sheltered-in-place. 
Proper evaluation of the factors below will determine the effectiveness of evacuation or in-place 
protection. The importance of these factors can vary with emergency conditions. In specific 
emergencies, other factors may need to be identified and considered as well. This list indicates 
what type of information may be needed to make the initial decision. 
The Dangerous Goods 
• Degree of health hazard 
• Amount involved 
• Containment/control of release 
• Rate of vapor movement 
The Population Threatened 
• Location 
• Number of people 
• Time available to evacuate or shelter in-place 
• Ability to control evacuation or shelter in-place 
• Building types and availability 
• Special institutions or population, e.g., nursing homes, hospitals, prisons 
Weather Conditions 
• Effect on vapor and cloud movement 
• Potential for change 
• Effect on evacuation or shelter-in-place” 
Evacuate means to move all people within the protective distance area to a safer place. To 
evacuate, there must be enough time for people to be warned, to get ready, and to leave the 
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area. If there is enough time, evacuation is usually the best protective action. Evacuations are 
usually progressive with the first evacuees being people closest to the incident location. 
Shelter in-place means that people within the protective distance area are advised to seek 
shelter inside a building and remain inside until the danger passes. Sheltering in-place is used 
when evacuation would cause greater risk than staying put, or when an evacuation cannot be 
performed. For shelter in-place, occupants are advised to close all doors and windows and to 
shut off all ventilating, heating and cooling systems. Shelter in-place may not be appropriate if: 
a) vapors are flammable, b) it will take a long time for the hazardous material to clear the area, 
c) if buildings cannot be closed tightly or d) the hazardous material incident may increase in 
severity (such as an ongoing fire that might result in release of additional quantities of the 
hazardous material) . 
14.9 Vulnerability and Risk Assessments 
As reviewed above in Sections 14.5 to 14.7, there are many fixed locations in Columbia County 
with inventories of hazardous materials and a considerable volume of hazardous materials 
being transported to, from, within, or through Columbia County. For both fixed and in transit 
hazardous materials, there is a wide variety of types and quantities of materials. 
Historically, the safety record for hazardous materials has been good, with relatively few, mostly 
minor hazmat incidents. Nevertheless, there is a potential for larger hazmat incidents in 
Columbia County. A brief synopsis of the probable impacts of hazmat incidents on Columbia 
County is given below in Table 14.9. 
Table 14.9 
Probable Impacts of Hazmat Incidents on Columbia County 
Inventory Probable Impacts
Portion of Columbia County affected
Most hazmat incident impacts would be localized near source of 
spill, but major spills could have extensive evacuation zones and 
affect a significant portion of a community in Columbia County
Buildings Negligible impact, except for explosion incidents very near buildings
Streets within Columbia County Temporary street closures likely
Roads to/from Columbia County Temporary road closures likely
Electric power Generally minor impacts, except for explosion incidents very near infrastructure 
Other Utilities
Generally minor impacts, except for explosion incidents very near 
infrastructure or spills which release hazardous materials into rivers 
or reservoirs providing public water supply
Casualties
Potential for casualties (deaths and injuries), depending on location 
and identify of hazardous material(s) involved, time of day and 
effectiveness of evacuations  
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14.10 SUMMARY AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES 
14.10.1 Planning and Response 
Hazardous materials vary dramatically in their degree of toxicity to humans. The impact of a 
hazardous material release incident on an affected community depends on several factors 
including: 
a. the toxicity of the hazardous material, 
b. the quantity of the hazardous material released, 
c. the dispersal characteristics of the hazardous material, 
d. the local conditions such as wind direction and topography, and 
e. the efficacy of response and recovery actions. 
Effective mitigation planning and effective emergency response planning can help reduce the 
number or frequency of hazardous materials incidents and also reduce the severity of incidents 
that do occur. In combination, these benefits can significantly reduce the negative impacts of 
hazardous materials incidents on affected communities. The general principles of mitigation 
planning, emergency response planning (and training) are well standardized and practiced by 
Columbia County. 
Perhaps the single most critical factor in enhancing both mitigation planning and emergency 
response planning is specific inventory awareness for major hazardous materials sites within 
each jurisdiction. Specific inventory awareness means detailed knowledge of the types of 
hazardous materials, quantities of hazardous materials and locations of every location in a 
jurisdiction with significant quantities of hazardous materials. In this context, what constitutes a 
significant quantity varies depending on the toxicity of the material, the dispersal characteristics 
and the nature and population of nearby areas likely to be affected by hazardous materials 
incidents. 
The Office of State Fire Marshall’s Hazardous Substance Information System (HSIS) database 
contains a vast amount of information on the inventories of hazardous materials at fixed 
locations in Columbia County. This detailed inventory information along with data on hazardous 
materials being transported within or through Columbia County, provides the basic data for 
specific inventory awareness. In combination, with the chemical data and emergency response 
information provided in the 2004 Emergency Response Guide and in other sources, these are 
the basic data necessary for effective planning and effective emergency response. 
The complexity and overload of information is compounded by numerous labeling, placarding, 
and classification systems for hazardous materials, with countless cross references to guide 
numbers, material safety reports and so on. Because of this vast amount of complex 
information, effective mitigation planning and emergency response planning must occur before 
an incident occurs, not after. During an incident, the most effective response is precluded and 
impossible to achieve if emergency personnel are thumbing through databases trying to figure 
out what hazardous materials are at a given location and what the appropriate response 
precautions and protocols are for the specific materials involved in a hazardous materials 
incident. 
Specific inventory awareness means that for every site with hazardous materials of sufficient 
toxicity, dispersal characteristics and quantities to pose a significant life safety risk to on-site 
employees and nearby residents must be identified in advance. Ideally, Columbia County 
should have detailed specific inventory awareness of every significant fixed site in its 
jurisdiction. Similarly, each jurisdiction should have specific inventory awareness of the most 
toxic, most common, large volume shipments of hazardous materials within and through the 
jurisdiction. For each hazardous material deemed to pose a significant life safety threat, the 
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necessary chemical data, response protocols, initial isolation distances, protection distances for 
small and large spills, and all other data necessary for safe and effective response should be 
compiled and readily available before incidents occur. 
14.10.2 Mitigation Measures 
Specific inventory awareness is one cornerstone of reducing the potential for negative impacts 
from hazardous materials incidents by helping to optimize emergency planning and response 
planning. The other cornerstone is pro-active mitigation actions to reduce the number and 
severity of hazardous materials incidents. 
The most common mitigation measures for reducing the potential of damaging hazardous 
materials incidents are briefly summarized below. 
14.10.2.1 Physical Safety Measures 
The tanks, other storage containers and transfer systems (valves, pipes etc.) for hazardous 
materials are frequently subject to damage in earthquakes, with a correspondingly high potential 
for accidental releases. Proper seismic design, bracing and anchoring of storage systems for 
hazardous materials can greatly reduce the potential of accidental releases during earthquakes. 
Bracing and anchoring measures for storage containers and transfer systems (e.g., piping) are 
often relatively inexpensive, with a large improvement in seismic performance. For small 
quantities of materials stored in bottles or jugs on shelving, bracing shelving and restraining 
containers so that they do not fall in earthquakes are particularly important. 
Over time, the storage containers and other material handling elements for hazardous materials 
may be changed many times. In some cases, later modifications may not be designed to the 
same seismic standards as the original installation or later modifications may compromise the 
seismic stability of the original installation. Therefore, periodic review and inspections of seismic 
design, bracing and anchoring are highly recommended for all hazardous material facilities. 
For facilities located in mapped flood plains or other areas subject to floodwaters there are two 
important physical safety measures. First, any containers subject to floating should be properly 
restrained. In many floods, improperly restrained tanks break free and float downstream, with 
high potential for negative impacts, including fires from tanks containing flammable materials as 
well as accidental releases of hazardous materials. Second, special precautions should be 
taken with water-reactive materials. Such materials should never be stored in low-elevation 
areas subject to flooding or in locations subject to water from storm water drainage or plumbing 
failures in a facility. 
14.10.2.2 Standard Operating Procedures 
Standard operating procedures for storing, transporting, and handling hazardous materials 
should be strictly enforced at all facilities. Appropriate training for all staff, with review courses 
and appropriate protective gear are essential for safety. Rigorous inspection and enforcement of 
hazardous materials regulations (federal, state, and local) are an important part of the overall 
process of ensuring safety. 
14.10.2.3 Mitigation and Emergency Response Planning 
Effective pre-event mitigation planning and emergency response planning can help reduce the 
severity of hazardous material incidents. From the mitigation planning perspective, specific 
inventory awareness of the types and quantities of hazardous materials present at each facility 
is particularly important for emergency response. Local fire departments and other responders 
should be thoroughly familiar with the specific inventory at each facility containing hazardous 
materials and with the appropriate response protocols for each hazardous material. First 
responders and emergency response teams must both have the full range of protective gear 
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and equipment necessary for their respective roles in responding to hazardous materials 
incidents. 
Emergency response planning should include thorough training in all aspects of hazardous 
materials response, including appropriate response protocols (procedures, protective gear and 
equipment). Frequent refresher training and frequent exercises (both tabletop and full field 
exercises) are essential for safe and effective emergency response. Training exercises should 
include both first responders and emergency response teams, to help ensure appropriate 
coordination of efforts during actual hazardous materials incidents. 
The table on the following page has hazmat mitigation action items from the master Action 
Items table in Chapter 4. 
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Table 14.10 





































































Hazmat Incident Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Ensure that first responders have readily available 
site-specific knowledge of hazardous chemical 
inventories in Columbia County
local fire and law enforcement 
agencies 1 year X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Enhance emergency planning, emergency response 
training and equipment to address hazardous 
materials incidents.
local fire and law enforcement 
agencies Ongoing X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Evaluate existing security measures for sites with 
large quantities of hazardous materials or any 
quantities of extremely hazardous substances and 
enhance security as necessary
local facility managers 1 year X X X X X
Short-Term     
#4
Evaluate seismic bracing/anchoring for sites with 
large quantities of hazardous materials or any 
quantities of extremely hazardous substances and 
upgrade as necessary
local facility managers 1-2 years X X X X X
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
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15.0 TERRORISM  
15.1 Overview 
For mitigation planning, terrorism is broadly inclusive of a wide range of deliberate 
malevolent acts intended to damage buildings or infrastructure or to result in deaths and 
injuries. The possibility of international terrorist organizations targeting Columbia County, is 
not zero, but is most likely small. However, Columbia County is certainly subject to deliberate 
malevolent acts from many sources including vandals, mentally disturbed individuals, 
domestic terrorist groups (e.g., eco-terrorists), as well as by disgruntled residents, and past 
or present employees. 
The range of possible malevolent actions includes vandalism, arson, explosions and armed 
attacks, as well as use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials. Chemical 
attacks include deliberate release of on-site chemicals as well as deliberate dispersal of 
transported hazardous materials. Biological attacks include deliberate dispersal of 
biologically active materials (e.g., anthrax) capable of causing sickness or death. 
Radiological attacks include deliberate dispersal of radioactive materials, via dirty bombs 
(conventional explosives laced with radioactive materials) or other methods. Nuclear attacks 
include explosion of nuclear devices and the radioactive fallout from such explosions. 
The range of possible malevolent actions also includes cyber-terrorism, or deliberate 
disruption/damage of computer systems and data. Especially for utility systems, cyber-
terrorism can also result in loss of service due to disruption/damage to automated SCADA 
(Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems widely used by utilities. 
15.2 Threat Spectrum 
For purposes of mitigation planning, we consider three sources of terrorist (malevolent) 
actions: outsiders, insiders, and hackers. In each case, we consider three levels of attack, 
with the levels reflecting the numbers of individuals involved, the level of technical knowledge 
or expertise, and the level of equipment or tools available. This threat spectrum is 
summarized below in Table 15.1. 
In Table 15.1, outsider means anyone who is not an employee of the facility under potential 
terrorist attack. Outsiders could be vandals, disturbed individuals, or members of domestic or 
international organized groups. For Columbia County, the most likely terrorist or malevolent 
acts are minor vandalism or actions by disturbed individuals or employees. Deliberate 
terrorist actions are most likely from domestic groups, including eco-terrorists, and are less 
likely to be from international organizations. 
In Table 15.1, insider means anyone who is an employee of the target under potential attack. 
Acts of vandalism, theft and other relatively minor actions are common. Larger scale 
malevolent acts are less common but still occur with some frequency. Such acts include 
larger scale damage, arson, explosives, and actions such as deliberate contamination of 
water supplies. 
In Table 15.1, computer hacker means individuals or groups using remote access to explore, 
vandalize, or destroy websites, computer databases and such. For utility systems, hackers 
can also impact SCADA systems and may affect system operations directly. 
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Table 15.1 
Threat Spectrum for Terrorist Actions 
Adversary Number of Adversaries Level of Knowledge
Equipment 
Tools Weapons Objectives
Outsider: high level 1 to small group
Extensive knowledge of 
security systems, 





handguns or automatic 
weapons, incendiary devices, 
explosives, contaminants
Extensive damage to critical 
facilities, widespread 
damage or casualties
Outsider: medium level 1 to 3
Limited knowledge of 
security systems, 





handguns, incendiary devices, 
explosives, contaminants Damage or casualties
Outsider: low level 1 or 2
Minimal knowledge of 
security systems, 
facilities and modes of 
attack
hand tools None Vandalism, damage or casualties
Insider: high level 1








handguns or automatic 
weapons, incendiary devices, 
explosives, contaminants
Damage or casualties
Insider: mediujm level 1








handguns, incendiary devices, 
explosives, contaminants Damage or casualties
Insider: low level 1








handgun or none Vandalism, damage or casualties
Hacker:  high level 1 to small group








Destruction of data and 
systems, business 
operations
Hacker:  medium level 1 or 2
Moderate knowledge of 








Denial of servcie or 
disruption of some business 
services
Hacker:  low level 1




N/A N/A Minor cyber-vandalism to non-critical business areas
 
 
The probable impacts of terrorist events on Columbia County are summarized below in Table 
15.2. For Columbia County, the most likely terrorist (or other malevolent) events are small 
scale events such as: 
1. vandalism 
2. minor damage by insiders (disgruntled employees) 
3. minor damage by outsiders (extremist groups, mentally disturbed individuals),  
4. computer hacking events, and 
5. eco-terrorist actions. 
Larger scale events by domestic or international groups are possible, but appear relatively 
unlikely for Columbia County, because there do not appear to be many targets of national 
significance in Columbia County. However, facilities with higher than usual concern for 
potential terrorism attacks include the following: 
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• Boise Cascade. A large employer in St. Helens with various quantities of hazardous 
materials. 
• Point Westward industrial area, which includes industrial facilities and a power 
generation facility. Beaver Creek power generation plant is part of the Bonneville 
Power Grid. 
• Columbia Meadows where summary concerts attracting up to 30,000 or 40,000 
people are held. This location is also next to a large chemical industrial facility. 
• Trojan Nuclear Plant – decommissioned 
• Lewis and Clark Bridge between Rainier, Oregon and Longview, Washington. 
• Natural Gas field and pipeline in Mist, Oregon 
The potential impacts of terrorism incidents on Columbia County are summarized in Table 
15.2 below. 
Table 15.2 
Probable Impacts of Terrorist Incidents on Columbia County 
Inventory Probable Impacts
Portion of Columbia County affected Localized impacts for minor incidents, large portions or the entire County for extremely unlikely major incidents
Buildings Localized impacts to a single building or a few nearby buildings, except for extremely unlikely major incidents
Streets within Columbia County Some incidents may include temporary street closures
Roads to/from Columbia County Some incidents may include temporary road closures
Electric power Some incidents may include temporary loss of electric power in localized parts of Columbia County or for the entire County
Other Utilities
Some incidents may include temporary loss of utilities in localized 
parts of Columbia County or for the entire County.  Major damage 
to water or wastewater treatment plants could result in full or partial 
loss of service for extended time periods
Casualties
Small scale incidents may have no casualties or a small number of 
casualties.  Possible, but unlikely, major events may result in 
significant casualties (deaths and injuries)  
15.3 Mitigation Actions 
Evaluation of the threat of terrorist or other malevolent actions generally includes several 
steps: 
1. determine critical facilities, 
2. identify the specific adverse consequences to be avoided, 
3. review the likelihood of malevolent actions, 
4. evaluate existing countermeasures, and 
5. implement a prioritized risk reduction plan. 
For Columbia County, critical facilities include key elements of the water systems, electric 
power substations, facilities with large quantities of hazardous materials or any quantities of 
extremely hazardous materials (cf. Chapter 14) and important public facilities such as police 
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The most likely adverse consequences are vandalism and minor destructive actions by 
outsiders, insiders, or hackers. The evaluation of existing countermeasures should include: 
1. Physical security measures, such as fencing, locks and key control, structural integrity 
of critical assets, and detection capabilities such as intrusion detection systems, 
alarms, operational alarms for utility systems, and general security/access issues, 
2. Cyber security measures, such as protection measures for business/operational 
computer systems and SCADA systems, including fire walls, access, security policies 
and protocols, including vendor access and system diagnostics, and 
3. Security procedures and polices, such as personnel security, physical 
security, key and badge control, system control and operational data, 
chemical and other vendor deliveries, as well as security and emergency 
response training, exercises and drills. 
For Columbia County vigilance and modest upgrades to existing physical security, cyber 
security, and security procedures and policies are probably all that are reasonably required. 
For the highest profile buildings or facilities, barriers to restrict vehicles reaching close 
proximity to the building or facility, to the extent practical, might also warrant consideration. 
The potential impacts of terrorism or other malevolent deliberate actions in Columbia County 
can also be mitigated by improving emergency response capabilities. Some types of actions, 
such as fires or explosions, are self-evident and emergency responders are well trained for 
dealing with such situations. 
Other types of actions such as release of radiological materials, bioterrorism, or 
contamination of water or food supplies may not be immediately recognized. For such types 
of actions, close cooperation with public health officials and awareness of the possibility of 
deliberate actions are important. Such situations also commonly require specialized 
expertise and equipment to detect and identify the radiological, biological or chemical 
materials used in an attack. Emergency response plans should be updated and expanded, 
as necessary, to cover such situations, including protocols for public notifications and 
information about appropriate public responses such as shelter in place or evacuation. 
The following table contains terrorism mitigation action items from the master Action Items 
table in Chapter 4.
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Table 15.3 





































































Terrorism Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Enhance emergency planning, emergency response 
training and equipment to address potential terrorism  
incidents.
local fire and law enforcement 
agencies, facility managers Ongoing X X X X X
Long-Term     
#1
Upgrade physical security detection and response 
capability for critical facilities, including water systems 
and for any high-profile facilities such as major timber 
industry facilities and sites with large quantities of 
hazardous materials
facility managers 5 Years X X X X X
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
  
15-31 






































































Flood Mitigation Action Items:  Within FEMA-Mapped Floodplains
Short-Term     
#1
Complete inventory of critical facilities within 100-year 
and 500-year floodplains, with GIS mapping if 
possible
Columbia County (Land 
Development Services, Roads, 
Assessor), cities, special districts
Ongoing X X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Complete inventory of residential and commercial 
buildings within 100-year and 500-year floodplains, 
with GIS mapping if possible
Columbia County (Land 
Development Services, Roads, 
Assessor), cities, special districts
Ongoing X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Consult with property owners and explore mitigation 
actions for any Columbia County properties on 
FEMA's national repetitive loss list
Columbia County Hazard Mitigation 
Advisory Committee 1 year X X X X
Long-Term     
#1
Survey elevation data for critical facilities, residential 
buildings and commercial buildings within the 100-
year floodplain and establish flood mitigation priorities
Local emergency services, 
Columbia County Hazard Mitigation 
Advisory Committee
2-5 years X X X X X
Long-Term     
#2
For critical facilities within the 100-year floodplain and 
for other structures deep within the 100-year 
floodplain explore mitigation options with property 
owners and implement mitigation measures
Local emergency services, 
Columbia County Hazard Mitigation 
Advisory Committee
2-10 years X X X X X
Flood Mitigation Action Items:  Outside of FEMA-Mapped Floodplains
Short-Term     
#1
Complete the inventory of locations in Columbia 
County subject to frequent storm water flooding
Columbia County (Land 
Development Services, Roads, 
Assessor), cities, special districts
Ongoing X X X X X
Long-Term     
#1
For locations with repetitive flooding and significant 
damages or road closures, determine and implement 
mitigation measures such as upsizing culverts or 
storm water drainage ditches
Columbia County (Land 
Development Services, Roads, 
Assessor), cities, special districts
Ongoing X X X X X
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline






































































Earthquake Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Complete inventory of public and commercial 
buildings that may be particularly vulnerable to 
earthquake damage
County, cities, special districts 1-2 Years X X X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Complete inventory of wood-frame residential 
buildings that may be particularly vulnerable to 
earthquake damage, including pre-1940s homes and 
homes with cripple wall foundations.
County, cities 1-2 Years X X X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Disseminate FEMA pamphlets to educate 
homeowners about structural and non-structural 
retrofitting of vulnerable homes and encourage retrofit
Columbia County Hazard Mitigation 
Advisory Committee Ongoing X X X X
Short-Term     
#4
Complete seismic vulnerability analysis of important 
public facilities with significant seismic vulnerabilities County, cities, special districts 1-2 Years X X X X X
Long-Term     #1 Obtain funding and retrofit important public facilities with significant seismic vulnerabilities County, cities, special districts 10 years X X X X X
Long-Term     #2 Retrofit bridges that are not seismically adequate for lifeline transportation routes ODOT, County, cities, roads X X X X X
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed






































































Landslide Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Complete the inventory of locations where critical 
facilities, other buildings and infrastructure are subject 
to landslides
Columbia County Land 
Development Services, cities (public 
works)
1-2 Years X X X X X
Long-Term     
#1
Consider landslide mitigation actions for slides 
seriously threatening critical facilities, other buildings 
or infrastructure
Columbia County Hazard Mitigation 
Advisory Committee 5 Years X X X X X
Long-Term     
#2
Limit future development in high landslide potential 
areas
Columbia County Land 
Development Services, cities Ongoing X X X X X
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed






































































Utility and Transportation System Disruption Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Educate and encourage residents to maintain several 
days of emergency supplies for power outages or 
road closures
Columbia County Hazard Mitigation 
Advisory Committee, CEPA Ongoing X X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Review and update emergency response plans for 
disruptions of utilities or roads
local emergency service agencies, 
CEPA 1-2 Years X X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Ensure that all critical facilities in Columbia County 
have backup power and emergency operations plans 
to deal with power outages
local emergency service agencies, 
CEPA 1-2 Years X X X X
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Wildland/Urban Interface Fire Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Identify specific parts of Columbia County at high risk 
for urban/wildland urban interface fires because of 
fuel loading, topography and prevailing construction 
practices
County Fire Defense Board, fire 
agencies 1-2 Years X X X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Identify evacuation routes and procedures for high 
risk areas and educate the public
County Fire Defense Board, fire 
agencies, law enforcement, County 
Roads, public works
Ongoing X X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Develop Community Wildand Fire Protection Plans for 
all at-risk communities County, cities, fire agencies, ODF 1-2 Years X X X X X
Long-Term     
#1
Encourage fire-safe construction practices for existing 
and new construction in high risk areas
County Land Development 
Services, city building departments, 
fire agencies
Ongoing X X X X X
Long-Term     
#2
Enhance home landscape cleanup (defensible space) 
and debris disposal programs
County Land Development 
Services, city building departments, 
fire agencies
Ongoing X X X X X
Long-Term     
#3
Identify potential fuel breaks and fuel reduction zones 
and implement mitigation actions
County Land Development 
Services, city building departments, 
fire agencies
Ongoing X X X X X
Long-Term     
#4
Implement SB360 Wildland Urban Interface Act of 
1997 in Columbia County
County Land Development 
Services, city building departments, 
fire agencies
5-10 years X X X X X
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Winter Storms Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Complete the inventory of locations in Columbia 
County subject to frequent storm water flooding Columbia County Roads, cities Ongoing X X X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Enhance tree trimming efforts especially for 
transmission lines and trunk distribution lines.
BPA, West Oregon Electric Coop, 
local PUDs Ongoing X X X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Encourage prudent tree planting (avoid service lines) 
and safe, professional tree trimming where necessary
Columbia County Hazard Mitigation 
Advisory Committee Ongoing X X X
Short-Term     
#4
Ensure that all critical facilities in Columbia County 
have backup power and emergency operations plans 
to deal with power outages
Local emergency services, 
Columbia County Hazard Mitigation 
Advisory Committee
1-2  Years X X
Long-Term     
#1
For locations with repetitive flooding and significant 
damages or road closures, determine and implement 
mitigation measures such as upsizing culverts or 
storm water drainage ditches
Columbia County Roads, cities Ongoing X X X X X
Long-Term     
#2
Consider upgrading lines and poles to improve 
wind/ice loading, undergrounding critical lines, and 
adding interconnect switches to allow alternative feed 
paths and disconnect switches to minimize outage 
areas
BPA, West Oregon Electric Coop, 
local PUDs 5 Years X X X X X
Long-Term     
#3
Encourage new developments to include underground 
power lines
Columbia County Land 
Development Services, cities ongoing X X X X X
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
 
 
